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13 November 1979

# West Europe Report

No. 1499

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

NETHERLANDS

CDA OPPOSES NUCLEAR ARMS MODERNIZATION, DEPLOYMENT

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 20 Oct 79 pp 50-51

[Article by Rene de Bok: "NATO Modernization: CDA Position Could Break Up Cabinet"]

[Text] There is a latent crisis in Dutch politics, and within the Atlantic defense pact it seems as if a clash between the coalition partners is only a question of time. The reason for this is the replacement of obsolete nuclear weapons and the installation of nearly 600 Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles which can carry nuclear loads over the Soviet Union: as a nuclear response to the Russian SS-20 missiles. There are serious reservations, particularly within the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], about a permanent continuation of the arms race with the Soviet Union. In the opinion of a growing number of CDA parliamentary party members in the House this would be more than worth a cabinet crisis.

During the latest negotiations between the technical NATO experts in Brussels, the controversies about the choice of new tactical nuclear arms have been cleared away. They are now working intensively at preparing the nuclear arms decisions which the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs of the NATO member states will be making on 12 and 13 December. For the time being, within the European context the Scandinavian countries -- which at this time do not have any nuclear weapons on their soil -- and the Netherlands are the main impediments. In the meantime, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has expressed willingness to allow the stationing of new nuclear weapons on his territory, provided that other European countries do not lag behind. In Brussels, the attitude of the Dutch Christian Democrats is considered to be decisive for the Dutch position in the negotiations. Within the CDA, disagreement about the Dutch position is growing. A growing number of CDA parliamentary party members in the House are turning against the energetic plans of NATO Supreme Commanders Haig and Rogers (and also Secretary General Luns) to push the plans through as quickly as possible. Within the CDA, this alienation also threatens to produce rough going

between the anti-nuclear weapons lobby and CDA Minister of Defense Scholten who very recently has repeatedly stressed the inevitability of the introduction of new nuclear weapons systems. His thesis implies that in the end an imbalance between the Eastern and the Western bloc with regard to the so-called gray area weapons -- nuclear weapons with a range between nuclear battlefield weapons and strategic nuclear weapons -- could have an unsettling effect. He noted that NATO's lag in this area is growing. In an explanatory statement on the defense budget, Minister Scholten wrote: "The combat forces of the Soviet Union are more than ever capable of making a surprise attack with a short preparatory period. The shift of NATO's military balance of power continues unabated in Europe as well as at sea. By itself, the alliance still has sufficient land and air combat forces to carry out a forward defense successfully, but the problem of the increasingly shorter warning period is becoming more intense."

Within the CDA, statements such as Scholten's are ever more frequently being identified as cold war philosophies. CDA defense expert J. de Boer strongly doubts the need for a military response to the Russian SS-20 missile. His colleague A. Frinking has also made negative comments about the introduction of new nuclear weapons on European soil. Frinking takes the position that NATO should first exhaust all channels of negotiation with the Soviet Union with regard to reducing nuclear weapons before the treaty organization makes a decision on modernizing the NATO nuclear force. He believes that NATO has until 1983 to make a final decision. If continuing negotiations were not to lead to a limitation in the production of nuclear arms in the Soviet Union, then the NATO ministers could still decide to introduce medium range nuclear arms. Frinking raises a warning finger against "overreaction" on the part of the Western alliance. The anti-nuclear arms lobby in the CDA is a factor which the government should not underestimate. The ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] is playing a dominant role in the background, as witnessed, for example, by the words of antirevolutionary House member M. Beinema. He believes that "the CDA parliamentary party will continue to take a strong position on the subject of reducing nuclear weapons." The CDA parliamentary party does not believe that the government will be able to come up with new arguments which would lead them to deviate from this position. "It should not be assumed," said Beinema, "that the CDA positions are not to be taken so seriously. On the contrary, the discussion between the cabinet and the parliamentary party has been such that really new arguments cannot be expected."

And thus the material for conflict between the Christian-Democratic-Liberal government coalition on the one hand and the CDA on the other is heaped up sky-high. Because Ministers Scholten of defense and Van der Klaauw of foreign affairs do not appear willing as yet to slow down the process of introduction of new nuclear arms within NATO context. Not even following Russian President Leonid Brezhnev's offer to pull back medium range missiles if NATO does not introduce a similar nuclear weapon. VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] Minister Van der Klaauw's position in a nutshell is: "The decision concerning new nuclear missiles in Western Europe cannot be deferred as a result of Brezhnev's proposals." The real significance

of the Russian offer has to be weighed "against the still enormous superiority of the Warsaw Pact side in terms of troops and conventional weapons."

In the internal discussion about NATO plans within the CDA, two interesting developments have occurred in recent weeks. The first involves the report of a CDA study group led by H.J. Neuman, in which they agree with the possible introduction of new nuclear arms in Western Europe as a response to the Russian gray area weapons. The first reactions to this report from within their own Christian Democratic camp were hardly encouraging for Neuman and his scientific staff. According to the president of ARJOS [expansion unknown], Klaas de Vries, the report reduced the credibility of the CDA. De Vries accused Neuman of waging "guerrilla warfare against the position of the CDA parliamentary party in the House."

The second important development was the attitude of CDA parliamentary party Chairman Lubbers, who up to now had held to a moderate position. During the general debate, Lubbers somewhat abandoned this reserved attitude. He called on the Van Agt administration to play a more active role in favor of arms limitation during NATO discussions about new nuclear weapons in Western Europe. He displayed obvious displeasure with the policy followed up to then by Ministers Scholten and Van der Klaauw. Thus, Lubbers removed himself in no uncertain manner from the careful plea in favor of the introduction of new nuclear weapons from the Neuman side. Lubbers: "We are at an historic moment. Are we going to succeed in keeping the first steps in arms control going and in strengthening them, or are we going to slide back into escalation, whereby nuclear arms control is only given lip service? The Netherlands should guard against playing too passive a role within the alliance and against being swept away into the historical legalities of military alliances."

This is a politically important statement which appears to give the measure of the CDA position against the Van Agt administration's nuclear arms policy. In the meantime, Ministers Van der Klaauw and Scholten have already intimated that they want to tie their cabinet seats to the Dutch position.

In this context, the attitude of some prominent individuals in the PvdA [Labor Party] is not without significance. At the time of his return from Moscow, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Stoel made a statement which, according to the present CDA view, puts him squarely in the ranks of /cold war/ [printed in italics] ideologues. It cannot be ruled out that the Van der Stoel approach could have a restraining effect on the anti-nuclear arms lobby within the CDA. As matters stand now, it looks as if the confrontation between the CDA and the administration will lead to a direct clash in the next few months, whereby in any case the portfolio of CDA Minister of Defense Scholten will be placed in the balance. Unless -- and this is not uncommon within the CDA either -- the uncompromising retrace their footsteps on the high wire. One has only to recall the example of Van Houwelingen, the CDA member who was about to force a cabinet crisis during the URENCO [Uranium Enrichment Consortium] debate, but who

at the very last moment turned himself and his principles around. The fact that the anti-nuclear arms lobby must also be considered capable of avoiding the threatened confrontation with the Van Agt administration was proven when CDA defense expert Prinking introduced a nuance in his generally positive reaction to the Brezhnev speech: "It is too bad that at practically the same time as Brezhnev's speech, the largest military parade of all times was taking place in East Berlin." On the eve of the debate between the CDA and the Van Agt administration, it looks as if the atmosphere of conflict does after all have a purifying effect on ideas concerning threats and simulated threats from the Soviet Union.

2-23  
CGO: 3105

## LATEST TURKISH IRRITATION WITH GREECE REFLECTED IN PRESS

## 'TERCUMAN' Advises Against Hostility

NC250805 Istanbul TER CUMAN in Turkish 22 Oct 79 p 1, 11 NC

[Article by Nazli Ilicak: "Discord in our Ranks"]

[Excerpts] On Saturday evening, the television network broadcast a short commentary vehemently criticizing Greece for coveting (?) Turkish territory.

If we knew the authority behind this commentary, we could make our appraisal accordingly. For instance, if it was the office of the chief of the general staff, the matter should be viewed seriously. That would mean that Greece has really carried its provocative acts to excess.

But if this commentary reflects the views and thoughts of the Turkish radio and television network, then we would look for bad faith. If for nothing else, we would look for exaggeration and excessive zeal.

We stand to gain nothing from inciting Turco-Greek hostility. Greece does not pose a danger to Turkey's territorial integrity. There should be no deviation from the target, and the Turkish nation should not be reduced to the position of Don Quixote tilting at windmills.

States do not have permanent friends and enemies. They only have national interests. It is in the interests of Turkey at present to develop its relations with Greece, with which we are in the same alliance and with which we share the same system.

Greece has, for the past 10 years, seen great economic development. It is rapidly increasing its national income and offering its society greater prosperity. Under Karamanlis' premiership Greece has regained the esteem it had lost under the rule of the colonels' junta: it has approached the outside world and become an indivisible part of the West. The troubled and poverty-stricken Greece of the 1960's has been replaced by a strong state which has also managed to become a member of the common market.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been busy with its internal affairs all this time. We must first eradicate this seed of discord which is corroding us. Let us unanimously help our country to recover from this malady. It is only then that we can protect our national interests. If we fail to do so, we are doomed to lose both in the Aegean and in Cyprus. And that is not all: we might even become a ruined country in which various states would act arbitrarily as their interests dictated. The United States wants an obedient Turkey. Therefore, it wants us to remain weak. For Carter would thus have a silent, respectful and undignified Turkey in Russia's lap as against Brezhnev's Cuba in the American lap.

The same can be said of the Soviet Union. This superpower, which oppresses millions of Turks and Muslims, supports the liberation (!) of the "peoples." It never ceases to bother Turkey in this respect. Even though it is unable to turn it into another Finland at least. That is, by condemning Turkey to an excessively dependent internal and external policy, it aims at destroying another flank of NATO.

To incite hostility against Greece at this stage, when various interests are in conflict, would mean deviating from the main target. Turkey must regain its strength if it is going to be able to cope with the dangers surrounding it. It is not our enemies so much as the discord among ourselves that will destroy us.

#### 'HURRIYET' Warns of Greek 'Designs'

NC250756 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 24 Oct 79 p 3 NC

[Article by Oktay Eksi: "Through the Minds of Others"]

[Excerpts] The National Security Council stated in a communique which was carried in yesterday's newspapers: "Taking into consideration the fact that Greece has recently been taking a more negative attitude toward Turkey and the Aegean Sea question and that it has been resorting to various new designs, the National Security Council has made an appraisal of the situation and of likely developments, and it has decided to continue its work in this respect."

It needs no stressing that "these designs", as Turkey has indicated, are largely confined to the attacks on our diplomats. The Turkish Government believes that the Armenian underground organizations enjoy Greece's support. It is also widely believed that circles trying to make Turkey disintegrate are using Greece as a plotting base. If this is the case, what does Greece stand to gain from disrupting relations which had shown some improvement during the past 2 years?

In reality, Greece stands to gain nothing in the long run. However, we have no doubt that certain centers which are using Greece as a means to an end have vested interests in such activities. For the greater the conflict between the two countries, the more the Aegean will turn into a "scene of conflagration," and only countries wishing to have access to and to settle in

the Mediterranean will benefit from such a conflagration. To attain this aim, it is not unlikely that they may have said to Greece: "We have no objection to your extending your territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles."

If, however, the Greeks are tempted by such recommendations, and decide to risk a confrontation with Turkey, let us put it in a friendly manner, they are blundering. For the price they will have to pay will be extremely high.

#### Greek Church Blamed

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Oct 79 p 3 NC

[*"The World Today"* column by Ali Sirmen: "Izmir--the Lost Fatherland"]

[Excerpts] "Izmir--the Lost Fatherland" is the name of a TV film which was shown on the Greek armed forces television network. In fact, this film is just one of many attempts intended to instill animosity toward Turkey into the minds of the people, an animosity which is currently being intensified in the Western Aegean.

Unfortunately, the Greek bourgeois collaborators and the abominable Greek Church are trying to instill the megalο-idea into the souls of the people as an element of spite for the purpose of agitating them against us.

The truth is that the Greeks are a people who have struggled against adverse conditions of nature, felt compelled to emigrate to other countries on various occasions, and fought bourgeois collaborators and the Nazi hordes invading their country. They are industrious, patriotic and sympathetic. But unfortunately, the Greek Church which, through spite, is burning with a desire to suck blood, tends to push these people into unending adventures.

Working together with Karamanlis and Papandreu, the Greek bourgeois believes that it has chosen the most opportune moment to embark on action against Turkey and to spread and augment feelings of animosity against the Turks.

But today, from an economic, social and political angle, Turkey is in a difficult position. Everybody knows how difficult it is for the Turkish nation, which is now dying through the bullets of its own fascists, to fight against a foreign enemy. That is why the fat Greek Church working with the Greek bourgeois collaborators think that it has chosen the best time to go into action against Turkey.

However, history shows that they are making a gross mistake. The Greeks tried the same trick in 1920. "The enemies plotting against the existence of Turkey in 1920 happened to be the agents of a victory unparalleled in the history of the world. Through force or intrigue, all the fortresses of our beloved fatherland were captured, all its arsenals seized, all its armed forces scattered and every corner of our country was actually occupied. Still more deplorable and perilous than these conditions, those in power at home

were deluded and misguided--in fact, they were even traitors. These rulers even went to the extent of reconciling their personal interests with the political aspirations of the invaders. Through poverty and distress, the nation felt ruined and exhausted."

That was the position of Turkey then. It was indeed difficult to move the people into action against the invader. We are thankful to our Greek neighbors for sharpening their appetite and for embarking on an expedition in Anatolia. This expedited the flow of our history. The people rapidly recovered from the shock of such circumstances and resorted to arms more easily. The rest was not difficult.

That day Turkey emerged from a difficult situation into brighter days. Turkey will do the same today. It is up to Greece to assume its past role now that Turkey is again in the grip of difficult times.

If it does so, 20 years from now the Greek armed forces may televise a new film called: "The Aegean Islands--the Lost Fatherland."

CSO: 4907

## BRIEFS

COOPERATION ON NICOSIA PLANNING--Lelos Dhimitriadhis, chairman of the Nicosia municipal committee, and Mr Akinci, in charge of municipal affairs in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, held a meeting at the Ledra Palace Hotel today to discuss the coordinated and uniform development of Nicosia. The meeting was held under the chairmanship of Mr Dalal, representative of the UN Development Program, and also attended by experts from both sides. At the meeting, it was agreed that both sides should cooperate closely toward drafting a central town planning program for all of Nicosia. It was also agreed that the UN Development Fund should provide experts from the "habitat" housing foundation to assist in preparing the necessary documents for formulating the central town planning program, which will be financed by the UN Development Fund. It was also agreed that experts from both sides should hold regular conferences to discuss various aspects of the plan. Speaking at the meeting, Mr Dalal described the plan as very significant because, as he put it, Nicosia was rich in historical monuments and, even more importantly, because its citizens came from two separate ethnic communities that have lived together for centuries. He added: this has given the town as a whole its particular political and social characteristics. [Text] [NC 241647 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1500 GMT 24 Oct 79 NC]

CSO: 4908

## QUEBEC BY-ELECTIONS SAID TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY REFERENDUM

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 18 Sep 79 p A6

[Editorial by Jacques Dumais]

[Text] No one knows yet the exact day in November that Prime Minister Rene Levesque will choose for by-elections in the districts of Beauce-Sud, Prevost, and Maisonneuve. But judging from the poorly concealed nervousness of PQ [Parti Quebecois] dignitaries on Sunday, when Pierre Harvey was chosen as standard bearer of the government's candidates in Prevost, the battle is going to be a tough and exciting one.

Harvey was the PQ's candidate in the Outremont election won by Liberal Andre Raynauld in November 1976. An economist, he is the author of the manifesto "Between Equals," which constitutes the government's current spearhead. He is facing a tough opponent in the person of Solange Chaput-Rolland, who will undoubtedly find it difficult to sell her Pepin-Robarts Commission Report--which incidentally impresses the PQ government more than it does Ryan's or Trudeau's Liberals.

The PQ's swank set, headed by Levesque and Marcel Leger, will try in vain to make us think the by-elections in Prevost are not going to degenerate into a minireferendum on the national question--the personalities and concerns of the candidates in the running implicitly invalidate such statements. People are good talkers on the subjects they know best, and Chaput-Rolland and Harvey are certainly not confronting each other on the question of high-way maintenance in the Laurentians.

Moreover, the government's candidates are laying such stress on the outcome of the voting that, if we are to believe my colleague Gilles Lesage, Minister Claude Morin will soon lift the ban on publication of the poll--so disparaged by the opposition--which states that 54 percent of the Quebecers would answer yes in a referendum asking for a mandate to negotiate with Ottawa on sovereignty-association.

So even though the referendum will not take place until on or around 2 June 1980, it is the major concern of the present moment. It is hard to see how the candidates in the three above-mentioned counties could resist jumping on the issue. Unfortunately, this situation is not of a kind to promote a necessary awareness at the level of the specific problems assailing ordinary people.

In Prevost, which is home to such monsters as Mirabel and Tricofil, in Beauce-Sud, which was not built in a day, and in Maisonneuve, where poverty constitutes a thorn in the side of Montreal, the politicians ought to relegate constitutional neurosis to the background. The election contest might be less exciting, but it would nevertheless bear more resemblance to a campaign for real life that has nothing to do with a congenital abstraction!

11798

CSO: 3100

## PQ REFERENDUM STRATEGY ANALYZED

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 24 Sep 79 p 5

[Commentary by Robert Barberis]

[Text] During the election campaign of November 1976, who would have said that the referendum promised by the Parti Quebecois [PQ] would not be held until 3.5 years after the victory of 15 November? Who could have foreseen that Pierre Trudeau would last for 5 years after his reelection on 8 July 1974? In order to understand certain of the Quebec government's attitudes over the past 2 years, one must realize that Trudeau's defeat was one of its major strategic requirements. "French power" and the identification of Quebecers with a French-speaking Canadian prime minister had to disappear. That explains the low profile maintained by the PQ government during the televised federal-provincial conferences and its resistance to provocations by the quartet made up of Trudeau, Lalonde, Ouellet, and Chretien. It explains the date chosen for the by-elections in Jean-Talon and Argenteuil, which enabled Claude Ryan to be elected in the midst of a federal election campaign ("Ryan will take care of Levesque" was the saying in Toronto). It also justifies the statements by Robert Burns concerning the PQ's defeat in the referendum and in the general elections (those statements were probably one of the last services rendered to the cause of independence by Robert Burns). It justifies the postponement of all national campaigns on behalf of sovereignty-association.

Two of the strategy's objectives have therefore been achieved: 1) the taking of power as a result of anti-Bourassa feeling and the promise of a referendum, and 2) Trudeau's defeat and his replacement by an English-speaking prime minister at the head of an English Canadian government. It is reported that in an attempt to predict the future during an interview granted to Peter Desbarats in 1969 and printed in his book "Rene," Rene Levesque expressed the hope that Trudeau would be defeated thanks to decisive action by Quebec's voters. ("Anyway, the Trudeau government was kicked out and Quebec was decisive in kicking it out.") It was English Canada that rejected Trudeau last 22 May, and the federal Liberal Party managed to elect 67 deputies from Quebec with the support of 2 million voters. The ambiguity of double

legitimacy continues. Chretien is therefore correct when he talks about "speaking in the name of the Quebecers." By taking no part in the federal election contest, Quebec's sovereignty bloc left the field entirely open to the Liberal bloc. Which only proves that there is no perfect strategy.

The next two steps in PQ strategy are victory in the referendum on a mandate to achieve sovereignty-association through negotiation, followed by victory in the next general election regardless of the outcome of negotiations with English Canada. If everything turns out as planned, the national question that has oppressed us since 1760 will be resolved sometime within the next 5 years.

According to PQ strategy, it is a matter of replacing the present federal system with a system of sovereignty-association with no break or separation. The Levesque government is not proposing to achieve sovereignty first and then to negotiate an economic association. It proposes to achieve sovereignty and association concurrently--that is, at the same time. The key word here is "concurrently." That is the background to the cabinet statement of 10 October 1976, known as the "hyphen" statement. It must be emphasized that that statement was in continuity with the book "Option Quebec," published 10 years earlier. At that time the prime minister gave the very clear impression that he valued association as highly as he did sovereignty. The opponents of the PQ strategy, with Claude Ryan at their head, adopted the opposite strategy.

They have already begun to reject the "hyphen," which has indeed irritated more than one supporter of sovereignty. Claude Ryan explains that the Levesque government is first and foremost in favor of sovereignty, that the referendum will be concerned with Quebec's political separation from the rest of Canada, that the economic association being advocated by the PQ is only a smokescreen for camouflaging separation, and that in any case, English Canada wants nothing to do with it.

The federalists are going to replace the decisive word "concurrently"--used in the PQ plan--with the word "separately," with its fears of brutal conflict and a breakup. To English Canada's question "What does Quebec want?", the PQ government is going to propose this response in the referendum: Quebec wants a new political system of sovereignty-association. And English Canada, with its nine provinces with their divergent interests and its federal government, will have to respond to that clear expression of the will of the majority of Quebec's people (because we believe that the Levesque government will win over 50 percent of the vote in support of the question it will submit). We will then ask ourselves: "What does English Canada want?" Does it want the system of sovereignty-association that the Quebecers want?

The Clark government may try to play for time in the hope that Claude Ryan's Liberals will win the next elections. But the PQ government may do like Trudeau and remain in power for 5 years. Clark will not be able to evade the issue. Will he negotiate? The federal Conservatives have not been

given a mandate to negotiate a system of sovereignty-association with Quebec. So what will happen? We recall that in response to a question by Pierre Olivier last spring, Levesque said that sovereignty (100 percent of the taxes and exclusive legislative power) is not negotiable; what will be negotiable is economic association.

According to PQ strategy, English Canada will either accept or reject the will of the Quebecers. If it accepts, the federal political system will be replaced by a system of sovereignty-association and the 1981 elections will be held in a new context that will undoubtedly invalidate election analyses such as those emphasizing the danger of the decline in the French-speaking vote in Ville Saint-Pierre, Notre-Dame-de-Grace, or Jean-Talon County. There will also be a new context if it rejects that will, because then the PQ government may call a general election and ask the Quebecers to implement Quebec's political sovereignty, since the Ottawa government, speaking on behalf of English Canadians, refuses to respect the will of the Quebecers.

All of that will take time. But all of it is a likely possibility. It is a plausible scenario that might result in Quebec's political sovereignty. Provided that the Levesque government gets through the Common Front without having to call a general election. And provided that there is no external interference with the democratic debate (economic terrorism, organized violence, and so on). Of course, one may criticize the fact that the PQ has been tamed by the government since 15 November. One may deplore the fact that Rene Levesque is finding it difficult to integrate the Pierre Renaud and Louise Harel groups harmoniously. One may regret the fact that a majority of Quebecers are apparently not ready to say yes to the very principle of sovereignty, with or without association.

But overall, it could be that the strategy will produce the desired results. Provided, as Pierre Vadeboncoeur has written, that the windows are opened, that the party members are given breathing space, and that Quebec's people are soon galvanized by public speeches. And provided, we would add, that October's White Paper does not add yet another step and that the question--which will be known before Christmas--is not too vague and does not disappoint the supporters of sovereignty.

In an interview granted to the magazine RELATIONS in June 1979--an interview not as widely known as it should be--Leon Dion asserts that the PQ "will organize the referendum around a question that is too vague in order to improve its chance of winning the next election." If that is true, then in our humble opinion the effect would be the exact opposite. And then certain election analyses emphasizing the drop in the French-speaking vote in the by-elections would become more relevant than ever as heralding a defeat in the general elections.

In any case, the PQ government will not evade its destiny and history. A people's political sovereignty cannot be achieved without that people's

conscious and aware majority support. Unless it is to betray itself, the sovereigntist government cannot avoid tackling the core of the problem and the content of sovereignty in a way that goes beyond strategic tricks. For that matter, Levesque himself has already started talking about the "masters in our own country" slogan which led to the nationalization of electricity and an assertion of Quebec power during the quiet revolution. That is why we can only be delighted that in this autumn of 1979, Quebec's people are on the verge of achieving collective maturity, either in the referendum to be held 9 months from now or in the general elections that will be held about a year later.

11798  
CSO: 3100

## LEVESQUE'S CONCEPT OF 'EQUALITY' CRITICIZED

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 21 Sep 79 p 4

[Commentary by Robert Decary]

[Text] If the speech delivered last weekend by Prime Minister Rene Levesque is an indication of what the Parti Quebecois' referendum campaign is going to be like, we can already expect the theme of the equality of peoples to be overused.

Addressing himself to a meeting of party members in Rimouski, Levesque maintained that nothing was preventing equality from being the foundation of a new understanding between Quebec and Canada and that anyone who did not understand that was retreating into old inferiority complexes. Equality between peoples, he said, is not a question of numbers, and the proof is that Canada is the equal, in terms of absolute rights, of the United States.

It is easy to exploit such a theme. The equality of peoples is a concept that appeals to the proudest element in Quebec's soul, and it corresponds to a reality that is as just as it is obvious, in principle. Who, for instance, would dare to assert that the people of Quebec, no matter how few in numbers, are not the equal of others? Without too much risk of being mistaken, one could even say that the people of Quebec, like every self-respecting people, considers itself superior to other peoples.

But the comparison made by Levesque between Quebec City, Ottawa, and Washington raises many more questions than it answers, and the prime minister would be well advised to explain himself further. He spoke of equality in absolute terms. Very good. But while that equality is absolute in legal terms, is it also absolute in political and economic terms? Does one display an inferiority complex by wondering what Levesque means in specific terms by his absolute equality and by asking him to demonstrate--because it is not obvious--that a sovereign Quebec would be as sovereign as the United States?

If Quebec and the United States are equals in law, for example, why does the one feel the need to associate itself with another country while the

other gets along very well by itself? Those are questions that the ordinary mortal can ask himself without being accused of betraying his race, and they demand answers. By laying too much stress on legal equality, Levesque is in danger of not being able to explain--to a population more interested in its de facto situation than in its de jure situation--how it is that Quebec is not in reality what it is told it is in principle.

Like individuals, peoples are equal. The small have the same rights as the big, and the sick have the same rights as the healthy. That is written in every charter. And yet their equality is very relative. There are many small countries--whose peoples are great for all that--which do not feel themselves equal to the United States, the Soviet Union, or China. Not out of an inferiority complex, but out of realism.

Levesque can cry from the housetops that Quebec City and Washington are equals and launch into vague discussions of principle. That will only add more ambiguities to a debate that already has enough. It would be more honest on his part to acknowledge that equality, while absolute in principle, is only relative in actual fact and that Quebec, regardless of its future political choice, will not be comparable to Washington in any foreseeable future other than on paper.

The stakes in the referendum debate cannot be absolute equality, which in fact makes no sense and never will make any sense. It would be better if all the parties would admit from the start that Quebec's equality is relative and that the debate concerns basically the choice of a political system permitting Quebec to be as equal as possible.

Will Quebec be more equal within Canada than outside Canada? Is it a matter of abandoning the idea of equality and falling into dependence if one shares political and economic institutions with another people? Is it a matter of shrinking or growing as Quebecers if we freely choose to belong or not belong to a larger community? Those are the questions that will have to be discussed during the referendum campaign, not the question of theoretical equality between Quebec City and Washington.

11798  
CSO: 3100

## QUEBEC ENERGY MINISTER JORON TO VISIT ALGERIA

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 19 Sep 79 p A2

[Article by Gilles Gauthier]

[Text] Quebec City--Minister of Energy Guy Joron will visit Algeria this fall at the head of a delegation consisting mainly of representatives of Hydro-Quebec, its subsidiary Hydro-Quebec International, and SOQUIP (Quebec Petroleum Initiative Company).

It was announced yesterday in Quebec City that in addition to discussions concerning energy supplies and policies, this visit will make it possible to promote what Hydro-Quebec International can supply and to strengthen trade in the energy sector between that country and Quebec.

Some members of the delegation, in particular the representatives of SOQUIP and Hydro-Quebec, will also take advantage of the trip to visit the People's Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) to discuss the possibility of concluding agreements there.

The discussion with the Algerians will be of the same basic nature as those Joron had in Saudi Arabia last February, when views were exchanged concerning the objectives of each party's energy policy and developments in the supply of hydrocarbons.

An agreement was signed as early as last spring between Hydro-Quebec and SONELGAZ [National Electricity and Gas Company], the Algerian state-owned firm responsible for the production, transportation, and distribution of electricity. So far that agreement has enabled the Quebec firm to assist in the areas of research, data processing, financial management, and the transportation and distribution of electricity.

As far as the People's Republic of Congo is concerned, SOQUIP could be called upon to cooperate in the exploration work being done in that country, which has petroleum resources and where the official language is French. For its part, Hydro-Quebec International could contribute its knowledge in the field of hydroelectricity.

## 'O AGON' WARNS GREEK CYPRIOTS TO STOP INTERNAL FEUDING

NC240925 Nicosia O AGON in Greek 24 Oct 79 pp 1, 8 NC

[From the Observer's Column "My Opinion": "Before Attila Comes to the South--Let the Danger Signals From the North Wake Us Up"]

[Text] The frenzied cries "Our Army to the South" that dominated the recent fascist congress that was held by supporters of Demirel, Turkes and Erbakan in the occupied part of Cyprus must--logically speaking--wake us up and make us see the source of grave danger and where the enemy is lying in wait.

We say logically because most of us are behaving so illogically that we little hope that the danger signals and alarming messages that come from the Cypriot north will be suitably received in the south and will wake us up.

What was said at the Congress in the occupied areas of Cyprus must convince us that very difficult days lie ahead for our national cause and our people. There is no doubt that this congress was under the "noble patronage" of Turkey's extreme rightwing parties since Demirel and Turkes (who will form the new Turkish government one of these days) addressed messages to it.

The definite coming to power of Demirel-Erbakan-Turkes and the extremist Cyprus policy of these extreme rightwing parties will create a new critical situation for our national problem.

Prime Minister Karamanlis has already warned that Demirel follows a more intransigent policy on the Cyprus problem. This warning shows precisely how much we should be disturbed by the new developments in Turkey.

The hardening of attitude that is most obviously demonstrated in the occupied areas serves to outline direct and serious dangers for Cyprus. It creates a new explosive atmosphere for both the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish issues and a manifold effort will be needed in order to deal with it.

Unfortunately we cannot effectively deal with the new situation that is being created because of the sad state of affairs prevailing here in Cyprus.

In order to deal with this situation there must be--above all--unity; unity of all Hellenism; unity between the Greeks of Greece and the Greeks of Cyprus; unity between Athens and Nicosia; unity among the Greeks of Cyprus. It is this unity that is actually absent. Athens-Nicosia relations are under a cloud. Both sides try to conceal misunderstandings and complaints instead of resolving them.

There is complete disruption among the Greeks of Cyprus. The internal front is in ruins. One forms the impression that Cyprus--what is left of it--is not in danger from Attila but from the leftwing or the rightwing. The conviction is being promoted, and unfortunately seems to be succeeding, that the south is not in danger from Turkish imperialism but from the democratic party or the democratic rally or AKEL or EDEK.

However, the frightful slogan of the Demirelaaturkes-Denktas bravos "Our Army to the South" must convince us of the source of danger. We must become conscious of the tragic situation and we must join our efforts as soon as possible in order to deal with the terrible danger that is menacingly emerging. Time is running out, and the time being lost is valuable. If we do not behave logically, if we do not place the country's interests above everything, there will be no time left to regret because the Atilla army will really be in the south.

CSO: 4908

## KTOD LEADER URGES UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 10 Oct 79 pp 1,4

[Text] Nicosia: Sharply criticizing CTP [Republican Turkish Party] General Chairman Ozker Ozgur's opinion that the "Independent Cyprus Turkish State Night" arranged for 20 October 1979 by the Cyprus Turkish Hearth Association [KTOD] is counter to the TFSC Constitution, KTOD General Chairman Fikret Kursat characterized the CTP Chairman as a supporter of the Greek Cypriots and the Communists who sees himself as the only individual capable of making statements and expressing opinions on a variety of subjects; he also said that he would continue his struggle ceaselessly and tirelessly along the road that his organization holds as its ideal.

Is Ozgur Moscow's Lawyer?

Charging that CTP General Chairman Ozker Ozgur has come out against every opinion and every activity that might be contrary to the interests of Moscow and the Greek Cypriots, and that he has defended the enemies of the Turkish race, Fikret Kursat claimed that the CTP is a communist party, saying that "Mr. Ozker Ozgur, just like the lawyers who are paid by their clients and do their business for them, seems to have been assigned the task of responding to and protesting against any sort of statement or behavior which could possibly be against the interests of Moscow and the Greek Cypriots."

Holding a press conference yesterday at the Cyprus Turkish Hearth Association, Fikret Kursat stated that the association has adopted the principle of an independent Cyprus Turkish State as a basic principle and challenged the statement of Head of State Denktas in London to the effect that "We are already independent. There is no need to declare this again. We merely want to be recognized." Kursat said that, in view of the intransigent and diversionary attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, it is necessary that an independent Turkish state be declared without further delay.

We Want Peace, But...

Explaining that the Greek Cypriots have been pursuing a diversionary tactic for years and that they plan to deliver the final blow to the Turks as soon

as they have the opportunity, Kursat charged that they had made the Denatas-Kyprianou agreement in order to change certain articles of the Denktas-Makarios agreement which were not in their favor. He said that "We also want peace, but this peace must be a peace in which the Greek will not exploit or exert tyranny over the Turk."

#### Greek Cypriot Stance

Saying that the Greek Cypriots, instead of sitting down to the conference table, have sought support on international platforms and have thus continually delayed the solution of the problem, Cyprus Turkish Hearth Association General Chairman Fikret Kursat stated that, with the declaration of an Independent Turkish State, we would have a state equal in meaning to that of the Greek Cypriot side, and that the economically more developed Greek side might then sit down to the conference table under the fear that two separate states might actually arise.

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CSO: 4907

## ATAKOL ANNOUNCES MOVE TO SPARK TFSC TOURISM

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 7 Oct 79 pp 1,4

[Text] London: In a speech published in TOPLUMUN SESI [VOICE OF THE COMMUNITY], the press organ of the London Turkish Cypriots Association, Dr. Kenan Atakol, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Tourism, called upon our businessmen in London to make extensive investments in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Noting that great importance is ascribed to London's community of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish businessmen, Atakol stated that a campaign will be initiated in order to bring about investment in the TFSC, saying that "In order to accelerate investment by our kinsmen and businessmen, we have drawn up a Foreign Investment Promotion Law. It is expected that this law will come out of the legislature by the new year."

Noting the importance of tourism in the TFSC's economic development, Atakol, after detailing efforts made with regard to tourism, announced that a truly encouraging influx of tourists has occurred this year, but stated that, in spite of this, our problems in the area of tourism have not yet been completely solved. Remarking that the greatest problem of tourism is that of transportation, Atakol announced that Cyprus Turkish Airlines will buy two airplanes in order to resolve the transport problem. He also said that the opportunity has been provided for Turks in London to buy shares in this company, and that this will be quite profitable for investors. He spoke as follows: "We are planning to establish a shuttle service between Istanbul and Ercan with the two new planes that will be bought. In addition, we are going to seek means of direct connections with other European nations."

## New Hotel Opened

Noting that another bottleneck in tourism has been that of bed capacity, Atakol announced the measures envisioned to resolve this problem as follows:

"Last season, accommodations facilities were insufficient. We had to turn down a number of requests from Italy and Germany. Our bed capacity of 1,500 to 2,000 beds must be increased immediately, and the increase of bed capacity will be speeded up even more in the years to come."

"This will be a second area of investment for the Turks in London. How unfortunate it is that Turkish businessmen have not made the necessary investments before this. Since Varosia is a political issue, it has been impossible to open the hotels there. Instead, the Zefiros Hotel on the beach at Kyrenia has been opened. The capacity of this hotel is 400 beds.

"Tourism makes up Cyprus's greatest economic potential. Before 1974, 34.8 percent of Cyprus's national income came from tourism. Now, tourism provides 12 percent of the TFSC's annual income. We are determined to raise this figure to 25 percent within the near future."

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CSO: 4907

## TPSC CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SELECTS NEW LEADER

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 11 Oct 79 pp 1,4

[Text] Mehmet F. Kucuk has been selected Chairman of the Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Commerce. Following Ramiz N. Manyera's resignation for personal reasons, the Chamber's Assembly met last night to select a new Chairman and Executive Board.

In the Chamber of Commerce Assembly meeting, which began at 2000 hours, Ramiz N. Manyera made the first address and explained the reasons for his resignation. Explaining that he would not be able to devote sufficient attention to his duties since he is of necessity obliged to travel abroad frequently, Manyera said that he had arrived at this decision with the thought in mind that the Chamber's activities not be handicapped, and thus he asked to be excused from the Chairmanship.

Following Manyera's address, Mehmet F. Kucuk was presented as the only candidate for Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. At the Assembly meeting, at which Necati Erozan was chosen as Assistant Chairman, the other members of the Executive Board were composed of Rehavi Piskobulu, Semih M. Isa, Hamza Arman, Merih Hasan Evrim, Ertan Necat, Mustafa Yildirim, and Adem Kader.

After the Chamber's Chairman and Executive Board had been chosen, former Chairman Ramiz Manyera, who conducted the meeting, wished success to the new officers.

Later in the meeting, new Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk made an address as follows:

"Honorable Assembly Members:

"I sincerely thank you for the trust in me which you have shown by appointing me to the position of Chairman.

"First of all, I want to offer my thanks to our former Chairman Ramiz Manyera, who is now giving up his post, for the valuable services he has given to our

Chamber and for the intensive labors which he has devoted toward solving our economic problems.

"I have complete confidence that Mr. Manyera, who for personal and justifiable reasons is obliged to resign from the Chamber Chairmanship, will not begrudge any sort of contribution which he might make within our Chamber, and that he will support the new Executive Board.

"You can be assured that our new Executive Board, in close cooperation with our Assembly and indeed all our members, will work vigorously toward a solution for the economic problems of the TFSC.

"In this period when we are faced with harsh economic conditions, the Chamber of Commerce will fulfill its duties in a manner consistent with its long and honorable past, and will endeavor mightily, within an understanding of cooperation, for the economic well-being of our people.

"I now want to express my confidence that all our members will show the necessary support for this goal, and to express my thanks once again."

#### Kucuk's Address

M. Kucuk: "We are ready for cooperation in economic development efforts."

New Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk said that the Chamber will carry out its duties with patriotic understanding in order for the TFSC's economy to overcome the severe current economic crisis.

Giving his first address after being chosen as the only candidate for Chairman at the Chamber Assembly's meeting last night, Kucuk said that every effort will be expended in order for problems to be resolved quickly and by means of mutual discussions.

Stating that the Chamber of Commerce is ready for well-intentioned and serious cooperation in order to fight inflation, unemployment, and smuggling in northern Cyprus, to revitalize all its economic sectors, including industry, trade, and tourism, and to initiate a process of development within the TFSC economy, Chamber Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk spoke as follows:

"It is only possible to attain economic development within an environment of confidence. For this reason, a stable economic structure must be brought about. Such a structure will revive the spirit of investment, and, at the same time, it will be possible to take major steps toward the development of foreign economic relations, which are of great significance from the standpoint of the TFSC's achieving close relations with third nations.

"Our Chamber, conscious that the TFSC's political relations with third nations can develop only in parallel with its economic relations, will continue its efforts to promote our commercial, industrial, and touristic sectors sufficiently abroad and thereby to develop all the various sectors of the economy.

Our wish is for rapid steps to be taken, within a system of mutual dialogue, toward the development of an environment of enterprise, and for the motive power of the private sector to be utilized to the fullest for the benefit of the economy of Northern Cyprus."

At the conclusion of his speech, Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk also stated that the Chamber favors action carried out within close cooperation and mutual support between the government and other relevant institutions toward the goal of securing economic well-being for the Cypriot Turkish community.

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CSO: 4907

## COLUMNIST REITERATES NEED FOR TURKISH TROOP PRESENCE

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 5 Oct 79 p 2

Column by Dr Fazil Kucuk

Text In a report published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces on Cyprus are compared. According to the report, the RMM [Greek Cypriot National Guard] are 10,000 strong. They have 1 armor battalion, 2 mechanized reconnaissance battalions, 20 infantry battalions, 15 artillery support units, 23 T-34 tanks, 30 armored vehicles, 40 armored personnel carriers, and 120 pieces of artillery.

These are what is visible.

But where is AXEL's 5,000-man secret army? Why wasn't the 5,000-man police force included in the figures? Why weren't Dr. Lyssarides' 900 special militants counted? How many armed men have EOKA and EOKA-B? People are saying 2,500 to 6,500; is this true?

Let's let these pass for now.

Why weren't the almost 2,000 Greek national officers and non-commissioned officers who make up the RMM's Command Staff listed? Couldn't the Institute for Strategic Studies see the Greek national force, almost 10,000 strong, serving in both civil and military capacity?

We'll let these pass, too...

The known reality — the objective reality --- stands as follows: The Cypriot Greek community of 450,000, if it armed its reserves, could form a 40,000-man army in an instant.

In other words, the Turkish Cypriot community, upon being deprived of Turkey's guarantee and the tangible force which supports this guarantee, will be left to the mercy of 40,000 Greek Cypriot soldiers and 10-20,000 Greek national soldiers who support them.

Our brainwashed young people on Cyprus who go around saying "We don't want new fighting, we want peace" should pay close attention to these realities. Peace doesn't come just with wanting peace... Peace needs to be defended; peace depends on the balance of forces between the two communities.

Following the 1959 agreement, it was said that "EOKA has been disbanded," and a ceremony was held for their weapons to be handed over to the English Governor. Later, in the course of a trial at Paphos, the English Commander responsible for the weapons depots revealed that the weapons that EOKA had turned in were suitable only for a gun graveyard, in that they were unusable scrap weapons. And EOKA did not merely stockpile their good weapons: while buying enough weapons during the period 1960-63 to arm a 5,000-man army, they encouraged the Greek Cypriot villagers to obtain all the arms they could get their hands on. In 1964, while the London Conference is in session, Mausers were coming to Greek Cypriot villages through the Cypriot postal system as "gifts". The consequences are well known!..

The Turks were declared to be in revolt. Makarios, saying "I am the government", brought armored vehicles, heavy artillery, sea vessels, rockets, and tanks from Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the Soviets, and their satellites.

Here is where the matter gets tied up: No matter what sort of agreement we make, tomorrow the Greek Cypriot can say "This agreement isn't valid... I have taken over the government... I don't recognize the rights granted to the Turks" and attack us again; and what will we do? Will we surrender to the Greeks, saying "We don't want war, we want peace"? Or else, when surrounded by 40,000 Greek Cypriot guns on a Cyprus "free of weapons, free of Turkish troops, deprived of the Turkish guarantee", will we shout "Cyprus for the Cypriots!" and rush to the bosom of AKEL? And if we do, what will be the use? Even to think of such things is painful. But if we don't think of them and don't take measures accordingly, the world will be content with three-line news articles when our 10-day-old babies and 90-year-old grandmothers are the targets for the bullets of a new EOKA, and the Cyprus file will be closed --- just as the file was closed on Crete.

This is what the Greek Cypriot is working for.

The true situation on Cyprus is this: The Turkish Cypriot cannot live without Turkey's tangible guarantee!

9173  
CSO: 4907

## 'HALKIN SESI' SCORES TURKISH ADVISORS TO TPSC

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 7 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Nicosia: Dr. Fazil Kucuk, former Vice-President of Cyprus, has asserted that "economic experts" sent from Turkey have caused suffering for the Turkish Cypriot community, in addition to having made illogical decisions.

In an article entitled "The Great Success" in the newspaper HALKIN SESI, which he owns, Fazil Kucuk said that "These bureaucrats, sent haphazardly from Turkey, have fouled up everyone actively working in Cyprus and, having kept billions from reaching the community, are now chasing after millions. It's because of these activities of theirs that this land, which was paradise, has been transformed into hell."

Stating that the high cost of living affects not the Turkish bureaucrats but rather the Turkish Cypriots, Kucuk wrote as follows: "Those who depend on the authority and power in their hands haven't moved a finger. Because they get their money in dollars and stuff it into their pockets, they can import whatever they want from wherever they want, without paying customs duties. They squeal that Turkish Cypriots are smuggling out foreign exchange, but I wonder what they're doing with the foreign currency they're getting? It's their behavior which is making us go overboard."

Maintaining that foreign exchange income to the Turkish sector has declined and that ships are no longer seen in the Famagusta harbor, Kucuk said that "We feel sorry for the government that has faith in these economic experts who have brought us to this state, for the government which gives in to everything they say."

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CSO: 4907

## LACK OF EXPERTISE CITED AS TPSC'S MAJOR PROBLEM

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 11 Oct 79 p 3

Column by Kessad Kazim

[Text] Some time ago, the government published a decree prohibiting the import, sale, and possession of 108 various articles. According to this decree, those who had these goods would either sell them within a certain time period, or else, that time period having expired, the government would buy the articles from the merchants at their 1977 prices and then sell them itself.

But this didn't work; it ended in a fiasco. Because this, just as every other matter, just as has become a virtual tradition, had been prepared without a plan, was a decision taken within a single day.

Following this decision, a meeting was even held at the time, concerning just how this would all be implemented... One of the participants at the meeting asked: We say that, a month from now, we are going to buy all of these 108 various commodities that the merchants have. The value of these goods will amount to millions, even billions. Does the government have sufficient funds on hand to pay all the merchants?

This question reduced everyone to silence. You see, the quantities of these goods on the market had not been determined, nor had their value. A decision had just been made out of the blue, just so that people would think those in the government were doing something.

Everything we do, whatever the situation and whatever the object, is like this: casual, thoughtless, and unplanned... Easy come, easy go... Without any idea of a plan or program. No one has the slightest idea of how to run the country. No one assigns any worth whatsoever to science, planning, competence, or contemporary thought.

You see, no one bothers to study contemporary economic theories. Yet economics is today the very cornerstone of scientific administration... Every administrator

must understand these matters at least as well as an economics expert. If he doesn't understand, then he should hire a specialist, and he himself should learn, read, and continually keep up with these matters. Statesmanship, good government, and the requirements of good administration demand this.

But all this is still unknown among us, it hasn't yet been understood... Everyone thinks that you merely sit down at the desk of a minister, or his assistant, or a director, and then the business at hand just runs right along of its own accord. Well, it doesn't: there is nothing magical in these desks and chairs; there is no power to work miracles in them.

The power to work miracles can only be found in the individual's will, in his brain and his heart...but he must not look after his own personal interests, but rather the community's interests above all else. But, in societies like this one of ours, this is too optimistic, too innocent, isn't it?

A person says "Take care of Number One first" and that's it. Science, economics, real administrative qualifications, nobody pays the slightest attention to such things. We have no thought for anything but our own pocket, our own interest, and woe to the loser!

This is what people say to themselves, and every enterprise, every undertaking yields fiasco upon fiasco, and all we end up with is sham results. And if anything is actually accomplished, it's for those circles who expect something from the politicians.

It continues this way until the elections. But until which elections? It goes on the same way until the coming elections, and until all the elections after that.

Someone arises, either a party or an individual, and says "I'll put all these things right; give your votes to me." He gets the votes and the office, then pockets his salary and takes it easy, looking to his own pleasure. If the problems of the community are mentioned, he says to himself "To hell with the community!" What can we do? This is the community's fate. Either society must change, or it must determine its own fate; or else we must simply endure these ordeals without complaint. Endure, endure... Is there any alternative, after all?

9173  
CSO: 4907

## MAINLAND GOVERNMENT CHANGES SAID TO HURT TFSC

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 7 Oct 79 p 5

[Article by Resat Akar]

[Text] Nicosia: Alpay Durduran, leader of the main Turkish Cypriot opposition party, has said that continual changes in government in Turkey have negatively affected the Turkish Cypriot community.

Explaining his views on the topic of Turkey-TFSC relations to GUNAYDIN, Alpay Durduran said that "It is an incorrect evaluation to claim that the government changes in Turkey will have no effect on Cyprus. Every government which comes to power in Turkey has to work to make itself accepted in the family of nations. In recent years, Turkey's foreign policy has begun to become more effective. A change in government at this time would definitely have negative results.

Maintaining that there are those who want to use the Cyprus issue as a tool in domestic politics in Turkey, Durduran asserted that nations which want material and moral pressure exerted on Turkey can engage in these policies with ease by taking advantage of Turkey's frequently changing foreign policy.

Touching on the effects of Turkey's domestic turmoil, Durduran said that "Today, the Greek Cypriot leadership is adjusting its foreign policy according to Turkey's internal situation. We have seen the best example of this in the Denktas - Kyprianou talks. I don't think that Kyprianou, who was forced by the effectiveness of the Ecevit government to sit down opposite Denktas, will ever forget this."

Alpay Durduran explained his views on economic matters as follows: "The main economic decisions of the TFSC are taken by the Cyprus Turkish government. Turkey merely extends a helping hand to requests from here. The efforts being made, in spite of these truths, to load onto the Turkish government those problems which the government here has been unable to solve merely distort the facts."

## TFSC AIRLINE INITIATES SERVICE TO MIDDLE, FAR EAST

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 5 Oct 79 p 1

Text Nicosia: The Northern Cyprus Airlines Corporation, established six months ago in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, has begun flights from Ercan to the Middle and Far East on DC-8 type aircraft under the name of Trans Anatolia. It is reported that Northern Cyprus Airlines, the first private airline to be formed in the TFSC, has also begun to transport our agricultural and industrial products to various countries.

#### Successful Flights

The "Trans Anatolia" planes belonging to Northern Cyprus Airlines, established by a group of Turkish Cypriot and Arab businessmen, have made successful trips to Middle and Far Eastern countries during recent days. Company officials have announced that they will be instituting scheduled flights to various nations in the days to come. Meanwhile, local travel agencies have begun procedures for carrying both passengers and cargo. Flights have been completed on "Trans Anatolia" from Ercan to the Arabian peninsula, the Far East, and Australia by way of the Middle East and Sharjah.

#### Promotional Flight

According to what has been learned, representatives of publishing and broadcasting concerns active in the TFSC will be carried to the city of Sharjah by Trans Anatolia this Tuesday in an effort to publicize the company's activity. It is expected that approximately 20 members of the media will be included in this promotional flight.

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CSO: 4907

## BRIEFS

UNIFICATION OF RIGHT WING REJECTED--The Democratic Party "rejects the doctrine of the unification of the right wing as catastrophic for the country." This statement is included in a communique released by the Democratic Party following a regular meeting of the party's political bureau. Among other things, the communique says: "The Democratic Party believes in and works for the consolidation and further strengthening of its ideological-organizational independence and self-sufficiency as a political entity and rejects any idea of unification with another party. The Democratic Party rejects as catastrophic for the country the doctrine being publicized on unifying the right wing because this would bring about ideological and class polarization and a conflict with disastrous consequences for normal political life and for our national cause. The Democratic Party rejects the various rumors about a split in its ranks and declares that absolute unanimity and unity prevail in the party and that it is seeking to strengthen these things to the greatest possible extent. The Democratic Party will be neither dissolved nor divided." [Text] [NC200634 Nicosia O AGON in Greek 20 Oct 79 p 8 NC]

CSO: 4908

COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

BRITISH OFFICIAL'S VISIT--'NEUE WESTFAELISCHE' of Bielefeld comments: At the conclusion of the 1-day German-British consultations the good relations between the two states were stressed, as they were 6 months ago when the chancellor visited Great Britain. One can indeed say about relations with London that they are rather free of problems, although there are contrasting approaches to problems pertaining to the alliance and to Europe. So there was no lack of explosive issues to be discussed at the first official visit of the British female government chief, a visit she has made to the Rhine despite the current Rhodesian conference with all its problems.

BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG stresses: The British guest was particularly concerned about a clarification of the problem about how London's burden of high contributions to the European Community could be curtailed to an acceptable degree. The national budget shows a considerable deficit which is supposed to be curtailed to some extent through a cut in payments to the European Community. The chancellor, who knows what a burden it is to play the role of paymaster, will have signalled agreement to his female colleague with regard to the European summit in late November in Dublin. But not only the tiresome monetary chapter was discussed; priority was given to disarmament and security policy problems between the East and the West. Bonn and London as well as the other NATO states are concerned only about a common answer to Brezhnev's disarmament proposal. [Text]

[DW021112 Cologne DEUTSCHLANDFUNK Network in German to East and West Germany 0605 GMT 1 Nov 79 DW]

CSO: 3103

**WORLD POWER, DEFENSE SITUATIONS CALLED 'PARADOX'**

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Sep 79 p 1

[Commentary by Claude Julien: "Paradoxes"]

[Text] The final days of a regnum are always fraught with danger. This risk increases when—for different reasons, of course, but simultaneously—uncertainty prevails within the government of each of the two superpowers. Furthermore, while there is speculation in Washington and Moscow about the policy Brezhnev's and Carter's successors will follow, the world scene continues to become more disorderly. Both the USSR and the United States are confronted with mounting difficulties, as evidenced by the economic reform promulgated last July by the Soviets and the recession heralded by all the American economic indicators. Each of the two giants feels less sure of its allies. Each one looks with misgivings upon tensions in such dangerous areas as the eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Iran, Southeast Asia, southern Africa, and Central America, all potentially explosive hot spots with possible chain reactions difficult to foresee and even more difficult to control.

In spite of everything, both sides continue to cling to "doctrines" which everyone knows, however, are at the mercy of profound transformations on the world scene and changes in persons and groups in power. Thus the trend of "detente" is openly challenged in some American political circles that it would be wrong to downgrade as mere victims of cold war nostalgia. And furthermore, who can flatter himself that he knows what rising generations in the USSR are thinking?

In this climate of uncertainty, Europe is asking itself questions, not without reason but with diffidence. Europe knows its existence is threatened both economically and militarily. Its maneuvering room in these two areas remains limited. Despite consultations that are often less extensive than European officials care to admit, Europe's powerful ally proceeds to make decisions--on energy, trade, money, and strategy--or give signs of vacillation that affect the future of the Old Continent, but the latter cannot manage to chart cohesively a course of action consistent with its interests.

European governments would be more clear-sighted if they drew all of the inferences from one major fact, namely that Washington's foreign policy is no longer bipartisan as it had previously been ever since World War II. Yet bipartisanship is the indispensable foundation of a policy of deterrence that lays the country open to an adversary's reprisals. Republicans clearly marked this turning point in May 1978 by denouncing the "15 months of incoherence, inconsistency, and inaptitude" which, in their view, had obscured major national objectives. This situation is serious enough to have prompted two quarterlies, FOREIGN AFFAIRS and FOREIGN POLICY, to discuss --in their summer 1979 issues--possible ways and means of regaining the confidence of both the American public and European countries.

But the situation has an even more serious aspect. Bipartisanship was actually based on an illusion that did not change in the U.S.-USSR balance of forces. De Gaulle had clearly seen where this illusion lay: as FOREIGN AFFAIRS now admits, it was paradoxical, to say the least, to build Europe's defense on risks the United States would take even though its national territory would not be attacked. The quarterly added: "The only thing that can be done is to put up with this paradox."

A heartening prospect, and all the more so now that, in Brussels on 1 September, Henry Kissinger publicly admitted that "it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide," the very essence of deterrence. This currently impaired credibility was no greater when the United States had unquestionable strategic superiority: why then would that country have exposed its own cities? Yet, as he now acknowledges, Kissinger frequently "reassured" America's allies with profuse "magic words" exalting the firm determination of the United States. He now doubts that his country is able and wants to keep its promises, because "if we execute those promises, we may well destroy civilization." And with the cynicism so many naive or prejudiced observers have hesitated to admit he had, Kissinger added: "I would not say this if I were in government."

It is good to have allies. It is even wiser to rely first on oneself. By definition, a defense cannot be left to others, no matter how friendly they may be.

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CSO: 3100

NEW PCF WEEKLY TO REPLACE 'FRANCE NOUVELLE', 'NOUVELLE CRITIQUE'

LD011249 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 17 Oct 79 p 8 LD

[Jean-Pierre Leonardini Report: "A Weekly for Democratic Progress"]

[Text] The new weekly which is to replace FRANCE NOUVELLE and the monthly LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE was officially launched yesterday morning. In the foyer of the Chaillot National Theater [PCF] politburo member Guy Hermier presented the editorial board of the new press organ to the press and numerous guests. The title of the magazine has not yet been announced but the names and faces are already known. The chief editor is Jean Burles. There are four assistant chief editors: Daniele Bleitrach, Michel Cardoze, Francois Hincker and Claude Prevost. Jean-Michel Catala has been appointed administrative director. An editorial board at present comprising 53 people has been formed.

Guy Hermier outlined the enterprises in the following terms:

"Last June the PCF Central Committee decided to replace FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE with a new weekly designed to tackle the major political, ideological and cultural questions of our time in an open, lively, creative and combative way. It is not an official central committee organ."

Guy Hermier then introduced the team mentioned above with apologies from Claude Prevost who had been detained in Poitiers. He explained that the editorial board had held its first meeting the previous day. He stressed that Aragon [presumably, PCF Central Committee member L. Aragon] (standing beside him) had expressed the "desire to take a very active part in the enterprise."

The editorial team is not yet complete. It will of course include journalists from the old FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE teams in addition to other journalists and other intellectuals whether communist or not.

The publication will be launched during November.

"We want to create a real political weekly which gives an important place to culture, major international problems and regional life.

"We want it to be a forum for views, debates, research and a means of struggle for all those opposing the policy of decline organized by the government in all spheres.

"In that way we want to do all we can to help all those who intend to contribute to opening a democratic outlook for self-managing socialism as described by our 22d and 23d congresses. It will be a weekly with strategic aims whose implementation includes debate and pluralist contributions.

"We will not only deal with politics, but also with ideas, culture, lifestyles and international relations, especially in this Europe stamped by Eurocommunism."

#### Area of Freedom

"I repeat that we want an open, combative press organ having its own individuality and aiming to stamp French political and cultural life with its originality. In face of the suppression systematically organized by the present government and the major channels of expression which it controls we want to provide an area of freedom and free expression for all those, especially many intellectuals, who feel affinity with that strategic outlook and who love democracy and freedom.

"We are trying to find a new way of interpreting France, of creating, searching and struggling in France.

"In many respects this is a new experiment for us.

"We are determined to make it succeed."

CSO: 3100

## ATLANTISM IS INCOMPATIBLE TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

AT011417 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 1 Nov 79 pp 1, 9 AT

[Statement of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KKE, issued on 31 October 1979, after a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee]

[Text] The Plenum of the party's Central Committee met during the end of October and discussed the issues: 1) "implementation of resolutions by the Central Committee's Plenum of December 1979: economic-political developments and the main problems of struggle," with Kharilaos Florakis, secretary general of the Central Committee as speaker; 2) report on action by the committee on party control.

In discussing the first issue the Central Committee Plenum dealt with the latest international developments. It paid particular attention to U.S. imperialist efforts to stop progress toward detente as well as the dangers to peace and to the peoples of Europe as a result of the U.S. decision to install new missiles in West Europe. In reference to this it stressed the grave significance of the latest USSR proposals for promotion of the process of detente and the need for intensification of the struggle against installation of these new missiles in our country.

Within this framework the Plenum also discussed the latest internal developments of our country stressing the party's position that continuation of the Atlantic policy in any--even its "European"--alternative is incompatible to national independence and the defense of our country's territorial integrity. It also discussed the serious deterioration of the economic situation and the severe drop in the peoples' living standard and, utilizing the experience gained from the development of mass struggles of the workers during this year, it stressed the necessity for a further intensification of unified struggle against one-sided austerity and authoritarianism. In this context the Plenum carefully studied the party's further development, particularly dealt with current problems in the formation of party organizations and stressed the necessity for multifaceted qualitative improvement of the party's leadership task.

The Plenum underlined the attempts by certain circles of the ruling class to frustrate any attempt toward a fundamental change and for blocking the

way toward such a change through the method of alternating governments by the two leading parties. These attempts are objectively facilitated by the tactics pursued by the majority opposition party. Pasok fundamentally confines the problem of change within the limits of its own election to government authority through an increase of its election strength without any cooperation with the other anti-imperialist democratic forces, without, first of all basing itself before all else and primarily, on improving the organized mass peoples struggle.

At the same time the Plenum stressed that the ruling class, in its effort to enforce the political election developments which it wants, also aims at diverting the attention of workers from their struggle against the policy of one-sided austerity which is directed against them.

A greater and more determined strengthening of the KKE's influence and presence upon and within developments is a fundamental factor for the success of cooperation between anti-imperialist democratic forces and for the course toward change.

The resolution was voted upon unanimously by the Plenum. The relevant resolution will be published. [Dated] October 1979. [Signed] The Presidium of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE.

CSO: 4908

## 'ELEVTHEROTYPIA' INTERVIEWS CYPRUS AKEL LEADER

AT231535 Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Oct 79 p 8 AT

[Exclusive interview with Cyprus AKEL leader Papaioannou by KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA contributor Akhileas Khatzopoulos--date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr Papaioannou, do you believe that prospects for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem have increased following Karamanlis' trip to the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' visit to Moscow and the capitals of the other socialist countries of Europe is certainly a very significant event. The agreements he signed in the Soviet Union and in the other countries he visited are an equally significant event.

With regard to the Cyprus problem, I believe that the Greek Prime Minister's visit and the talks he had, especially in the Soviet Union, will have favorable results. This, however, also depends on the way we act and the way the Greek government acts. The agreement which the Greek Prime Minister concluded in Moscow--not only regarding the Cyprus problem, but also regarding other serious international problems--stipulates that the two countries will consult each other on these issues and will make joint efforts for the peaceful solution of these problems. The Greek government's responsibility is to see how to utilize in the best possible way this part of the agreement. At the same time, the Cyprus government should study how to utilize the Cyprus president's visit to Moscow which has been outstanding for a long time. I hope this visit will take place in the near future because I believe that this visit, like Karamanlis' visit, will contribute decisively to the strengthening of Cyprus' position for a peaceful, democratic solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of UN resolutions and the Kyriakou-Denktas agreement of 19 May 1979.

[Question] Do you think that a visit by Fidel Castro to Cyprus would strengthen Cypriot positions?

[Answer] Fidel Castro is a very good friend of the Cyprus people and the liberation struggle the Cyprus people are waging. Both in the United Nations and in all other international forums, Cuba and Fidel Castro personally have always supported Cyprus which is struggling for freedom. Certainly a visit by Fidel Castro will have very positive results. For the next 3 years Castro will have very positive results. For the next 3 years Castro will be the chairman of the nonaligned movement. As such, he can contribute to the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. Already the nonaligned countries have committed themselves in Havana to contribute to the next UN General Assembly by submitting a resolution asking that measures be taken for the implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus. Of course, the UN General Assembly can only make recommendations to the Security Council. As you know, in accordance with the UN charter, only the Security Council can take and implement measures. It will be very significant if the General Assembly, as we believe, recommends the taking of specific measures for the implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus.

[Question] What form do you believe the struggle of the Greek Cypriots should take now?

[Answer] I think the course has already been charted. It is our recourse to the UN General Assembly which will be discussed in November. With the resolution it will pass on the Cyprus problem, I believe the General Assembly will contribute to the further strengthening of the struggle being waged by the Cyprus people for a peaceful, just and democratic solution of their problem.

At the same time, however, we could and should demand that the Security Council form a committee which, as president of the republic Kyprianou has stated, should involve itself in the entire procedure for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The despatch of a Security Council delegation to Cyprus is a proposal that was made in August 1974, and like the convening of an international conference within the UN framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem, both are proposals that should seriously occupy the nonaligned committee so that in the resolution they will submit to the next General Assembly something concrete would be included regarding the international conference and the despatch of a UN delegation to Cyprus. This delegation will study on the spot the implementation of UN resolutions.

[Question] Can and how will solid unity in Cyprus' internal front be achieved?

[Answer] It is imperative to have unity among the democratic, patriotic forces of the Cyprus people if we really want this country to be led to freedom and vindication. This unity can and should be achieved on the basis of the course and tactics of struggle that the late president of the republic Archbishop Makarios had charted. We believe that this is the only correct course. It has been proven by our experience that no other course except this course of an independent sovereign and territorially integral, nonaligned and demilitarized Cyprus can exist. Any other course will lead either to double enosis or to Cyprus' partition or even to the country's complete Turkeyfication.

The internal constitutional regime has been charted both by the late president Makarios and the ministerial and national councils. It should be a federation of two parts that could solve for us the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus problem.

Of course, when we talk of a federation we mean a federation, not what Denktas means. At present, there is no confederation anywhere in the world. There is a huge difference between a federation and a confederation. In the case of a federation, the state is unitary even though it may consist of many parts. There is one central government, one central parliament and so forth.

We believe that the Cyprus people's unity is imperative. In order for it to be substantive, viable and steady, it should be based on the course and tactics of the struggle.

[AT231612] [Question] Would you like to tell us which sides have begun activities to undermine President Kyprianou's work?

[Answer] Recently, the imperialist conspiracy against Cyprus has escalated. Specifically, after the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran and the loss of U.S. positions in that country, Cyprus' strategic importance for U.S. imperialists and more generally for NATO increased even more.

It is public knowledge that the people controlling the British bases in Cyprus at present are Americans. They use these bases for spy flights over the soil of the progressive regimes of the Arab countries and over the soil of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This imperialist conspiracy, which dates from long ago, has recently been renewed. Of course in the past it escalated and reached its peak with the coup and the Turkish invasion. Now, it has again started to escalate and to use all the local organs it has to achieve its goals.

The purpose of this renewed imperialist conspiracy is to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of imperialist interests only. The U.S. imperialists will never resign themselves to an independent, sovereign, territorially integral regime in Cyprus. Even more, they will never resign themselves to the idea of a progressive, democratic regime, as we believe the Cyprus republic regime will be. The imperialists always encourage and support reactionary and fascist regimes on which they rely to serve their own imperialist interests. In Cyprus' case--of course I cannot mention names--those elements, most of which are EOKA B remnants, which have recently become active are well known.

Although some people deny that these elements are again becoming active, they are nevertheless. The people who are denying this fact did the same thing in the past when we warned the people and the government of the undermining activities of EOKA B which reached their peak with the treacherous junta coup. We believe that the best way to deal with this renewed imperialist conspiracy is to unify all patriotic democratic forces on a correct course and tactic. It is necessary to base this unity on strong foundations, otherwise imperialism will find it easy to again achieve its goals, to create a division of forces and promote its own plans of enslavement.

[Question] Do you believe the Cyprus Republic can impede the spy flights of the U.S. U-2 planes which originate from the British bases on Cyprus?

[Answer] I believe that what the U.S. imperialists are doing in the British bases on Cyprus is contrary to the special obligation the British undertook toward the Cyprus Republic concerning the British bases. The specific obligation the British undertook was that they would use the bases. And if for any reason they decided to give up the use of these bases, they would surrender that land to the sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic.

That which is currently being done through the use of the British bases by the U.S. spy planes is contrary to the obligation the British undertook.

I believe the Cyprus government could and should remind the British that they have undertaken this explicit obligation and that it is their duty to comply with it. After all, this is an opportunity to raise the entire issue of the bases in order to show that it is an open issue for us. The British imperialists should not think that they are in these bases forever. We always keep this issue open. We insist that the bases be dismantled and that Cyprus be completely demilitarized. Of course, we are waging a struggle for the abolition of the bases.

[Question] Do you know the details of the explorations the Americans had conducted regarding the discovery of oil in Northern Cyprus before the invasion in 1974?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I am not in a position to know the results of those explorations.

Of course, many things were said and one should not rely on that. We do not have precise facts on the results of those explorations. Naturally, as we are in an oil area, I believe that some quantity of oil should exist in Cyprus. How much and where is a matter for exploration.

CSO: 4908

## PAPANDREOU ANNOUNCES PASOK'S 'GOVERNMENT' PROGRAM

AT181700 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 18 Oct 79 p 6 AT

[Speech delivered by PASOK Chairman Andreas G. Papandreu on 17 October at Iraklion, Crete, announcing PASOK's Government Program]

[Text] People of Iraklion, people of Crete, I am deeply touched by the welcome you have accorded me. Tonight's gathering, the great crowd and the great feeling are unprecedented.

Tonight you are sending a very important political message to every corner of the Greek land. Tonight the people of Crete are unreservedly condemning the policy of new democracy. Tonight the people of Crete are declaring their irrevocable resolve to open wide the great avenue leading to change.

Our country is going through one of the most critical periods in its newer history. The troops of Attila continue their occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus and they are a constant threat to the island's free section. Turkey insists upon its illegal claims on the Continental Shelf and airspace of the Aegean islands and it raises the question of the Moslem minority of Thrace.

Negotiations for our country's return to NATO's military wing continue. We withdrew from it in the summer of 1974 "finally and irrevocably" as Karamanlis stated at that time. We withdrew, however, in order to immediately request our return. In this way we provided the opportunity for the United States, NATO and Turkey to apply a cynical blackmail. According to the plans of the Pentagon and Brussels the return of Greece to NATO's military wing is under the condition that our operational control over the Aegean is given up.

The prime minister has not given in to this pressure. We have applauded this action of his. We stated that PASOK supports this "no" of the prime minister.

## Danger From NATO

Tonight from Iraklion we call upon the prime minister to proceed to the second and decisive step: To withdraw his request for our return. To terminate negotiations with NATO finally and irrevocably.

At some time, at long last, the government must draw the unavoidable conclusions about what NATO means to Greece. NATO supported the 7-year dictatorship. NATO coordinated the colonel's coup for the overthrow of Makarios with the barbarous Attila invasion of the island. NATO is arming Turkish forces for the purpose of overthrowing the military balance of power in the area. NATO adopts and promotes Turkey's expansionist claims. NATO threatens our direct and sovereign rights in the Aegean.

Recent developments fully justify PASOK's positions. This is why for us, for PASOK, it is an immovable position that Greece must withdraw from NATO finally and irrevocably, both from the military as well as from the political wings. What is the purpose of our participation in NATO when, according to government statements, the "danger from the north" does not exist any more?

The signing of the Greek-U.S. agreement on bases in our country remains pending. It remains pending because to date the government has connected its fate with our return to NATO's military wing. It is for us, for PASOK, an unyielding position that foreign bases must go from our country. They are a permanent danger to our population, even in times of peace, as proved by the recent explosion at Souda. They expose us to nuclear destruction in case of a world war. This particularly applies to Crete which has been converted into a "gigantic U.S. nuclear fortress." They serve only the imperialist plans of the United States and NATO in the east Mediterranean and the Middle East. They could be used against our country in case of a Greek-Turkish clash. Unavoidably they lead to U.S. and NATO intervention in our country's political life and in this way they intensify our political-military dependence upon the metropolises of the West.

#### Lessening the "Overture's" Significance

The prime minister returned from his visit to Moscow, Budapest and Prague about one week ago. The entire democratic opposition greeted the event as a positive step, as a step forward in our country's foreign policy.

It is well known how "irritated" the United States and NATO were as a result of the visit to Moscow. They reacted with danger-mongering and with an unacceptable intervention in the agreement of Neorion of Siros. Yet this Greek "overture" takes place 13 years after the overtures of the metropolises of the West toward Moscow at the time when peaceful coexistence between east and West was inaugurated. Both this 15-year delay as well as the reaction from the United States and NATO to the Moscow visit confirm in the clearest way the satellite role entrusted to us within the framework of the Atlantic alliance. So that there may be no doubt or misunderstanding, the Moscow declaration concludes with the words: "The present statement does not affect in any way the obligations of the two signatories derived from international agreements signed by them previously."

The importance of the visit to Moscow is not to be found in the results achieved, which are not so impressive in any case, but rather in the fact that it was carried out. There is a clear effort by the prime minister as well as by his aids to lessen the significance of the visit both with words and with deeds.

During his departure Karamanlis recommended to journalists to "put a break on their imagination" because they nearly turned his visit "into a novel."

Prior to his departure from Moscow Rallis stressed the visit was "not" aimed at changing foreign policy." Addressing naval officers Averof stated "we belong to the West" with which we are connected with traditional and spiritual ties, "yet we try and we do maintain ties with the other coalition as well."

All these are words. But we also have deeds. Immediately after Moscow the prime minister will also visit Western capitals and then he will visit Beijing. In this way he "equalizes" his visit to Moscow.

#### AT181830 "Incorporation" Into the West

Recently the prime minister described his foreign policy as "multifaceted." And yet, also according to his own statement, "we belong to the West" and this doctrine continues and is the basic orientation, the corner stone, the axis, of his foreign policy. Accession to the EEC, the intensive 2-year effort for our return to NATO, our hosting the U.S. bases are three aspects of this "we belong to the West." Our country's accession to the EEC, our return to NATO's military wing, the signing of the Greek-U.S. base agreement, if all this does take place, will complete the political and economic dependence of our country upon Washington and Brussels. At that time Greece will be incorporated in the West as a province of the EEC and as a NATO and U.S. satellite.

Being enclaved within NATO and the EEC Greece will be unable to implement a truly multifaceted foreign policy. Every overture toward the east or toward the nonaligned will be nearly absolutely controlled by the apparatus of the alliance.

It is time, at long last, that our country must overthrow the chains forged for it by the United States and NATO. It is time that we proclaim that our country's foreign policy is laid down without restrictions and only in accordance to the interests of our nation and our people.

#### The Economic Deadend

During the past five years the government of new democracy was tested and it dismally failed in all sectors. Its most severe and most impressive failure is in the economic deadend into which it has led the country. The unbearably high prices for the people's masses and the specter of recession and unemployment (which has started to appear over the horizon already) make up the harsh economic reality in our country.

Our government, representing the interests of large capital, is trying to stop the country's downhill run with spasmodic and uncoordinated measures.

The mask of the right wing has dropped. Its trapped followers, those who come from the ranks of the workers, the farmers, the laborers and the wage earners, face reality in sharper relief.

Every day they understand more and more that the right wing is the political representative of the economic oligarchy, both local and foreign. They also understand that it is for this very reason the government is in no position to control the progress of our economy.

This is why today, more than ever before, there is an imperative need for a radical change. This is a change which will lead the country out of the deadend. This is a change which will put down firm foundations for a speedy but firm economic and social development. This is a change which will open wide the avenue which leads to the social liberation of the working Greek.

This is why today we require a radically different political spirit. This is the spirit without restrictions and subjugation to the economic establishment. It is a spirit which will have the interest of the Greek people as its exclusive criterion. This is the exact spirit which is represented by PASOK.

PASOK has placed as its direct political goal the effective solution of the economic deadend which is the fruit of the 5-year administration of the country by the right wing. It is already clear that handling the problems amassed during the past 5 years is a necessary prerequisite for laying the country's course in the direction which leads to socialist reformation to the socialist liberation of the working Greek. It is on the basis of such a program that PASOK will claim authority.

#### Inflation and Oil

There are two critical characteristics in the economic developments of the past 5 years. 1) Deterioration of inflation which started taking on explosive dimensions in 1979 and 2) the basic development stagnation of Greek economy.

By comparison to 1974 and up to 1979 the drachma lost 50 percent of its purchasing power. We have already entered another dangerous phase of the inflationary trend. During 1979 the value of the drachma will drop by about 25 percent. This will take place while the government's original goal was to raise the cost of living only by 10 percent.

It is upon this goal, this 10 percent, upon which the government based its salary and wage policy, the policy of one-sided austerity, austerity for the many and luxury for the few. In this way wage and salary increases were limited to levels much lower than those required by the loss of true income as a result of inflation.

The government is attempting to blame responsibility for inflation upon the price hikes for oil and other raw materials imported by our country. It is trying to do this in vain. This is because the rate of the cost of living rise in Greece is more than double the equivalent rise in the EEC. The energy crisis, this great excuse of the government for its momentous failure in economic policy would not have had so serious repercussions on our country's economy if there was a completed program for the utilization of local energy sources.

#### AT191005 Businesses and Credits

The Karamanlis government neither wants nor is it able to overcome the restrictions imposed upon implementation of its policy by its own class position. This is obvious both in its credit and financial policies.

Since 1974 to date the annual increase in credits reached approximately 23 percent (with a parallel increase in currency circulation). In other words it increased at a rate 5 times higher than the rate of increase of national revenue. This means a large scale leakage of credits into non-productive and profiteering enterprises. This thoughtless and anti-productive [word missing] of credit was a basic inflationary factor. At the same time it led to distribution of national wealth at the expense of the non-privileged classes.

The bank system is virtually monopolized by a few local and foreign structures. In August 1977, 25 industries which belonged to the group of 100 larger industrial enterprises owed the banks approximately 50 billion drachma. This sum is larger than the sum total of loans for improvement projects and agricultural improvements which amounted to 46 billion over the same period.

Most of these enterprises are controlled by foreign multinational capital. It comes to our country in order to share the robbing exploitation of peoples' savings side by side with local capital. Thus the vast profits earned at the expense of peoples' savings are smuggled abroad through the well known tactics of over and under-costing.

The right wing's credit policy is dedicated to serving local and foreign monopolies. The vast production potential of the small and medium enterprises is virtually attached to the banking system.

There is an imperative and direct need to change the monetary-credit system from the position of a tool of large scale capital to a true tool for the development of Greek economy. Without this radical change it is futile to speak seriously about any control of inflation and about the country's social and economic progress.

#### Stagnation and Dependence

Large financial deficits and thoughtless expansion of state expenditure both in the regular budget as well as in the investments budget, have led to a worsening of inflation.

At the same time under the new democracy taxation policy the people carried and continue to carry the main burden of budget revenue. This is revenue from indirect taxation, which particularly strikes the peoples' classes, and is three fourths of the total revenue from taxes. Direct taxes are mostly based upon the declared incomes of wage earners and pensioners.

New taxation measures inaugurated by the new democracy government in 1979 only increased the unequal division of national income. The required taxation proofs create imaginary and non-existent incomes from the people's masses. At the same time they discourage savings trends and thus lead to a further increase in inflation. At the same time large scale capital manages to evade taxation proofs. In this way the economic oligarchy remains unpunished even though it is primarily responsible for large scale tax evasion.

The policy of the alleged production incentives is continued and further expanded. In the way these incentives are provided they are nothing but grants to the benefit of large scale capital. At the same time they cut down budget revenue and any possible margins for a more just taxation policy. It is characteristic that the government has not yet managed to present the economic program which the prime minister promised the Greek people 5 years ago. This is because its economic policy went bankrupt. The bankruptcy of the government's economic policy over the past 5 years is also expressed through its inability to create the prerequisites for the country's economic development.

Investment atrophy and particularly the drop in industrial investments threaten to lead the economy to stagnation. At the same time they strengthen inflationary trends and consequences of the credit and financial policy of the government.

The adverse developments of Greek economy and the difficulties created by the energy crisis are reflected in the considerable deterioration of the balance of payments. At the end of 1979 both the deficit in the balance of trade as well as the deficit in current transactions will be doubled by comparison to 1975. At the same time there is an increase in the dependence of Greek economy upon foreign loans which amounted to \$5 billion in 1978.

#### The Decline of the Countryside

The consequences of inflation and the policy of one-sided austerity is felt by the workers, laborers, farmers, the wage earners and pensioners.

The repeated waves of high price hikes and the anti-peoples character of the government's policy particularly strike at the Greek farmer. As if bad weather conditions were not enough, as if the inadequacy of agricultural insurance were not enough, as if the insufficiency of agrarian capital were not enough, as if the lie of medical and hospital care were not enough together with starvation pensions the producers also have to fight against the government price policy, for prices which do not even cover the cost of production.

AT191122 The farmers also have to fight against a huge swarm of middlemen who suck up their sweat and labor. At the same time as a result of the distortion in the relationship between prices created by inflation there is a continual deterioration of conditions for the exchange between agricultural and industrial products.

Unless there is a timely and radical change in the government's policy for the economic and social progress of the Greek countryside this countryside will unavoidably be led to total decline.

The farmers of Crete have a bitter experience of the government's antiagrarian policy. The prices fixed for the basic agrarian products of the island, prices which are usually fixed with too much delay, cannot even cover the cost of production for Sultana raisins, olive oil, grapes.

The government's abandonment is most evident in the sector of agrarian basic projects. The government leaves virtually unexploited the vast water wealth of the island while it maintains a totally inadequate road network throughout Crete. Naturally such a situation keeps productivity at unacceptable low levels despite the hard work of the farmers.

#### Accession and Agriculture

The government not only look overseas for excuses to justify the economic crisis and inflation. It also looks overseas for the solution to all our problems. The country's accession to the EEC is for the government God's own key to the solution of all evils.

We, PASOK, are certain that the government's choice is contrary to the true interests of the Greek people. For us, for PASOK, the problem of the social and economic structure and development of the country as well as of more general national options is our own, a Greek problem. It is a problem which must be dealt with without any foreign influences and with a full sense of the historic responsibility for the nation's future.

The government, by contrast, relegates responsibility for the country's future to non-Greek decision making centers. It believes, or it says it believes, that accession to the EEC will automatically create the prerequisites for the country's development. Such an automation not only does not exist but there is apparatus within the EEC which leads to a deterioration, to an increase in regional differences within the community itself. For us, for PASOK, there is no doubt that Greece will, with its accession to the EEC, lose the historic opportunity to establish and follow a self-supporting and independent development policy.

Repercussions from accession will be particularly felt in the agrarian sector. The orientation which the EEC is attempting to impose through agrarian policy is aimed at creating an agrarian capitalism based upon the merciless extermination of small to medium farming enterprises. This is the target toward which the system of incentives, prices, subsidies, technical conditions,

qualitative restructuring etc., is aimed at. Unavoidably this policy leads to conversion of a large number of small and medium farmers into proletarians. The government tries to encourage the farmers with imaginary incomes to be created by the difference between Greek and community prices. Deliberately, however, the government avoids to inform the farmers that galloping inflation and EEC curbs on price adjustments for agrarian products will make such a difference, even if it exists today, disappear by the time of accession.

#### A Program for Just Distribution

The long term battle against inflation demands a radical reorganization of the country's credit, financial and development policies. It also requires, however, measures which will give immediate results.

Such measures are:

1--An automatic readjustment of workers' earnings on the basis of the cost of living within specified time limits. This must be done irrespective of the readjustment, each year, of collective labor agreements so that they can reflect a share by the workers in the increase of national income.

2--Effective control of prices and profits particularly of prices which are established in a monopolistic way and which greatly influence the entire price system. The class position of the government and the lack of a suitable control apparatus explain the government's total failure in this sector.

3--The annual readjustment of the tax scale based upon the cost of living index. Through this measure it is the true income of workers that will be taxed. In other words the adjustment of wages on the basis of the cost of living index is not considered as an increase.

There must also be a radical change in the structure of the budget so that it can become a tool for the development of national economy, for curbing inflation trends and a more just distribution of national income.

If the distribution of national income is to become more just it is imperative to have a series of measures which include:

One--Readjustment of taxation scale factors with easing the burden of lower income brackets as its goal.

Two--Decrease of taxable income derived from earned wages for those who do not own a home with equivalent treatment of the home owner's income.

Three--Abolition of irrevocable tax proofs which lead to the taxation of imaginary incomes while they leave large scale capital untaxed.

Four--Abolition of taxation of pensions. This is the least that can be done by a just state for the veterans of labor.

Five--Radical amendment of the taxation code so that it can become an effective weapon for taxation control and against tax evasion.

Special weight will be given to the combat of tax evasion by local and foreign large scale enterprises which use the device of over and under-costing on a large scale.

#### AT191607 Socialization [Koinonikopoisis] of Enterprises

Development of our national economy is directly related to the amount and character of investments. It is therefore essential to reorganize state investments upon nearly the exclusive criterion of their contribution to the country's economic development. In this way the state will contribute toward formulation of a development base while local self government will draft and execute regional and local programs which fall under the national program for social and economic development.

Today stagnation and lack of drive in industrial investments leads to a worsening of inflation and undermines the development prospects of Greek economy. PASOK is determined to firmly deal with this problem through a direct and radical reform in the special investment apparatus, industrial development bank and so forth, in order to fill the investment gap without serious disturbance and disruption of the implementation of the national development program.

PASOK pays special attention to the mobilization of the vast production potential of the small and medium enterprises. Toward this end it will inaugurate a new policy of incentives which will be closely related to the goals of the development program.

PASOK is determined to protect its national program for the country's social and economic development against the undermining efforts of local and foreign economic oligarchy. For this reason it will proceed to the gradual socialization of basic and strategic sectors of our economy which are also its foundations. Such sectors are the banks, insurance, mass transportation and communications, energy and utilities, large scale export and import trade, large enterprises for exploitation of mineral wealth, ship-building yards, the steel cement and fertilizer industries as well as enterprises having to do with national defense and medicine. These measures have an anti-monopoly as well as an anti-dependence character. They are aimed at passing control of strategic sectors--levers--to the social whole and its representatives.

Private initiative will be able to operate without interference within this framework on the basis of common interest as a basic criterion, as this interest is expressed in the goals of the national program for economic and social development.

## A Different Policy for Agriculture

A corner stone in PASOK's economic policy will be development in the agrarian sector.

A radical institutional change will be implemented on a long term basis through creation of agrarian-industrial cooperatives of a new type. In this way there will be unification of the factory with the field and the prerequisites will be created for a spectacular increase in productivity. In this way the control of production and marketing will pass into the hands of the farmers themselves. This will also put an end to exploitation of the farmers by the middlemen and middle merchants. Apart from this basic institutional change the increase of agrarian productivity will also require a long term investment program for the development and completion of the sub-structure of our agrarian economy, road network, irrigation projects etc.

PASOK will take direct measures for the protection of the farmer's true income. For this purpose it will implement a new price policy. Prices for agrarian products will be announced early, they will cover the cost of production and they will leave a logical margin of profit. PASOK will attempt to increase the factors of compensation, will complete insurance coverage to cover all dangers due to adverse weather conditions as well as to cover all production sectors, plant and animal, as well as agrarian capital.

At the same time special significance will be attributed to preventative insurance for produce which today is virtually nonexistent. Within the limits of the gradual reorganization of the country's health system PASOK will give special priority to meeting the medical and pharmaceutical needs of the agrarian population.

Agrarian pensions are today an insult and contempt to veterans of the earth. Agrarian pensions must be placed upon new foundations. As a temporary and immediate measure PASOK will triple current agrarian pensions. At the same time it will provide an independent pension to the farm woman and will cut down the age limit for her retirement.

## Mobilization of the Workers

Our country is faced with a galloping inflation, stagnation, at low levels, of productive investments and an ever increasing deficit in the balance of payments. Prospects for 1980 are a continuation of the high 2-figure inflationary standard, a considerable decrease in the rate of increase in national income, unemployment and further redistribution of national income at the expense of the workers and to the benefit of monopolistic conglomerates and the oligarchy of wealth. This is the legacy of the thoughtless financial and currency policy of the government, of its inability to effectively control prices of foreign and local monopolies and to combat the profiteering of the middlemen and the tax evasion of large scale capital.

The policy of one-sided austerity, austerity for the many and luxury for the few, is a provocation against the workers, the farmers, the wage earners, the professionals, pensioners and our youth.

AT191644 It is unavoidable that workers must mobilize against the policy of one-sided austerity. PASOK unreservedly supports their just struggles for the protection of their true income. In reply to their struggles the government counters with special riot squads and armored cars, with suppression apparatus and an antilabor and antipeoples institutional framework. Without the purge which the people expected, without the hellenization of the state's apparatus, without the detachment of the armed forces from foreign controlled apparatus, we once again see erection of the authoritarian state of the right wing. The government of the right moves within its framework in order to subdue, direct, disrupt and weaken our country's trade union movement. It is only in this way that it can support its anti-income policy and to guarantee the profits of local and foreign monopolies.

The government has not hesitated to employ every acceptable and unacceptable method in combatting the worker's mobilization. It has resorted to the unacceptable and undemocratic measure of conscription. It violated university asylum. It demonstrated a bestial and unprecedented harshness in order to disperse the peaceful demonstration at the university's gates. In conclusion it employed the legal trick of "security measures" thus violating the constitution which guarantees the right to strike.

Every day the workers understand that the right wing, in all its hues, multiplies the dangers and problems our country is facing. The workers daily clash with the policy of dependence, authoritarianism and austerity. Every day the peoples masses develop, liberate themselves and forge their unity through common struggles against new democracy's atlantic, authoritarian and anti-peoples policy. Every day the peoples masses rise and they steadily promote the policy and goals of national independence, people sovereignty and socialist change.

The rooting and growth of the movement for radical change is primarily waged through struggles and claims. It is through such struggles that mass movements are forged in the areas of the worker-employees, the farmers, the professionals, the artesans, the scientists, the youth and local self government.

#### Claiming Authority

Although a minority yet the right wing has managed to govern the country for decades. For this purpose it employed all possible means: violence and corruption, election systems tailored to its own measures, monopolization of mass information media and even violation of the constitution and democratic institutions.

Today our mature people are seeking the radical change.

The popular foundation of new democracy is steadily shrinking. Its turn toward PASOK is also speedy. The impressive political rise of PASOK naturally places huge responsibilities in front of our movement. This is why PASOK pursues the firm establishment and development of the people's forces around the main axis of national peoples' unity. In this way PASOK addresses itself to the large masses of the Greek people, it calls upon them to overcome old dependencies and predilections, it calls upon them to unite within the movement for national liberation, independence, territorial integrity democracy and social change.

PASOK calls upon the man of daily labor to join, to take up the cause of change in his own two hands. It calls upon you to be present in the struggles of local democratic self government, of the agrarian associations and cooperatives. It is only in this way that you will be able to strengthen and effectively claim your rights.

PASOK calls upon you to join its ranks, to join in a militant spirit to carry the message for change to every village, every town quarter, to every place of work. Take up in your own hands the struggle for independence, people's authority, democracy and socialism.

All together and each one according to his own strength we can raise the sun (PASOK's symbol) over Greece.

The vision of radical change and people's authority is today directly visible. It can and it must become a tangible reality.

In the next election PASOK will claim authority, so that it will be able to forge a new course, a course which will reflect the desires and expectations of our people and particularly of the new generation.

Forward, all together for a new Greece, a Greece belonging to the Greeks.

CSO: 4908

## GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO PASOK'S 'GOVERNMENT PROGRAM'

AT191745 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 18 Oct 79 p 6 AT

[Text] Commenting on the Iraklion speech by PASOK's chairman, a government spokesman made the following statement:

1--By following the dogma that one can easier dominate the people by fanning their feelings instead of pursuing the people's rights, the chairman of PASOK surpassed his worse self today at Iraklion with his baseless polemics, demagogic lack of responsibility and contradictory wish-mongering.

Political circles realize that the Iraklion speech was aimed at diverting the people's crushing attention from the prime minister's visit and the collapse of PASOK's foreign policy. The people are not ignorant of the fact that a) it is not the first time the chairman of PASOK appears on the political stage and that he is not untried in the exercise of authority, b) that the economic crisis belaboring the country does not have basic internal reasons but is a world phenomenon as a result of which other countries' measures are stricter than those of Greece particularly in respect of wage earners and c) any possible implementation of PASOK's economic recipes, presented as an economic policy, would result in the immediate and total collapse of Greek economy.

2--PASOK's chairman returns to foreign policy and does not get tired in prophecising imminent national treason or imminent national calamities. His followers have been rattled by the proud statement of the Greek prime minister that "we accept neither tutors nor do we exercise blackmail." This responsible position is the result of high prestige and universal recognition.

PASOK's chairman complains that the East European visit was undertaken too late. His own government however which preceded not only failed to undertake such a visit but it even rejected an invitation. PASOK's chairman contradicts himself also in his declarations. Although allegedly he is happy with the applied multifaceted policy he protests that visits to eastern countries are followed by visits to other countries. In other words he protests because we do not agree to attach ourselves to the

chariot of one single policy and at the same time to unhesitatingly call ourselves nonaligned. As for the rest he repeats the boring litany about NATO and bases which is not worthy of an answer.

3--Referring to the economic crisis and inflation PASOK's chairman enumerates measures he would take if ever his party attains authority. These are not measures but gifts, increases of wages and salaries, increase of prices, tax exemptions and subsidies. Nowhere does he explain how he will deal with inflation and he does not say where he will find the money to pay for his gifts. This is not even demogogy it is just "distribution of pennies at a Cretan baptism."

4--The only anti-inflation proposal in the Iraklion speech is in the cut in credits, regular budget expenditure and the investments budget. There are two contradictions here. Cut of these expenses is incompatible to the proposal for an increase in allocations. Such a cut would, of necessity lead to recession and unemployment which, however, PASOK's chairman ignores.

--PASOK's chairman at Iraklion alleged that taxation revenue is born by the wage earners and pensioners. Nobody ignores the wage earner's contribution to revenue. On this point, however, the statement is inaccurate. Although wage earners are more than half the taxpayers, in 1979 they paid less than 50 percent of taxes. While the average tax factor on wage earners' declared income was 6.5 percent, it was 9.9 for the rest. It would be better if the movements' advisors drew their conclusions upon true facts instead of trying to use their own facts.

6--He also alleges that proofs upon which tax evasion was considerably decreased only produced results because citizens were allegedly overtaxed. On this point too his advisors swept their leader away. It is well known that the sum total of income declared in 1979 in the amount of 369.5 billion drachma was voluntarily declared as income by the taxpayers and not as an expense based upon proof provided. This denies PASOK's allegation. As to the rest PASOK returns to over and under costing but once again proposes nothing to combat the practice.

7--The Iraklion speech expresses concern over deficits in the balance of payments but forgets to reveal to PASOK's followers that \$1.7 billion is now spent on fuels and that \$400 million is spent on car imports. PASOK's chairman also wants a cut in foreign exchange spending on cars but is against any logical curb on their importation.

8--He demonstrated all his sympathy to Crete, allegedly treated unjustly in the investments sector. He did not tell the people, however, that this year Iraklion area has in hand a 1.5 billion drachma development project while in 1964 to 65 when PASOK's chairman was minister of coordination this amount was nonexistent.

9--Once again from a safe distance he attacks our country's participation in the EEC. Yet he had the opportunity to explain his views in the chamber.

Lacking any arguments he cleverly avoided any dialog. Nobody pays any attention to his monolog now.

10--PASOK's chairman proposes an adjustment of salaries and wages on the basis of the cost of living index. He says nothing, however, on the fact that so far wage earners and farmers have a true income, thanks to the government's measures, which is much higher than the cost of living index.

11--There are only two messages from the commonplace Iraklion speech: One, that he calls for formation of a popular front and, two, that he directly fires against the armed forces which he allegedly wants to detach from foreign motivated apparatus. Under such conditions it is in vain that PASOK strives to gain the people's confidence at some future time.

CSO: 4908

## 'I KATHIMERINI' ANALYZES PASOK PARTY DILEMMAS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Oct 79 p 4 AT

[Political analysis by I KATHIMERINI contributor Stamos Zoulas: "The Critical Political Dilemmas of PASOK"]

[Text] PASOK is facing critical dilemmas in the most significant issues of its internal and foreign policy, dilemmas that concern the election of a new president of the republic, the method of dealing with the new reality which is taking shape after our country's accession to the EEC and generally the formulation of a new policy to contest power. This is based on assessments and conclusions from a friendly but very interesting talk by PASOK Chairman A. Papandreu with political editors of Athens newspapers in Kastri last Monday evening. Given the fact that a friendly talk is not as important as a declaration of positions, this analysis does not claim to be infallible regarding the assessments and judgments it makes nor does it pretend to be anything other than an analysis.

At present, the nucleus of PASOK problems seems to be the fact that in 6 months the Chamber of Deputies will elect a new president of the republic and naturally the party of official opposition views this fact as the beginning of political developments or at least the clarification of the course which our political affairs will follow over at least the next 2 years after Prime Minister K. Karamanlis has revealed his intentions.

The PASOK dilemma on this specific issue is whether it should support, indirectly encourage or oppose a possible Karamanlis intention to contest the presidency of the republic. This dilemma becomes even more complicated since, like all Greeks, Papandreu till now does not know the plans, if these have been made, of the current prime minister.

Pasok considers it most probable that Karamanlis will contest the presidency provided our country's accession to the EEC is finalized by April following the ratification of the accession treaty by the parliaments of the community's most important partners. This conviction is strengthened, always to the PASOK viewpoint, by the prime minister's recent working trip to four west European capitals and the urgency the Greek prime minister attaches to the completion of the final procedural phase for accession.

In this instance, it is speculated that Karamanlis wants to assure the retention of power by the current party of the majority if possible until the chamber's term of office expires in November 1981.

If, for any reason, the prime minister does not move on to the presidency and remains at the head of New Democracy, predictions by PASOK on the results of the next elections--whenever these take place--give 38 to 40 percent to New Democracy and 35 to 36 percent to the party of official opposition. Should, however, Karamanlis prefer to become president or decide to withdraw from politics, according to the PASOK viewpoint the above percentages will be reversed, in which case PASOK will be the first party and New Democracy will take its place as official opposition with 35 to 36 percent of the vote.

On the basis of these assessments, the current prime minister's movement to the presidency will favor PASOK in its efforts to attain power. Furthermore, it is admitted that Karamanlis' presence in the supreme state office makes more "digestible" the election of a PASOK government and of Papandreu as prime minister, thus lessening fears of a disturbance in normality and of reactions that may perhaps precede this possibility.

However, this "positive" element is balanced by two "negative" repercussions. On the one hand, it is noted that because of the power the constitution gives to the president of the republic, Karamanlis will be in the position to thwart the implementation of PASOK's program of "change" even though this party may be the majority in the chamber. On the other hand, the ideological-political rift between the current prime minister and Papandreu makes it very difficult for Pasok to support or even to tolerate Karamanlis' candidacy as the "representative of the right" for the office of the presidency.

These are, in summary form, the constant factors which pose a dilemma to PASOK concerning its position on the election of a new president for the republic. However, there are, in addition, certain imponderables and unforeseen factors which may influence the final decision of the party of official opposition.

For instance, if during the successive votes for the election of the new president Karamanlis cannot garner the bare majority of 180 votes, then the parties or the groups which oppose Karamanlis' candidacy will shoulder the responsibility for the dissolution of the chamber. (As is well known, this ultimate solution is foreseen by the constitution when after three successive votes no candidate has received three-fifths of the votes of the deputies, that is 180 votes).

In such a case, the situation will become complicated since the opposition of 121 deputies to the prospective president will lead to an immediate electoral confrontation and since secret balloting encourages party indiscipline by deputies who do not wish to jeopardize prematurely their offices to which they were elected for 4 years.

Evaluating all the above thoughts, one could say in conclusion that Pasok would like Karamanlis to become president without, however, being ready to contribute positively to his election. That is, the most ideal solution for Pasok is to elect the current prime minister as president despite the declared opposition of PASOK's 93 deputies. It is not unusual in politics for desire to conflict with action.

In any case, PASOK assessments regarding the possible development of our political affairs and its predictions about the differentiation "which is taking place" in electoral power between the two largest Greek parties create new dilemmas for the party of official opposition.

[AT301618] On the basis of PASOK forecasts, it is most probable that neither of the two large parties will secure an absolute majority in a future electoral confrontation. It should also be added that the leadership of the party of official opposition precludes in advance the possibility of post-electoral cooperation between PASOK and the KKE or New Democracy, nor does it foresee cooperation by New Democracy with the "National Front." Therefore, given the fact that the power of the remaining parties--according to the same forecasts--will not be sufficient for the formation of a majority government, PASOK sees no other solution in this instance that recourse to a government of technocrats which will survive as long as the two largest parties tolerate it.

In this series of suppositional and hazardous forecasts, the most notable element is PASOK's inflexibility on the issue of post-electoral cooperation. Regardless of how much this stance is dictated by tactical reasons--since any preliminary discussion for post-electoral cooperation may be construed as defeatism--it continues to reflect a real situation based on PASOK's conviction that only through a pure government will it be able to implement the "change" it has declared.

This aim springs not so much from the differences of the PASOK economic program, as the movement's leadership has admitted, but from the ideological rift that exists between the agent of the official opposition and the other parties, especially on issues of foreign policy. Actually, Papandreu himself unexpectedly minimized existing differences between New Democracy and PASOK in the foreign policy field and on Monday evening recalled to political editors--without any intention to satirize--that Karamanlis considers himself "somewhat socialist."

Of course this position cannot be considered irrelevant to the current PASOK goal of appeasing and proselytizing new followers from New Democracy, as became obvious in Papandreu's last speech at Iraklion. One could observe that in that speech the PASOK chairman--somewhat in contradiction with the previous observation--tried to maximize his party's rift with the government on domestic issues, especially economic policy, but blunted his criticism on foreign issues.

Perhaps this contradiction implies one more PASOK dilemma. On the one hand, the party of official opposition seeks to gain the trust of the most conservative classes, downgrading for instance the significance, extent and profundity of the program for "socialization" it has announced. On the other hand, it is afraid lest it disappoint that segment of its electoral force which considers PASOK as the agent of an advanced socialist transformation.

In these circumstances, one can justify the current position of the party's leadership which emphasizes its ideological differences with the other parties without specifying how these differences will be substantiated in political action when and if the Greek people trust PASOK to assume power.

The most indicative example of these tactics is the current position of the party of official opposition on the EEC issues.

Papandreu has promised that when his party comes to power it will ask for a plebiscite so the Greek people can decide the issue of our country's accession to the EEC. Since then--and after the signing of the agreement--PASOK has "rested." Deactivating every reaction it had to this issue which is of determinative significance for our country's future and especially at the current stage presupposes an irrevocable procedure for adjusting ourselves to the regime of the community.

This acquires an additional significance from the fact that PASOK's "promise" is constitutionally and politically impotent. This is so because according to the constitution the decision to hold a plebiscite is the prerogative of the president of the republic who according to article 44, paragraph 2 of the constitution "can by decree proclaim the holding of plebiscites on critical national issues."

Therefore, on the basis of the current political reality and on the basis of Pasok "forecasts" regarding Karamanlis' move to the presidency, the final decision and responsibility for the legalization and implementation of Papandreu's "promise" concerning the holding of a plebiscite belongs exclusively to the president of the republic.

The final conclusion from all the above notes and assessments is that although Pasok declares it is on "the road to power." It does not seem to have solved basic problems of its political and ideological orientation. In other words the voters, who PASOK hopes will join its ranks, should know not only what PASOK "does not want" but also "what PASOK seeks," especially "how it will achieve it."

CSO: 4908

## PASOK ACCOMPLISHMENTS TRENDS REPORTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 2-3 Sep 79 pp 4, 13

[Text] It has been almost 5 years since the founding of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). This is an opportunity to give an account of the course of the party to date and evaluate its prospects. The critique of its 5-year course by the party of the axiomatic opposition itself is perhaps harder than what appears in the press, whether friendly to PASOK or not, because it is a fact that PASOK has changed to the second political power of the country in less than 5 years with a surprising course and with a real potential to take over power.

The founding of PASOK was declared by Mr A. Papandreu on September 3, 1974, 15 days after he returned to Greece, in an impressively large press conference at the King's Palace Hotel. It was the biggest press conference a political party held after the political change. That is why it attracted even more attention.

Mr Papandreu stated the principles of PASOK and made an appeal to the Center and the Left to join. The principles in the revealing speech provided the facts and the followers could have come forth.

The response of the leftists and the oppositionists to this invitation was limited. That is why he agreed to make quite a few concessions, mostly on positions, to the party mechanism established at that time so the "Democratic Defense" would join. The officials of the Democratic Defense with their oppositionist activity would have added a glitter and projection to a new party that was fighting hard against another section of the "Center Union." The accession was confirmed with a second press conference a month later. The basic officials of Defense were sitting next to Mr Papandreu. Among them were professor Sakis Karagiorgas, V. Filias and others. PASOK managed to insert the oppositionist titles within the narrow limits of PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement).

During the same period, however, and after he secured the accession of "Defense," he excluded the leftist-Marxist representatives of "chaos," most of whom originated from the pre-dictatorship EDA (United Democratic Left). It was an action that made problems for many at that time.

Those same days, he was officially inaugurating his pre-election collaboration, wearing the leather jacket, typical at the time, presenting his wife at his side almost always on the balcony, and projecting the slogan "Socialism on Monday," promising self-government at the same time.

#### Goodbye "Zhivago"

But the electoral results did not justify the predictions of PASOK, which obtained a rate smaller than 13 percent and only 12 parliament members whom it increased to 15 during the repeat elections that came up. The electoral failure had the first results. The leather jacket and the zhivago were abandoned and replaced with a tie. The first open clash within the party broke out about who would be in charge, the president or the collective officials. To confront the post-election problems, Mr Papandreu renewed the Central Committee of PASOK and the Executive Office. Less than 3 months later all the top officials of PAK and "Defense" resigned en masse. On his personal decision, Mr Papandreu fired three of the nine members of the Executive Committee and 43 of the 70 members of the Central Committee.

This crisis proved that PASOK is nothing more than Andreas Papandreu. The resignations of the members of "Defense" and PAK, including all those who surrounded the president of PASOK in key positions of the party, had a very small repercussion, if any, on the electoral clients. The fact that certain constitutional procedures had not been observed as well as the principles of September 3 was considered only by a few intellectuals who also withdrew.

From that time on, the president of PASOK imposed absolute obedience in his party. The "infiltrators," the followers of known Trotskyite Pablo, who did not appear to obey loyally were also dropped from the party rolls in the summer of 1976 and the next spring a mass resignation of the youth officials followed. It was the period when PASOK presented a significant rise by starting an extreme opposition to Karamanlis and accusing EDIK (Democratic Center Union) and Mr G. Mavros of being a "tail" of the "New Democracy."

The policy of intense advertisement and projection was assuming other proportions. The positions taken by PASOK were always opposite to the government positions, regardless of whether they referred to internal or external affairs. Thus, that summer we had slogans such as: "Sink Khora" for doubling the price of any agricultural product or for the support of every demand for a raise in pay by striking workers.

By following the policy of the extreme opposition, but with a great art in opposition sloganism, Mr Papandreu led the party to the electoral triumph of 1977. PASOK doubled its vote, passing the 25 percent mark--and surpassing every optimistic prediction of the most loyal officials. The balance of power on the political scene changed perceptively, especially if the sudden rise of PASOK is compared with the drop in power of the "New Democracy" from 54.5 percent to 42 percent.

The first target of Mr Papandreu, the annihilation of EDIK, had been achieved. The party of the Center dissolved into many pieces after its electoral defeat. Even PASOK and the ND (New Democracy) went after a part of it. The 92 members of the Parliamentary Group were divided in various "work groups" for better production. The party mechanism confirmed its domination in the Parliamentary Representation, as the Parliamentary Group was characteristically named.

#### First Problems

But the first problems started to appear very soon. It was evident that the upward march was not so easy, but was becoming rather awkward. The first consequences of the absolute domination of Mr Papandreu were expressed within the party. The revealing speech, the principles of September 3, did not appear capable of securing the smooth operation of the party.

The first manifestation of intraparty difficulties became evident with the inability of PASOK to organizationally assimilate the new voters. The party officials who held the important positions in the central offices of the party and in the district are anything but representative of its voters. And this is one of the basic subjects of the intraparty dissension. Indeed, after the mass resignations of 1975, 1976 and 1977, they do not represent even the 13 percent of 1974 as claimed by their rivals. Thus, the first chasm became evident, its most important manifestation being the clash between the Parliamentary Group and the party officials, in a concealed form of course, which perhaps made it more explosive.

As time went by, the tempering of the two trends became more difficult as was being ascertained by Mr Papandreu who could not answer with new resignations this time. The obligations were different for an axiomatic opposition and the repercussions much more critical. Perhaps for this reason he chose to follow his other tactic: to ignore the existence of every party functionary and to handle matters by himself, with the cover of the "obedient and without opinion" Executive Office, as it was called by one of his better parliament members. When one of his members, professor K. Simitis, dared to publicly express a previous view of his president which did not agree with the slogans of the moment, he found out about his resignation by reading the newspaper.

The Central Committee and the Parliamentary Group meet every 6 months, but every time it has been declared that they will hold regular monthly congresses to define the policy of the party. The major objection and criticism of most of the parliament members as well as of many officials is that PASOK remains a complaint movement according to the tactics it employs and thereby precludes itself from becoming the party in power. All of these persons argue that by continuing the policy of slogans, PASOK may gain 5 percent but will never reach the rate of the first party. The reason for this is that many voters have not been convinced of the party's ability to govern. And being with the party in power counts a lot for the Greek voter.

### Slogan Promotion

The party's stand in Parliament and on the more general political problems caused the manifestation of the disagreements. Those in Parliament who criticized the way the Parliamentary Group was operating were not few. They disliked the projection of popular slogan promotion and the avoidance of constructive criticism. During the last two meetings of the Parliamentary Group, which had some quite intense discussions, Mr Papandreu was compelled to direct very strict warnings to his parliament members not to publicize what was being discussed, in other words not to give the press something to exploit.

In fact, the intraparty dissension is mentioned mainly in plotting the strategy of PASOK. One wing, the one which includes most of the parliament members and many officials who do not hold important positions in the party mechanism, proposes the acceptance of a more flexible policy for the purpose of attracting the voters of the Center in preparation for taking over the government. This same wing wishes a change in policy on the matter of the EEC, even with silent acceptance of accession and the joining by PASOK of the Socialist International, even in the form of an observer in the first phase.

But these changes hit upon the reaction of the party officials who want a continuance of the present policy with extreme leftist slogans. These officials hold the most important positions of the party mechanism and thus the dispute is increasingly assuming the form of rivalry between parliament members and party officials. In the first phase, after the withdrawal from Parliament during the discussion of the Accession Treaty with the EEC, the views of the party officials prevailed. The parliament members were informed of the decision to withdraw from Mr Papandreu himself when he got up on the podium in Parliament.

This withdrawal made the intraparty dissension more acute instead of calming it down. Mr Papandreu did not dare call a Parliamentary Group meeting or a meeting of the Central Committee of the party, hoping that with summer vacations the situation would be defused. Up to now, however, the opposite results have occurred. The parliament members who returned to their provinces carried the negative influence of the withdrawal from Parliament. Indeed, many believe that if there had been no withdrawal, the rise of the party would have been much greater, after the diminished power of the New Democracy with the anti-democratic measures it took to cope with the economic crises.

### Disagreements of the Wings

The disagreement within PASOK in this way assumes the form of a struggle for the future course of the party. One wing believes that the only thing accomplished by the socialist slogans is the repulsion of the voters of the Center while, at the same time, lowering socialism to slogan promotion, avoiding to project its democratic principles and the need for free dialogue. The same people believe that the majority during the last 50 to 60 years in

Greece was held always by the parties that managed to attract a large part or all of the voters of the Center. And these powers respected and supported, even more than their own interests, the principles of democratic dialogue, both within the party and more generally in political life.

What they are especially asking is that PASOK stop promoting its popular slogans and the projection of a revealing speech, that always identifies with the principles of September 3. Those principles are always violated at critical moments and are used as arguments by those who resign. This revealing speech was accompanied by an intense projection of advertising tricks that betray a deep knowledge of capitalist advertising. What was sought was the creation of impressions at the proper time without concern for substance. And this is because the principle of advertising appears to be well known. When a strong impression is created, the advantage is greater because in the long run, even though it is contradicted, the intense emotional element has been impressed.

By exploiting these elements, the president of PASOK managed to always properly channel his slogans, directing himself each time to one class of the population. This way, the contending slogans are directed to the middle class and the farmers who now have the same mentality as the middle class: The insatiable appetite for social exhibition and for increasing income for consumption. The socialistic slogans are directed to the youth and to the party officials, to those who believe that with the slogans they have solved the social problems and who have divided the world into the good and the bad. Finally, the national slogans are directed to the army and the conservative layers of the population.

### Symplegades

The projection of this slogan promotion is planned by the party mechanism and is imposed upon the parliament members of the party. Its reflection is evident from the electoral clientele of PASOK. During the elections of 1977, it managed to win over more of the conservative agrarian masses rather than the voters who left the Center. But even today, the parliament members and the politicians who return from the province carry the word that the conservative layers are moving towards PASOK more than the center ones. Indeed, they mention examples of people from the right wing of the New Democracy who joined PASOK, being disappointed by the economic crises and complaining about the strict government measures.

All these messages that they carry reinforce the internal disagreement and render the course of PASOK even more awkward. In other words, how will he manage to maneuver between the symplegades and the reefs which he has planted himself? The cultivation of popular psychology contributes to reversing every accusation against the leader and turning it into an advantage. But, on the other hand, it causes repulsive reactions by a large part of the people, especially those who are becoming necessary for the increase in the power of PASOK. Because they all know very well that in the parties that show the

accelerated growth of PASOK, a social law of a continuous upward course is in force. They cannot remain stationary. Either they expand at a faster pace or they are crushed. The remodeling of the party for a smoother evolution is also the request of the parliament members. How and to what extent this can be accomplished remains to be proven in the coming months.

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## 'AKROPOLIS' INTERVIEWS PASOK'S PAPANDREOU ON OPENING TO EAST

AT211730 Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 21 Oct 79 pp 1, 13 AT

[Interview with Andreas G. Papandreu, PASOK chairman]

[Excerpts] The great inquiry among political leaders which AKROPOLIS began last Sunday in connection with the significance and results of Prime Minister K. Karamanlis' visit and talks in Moscow and the other eastern capitals ends today with an exclusive interview by leader of official opposition A. Papandreu which follows:

On the basis of the questions which are published at the end, the PASOK chairman gave one integral reply. The text of the interview is as follows:

"As you know, we have hailed the prime minister's initiative and also the Soviet Union's initiative for a rapprochement between the two countries. The significant thing about the visit is the fact that at last, some 15 years after the inauguration of the policy of peaceful coexistence, a Greek prime minister has visited Moscow. During those 15 years, our allies have gone many times. It was and still is clear that this timelag of about 15 years is a kind of measure of respect for the role Greece plays in the alliance. This alignment with the West, which was delayed for 15 years, actually means that Greece is considered by its allies to be a satellite of NATO and the United States or a province of the EEC.

"Consequently, it is a delayed alignment but a very significant one because at least the cold war has also ended for Greece. This is what it is about and Averof's statement that there is no longer a danger from the north seals a new position of the rightwing.

Certainly I consider correct the prime minister's initiative. However, I do not think that one can say that this visit to Moscow constitutes a significant change in Greece's foreign policy. I do not believe this. It simply concerns an alignment, as I said before, and a correct step. However, I believe that the policy of Karamanlis and the right remains firmly one-dimensional for the following reasons: Karamanlis the minister of foreign

affairs and the minister of defense have striven to appease the Western allies regarding the meaning of the trip to Moscow.

"Before his departure for Moscow, the prime minister criticized the press because its imagination had no limits and because it was constructing a fanciful novel attributing a significance to his visit to the Soviet Union which it did not have.

"While the prime minister and the foreign minister were in Moscow, Rallis stressed on Soviet soil that Karamanlis' visit to the Soviet Union did not constitute anything but an act which the allies had made much earlier. Precisely what I said about alinement was stated by Rallis in Moscow, who gave a sort of assurance to the West that the government maintains the basic principles on which it is based: NATO and the one-dimensional alliance with the West. Finally, speaking to the navy, Averof used Karamanlis' now classic phrase that 'we belong to the West.' He said it in these exact words and added that we are exerting efforts to develop good relations with our other neighbors. Consequently, it is clear that the government line was to downgrade the trip.

"I have been criticized that allegedly I have downgraded the significance of the trip, but it is obvious that the Moscow visitors themselves have downgraded it.

"On the other hand, there is also the prime minister's trip to the four West European capitals and later his visit to Beijing.

"The trip to Europe creates the impression that Karamanlis is going in order to explain to the European friends what happened in Moscow and to limit the impressions which may have possibly been created after the agreement of Neorion of Siros, which truly has absolutely annoyed U.S. and NATO circles.

"After Europe, a trip to Beijing will follow which is a tough opponent of Moscow so that the trip to the Soviet Union may appear simply as an act that falls within a more general policy of being on good terms with all countries of the world with which we have no differences about our territory or our national independence.

"Many times the question has been asked regarding the trip to Moscow: Is there something new? Of course, I do not refer to the economic agreements which may be significant, provided they are implemented by both sides. Many of these are still 'on paper' and only now will investigations and studies be made so that the Soviets may decide whether to proceed with their investments in Greece on the energy problem, the production of alumina and so forth."

#### Confirmation of Positions

"The question is: What political news is there? The viewpoint I have many times expressed is that the only significant thing about the visit is the

visit itself: Not the talks, which in my opinion on the political level constituted only a confirmation of each side's positions without efforts for a coincidence of views on something common. Both held their positions: the one NATO and the other the Warsaw Pact.

"Perhaps the only point which may have significance in the political consultations that took place in Moscow is that both sides took a clear position on the issue of peace, arms and detente. There was absolute agreement on these. I am not noting these things because I spoke with the prime minister, but because I had reached my conclusions on them before my meeting with Karamanlis.

"Consequently, this is how we should assess the visit to Moscow, as an event that has value precisely because the trip did take place and not for the results the prime minister brought back to Greece."

#### AT211854 About the 12 Miles

"I believe--I said so before the trip--it would have been significant had the Soviet Union taken a position on the 12-mile issue.

"I do not underestimate the fact that the extension of our territorial waters is solely a Greek issue. Greece has the right internationally to pass a law that will define its territorial waters at 12 miles. However, it is correct for one to expect some support from a country for which the Aegean is significant because it is an access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. That would have been very useful, but clearly that did not happen; that is, the Soviet side did not take a position on the issue."

#### The Turkish Aggressiveness

"In addition, at first glance it seems that in the Moscow talks the reference to the final act of Helsinki which concerns the borders, the Aegean and the Balkans is politically significant. We benefit from this but, in Greece's instance, to refer to the final act of Helsinki and at the same time to decide that the Greek-Turkish dispute should be resolved through peaceful means is not enough in Greece's interest. This is so not because I believe that there should be a clash and that the difference should not be resolved peacefully. But as soon as one starts talking about the peaceful solution of a difference one has legalized it, has accepted it, has accepted that there is indeed a dispute and as Greeks in no way must we accept that there is a dispute. There is merely a provocative aggressiveness by Turkey and a violation of our borders. Consequently, when one says that one supports a peaceful solution in the Aegean, that the interests of Greece and Turkey are similar and does not specify that Turkey is being aggressive and Greece defensive, then one does not offer much to the cause but on the contrary strengthens the viewpoints that some other parties--the great--should intervene for a division of the Aegean."

### **Without Delusions**

"I regret to say this because I know that on other issues, like the Cyprus case, the Soviet Union has taken a very positive position. However, on the issue of the Aegean, the Soviet Union is using the same language as the West; that is, the peaceful solution of existing difference. I must again stress that I do not want to downgrade the visit to Moscow, but we should not have any delusions concerning what happened or will happen."

### **The Guarantee of Borders**

"Had the Soviet Union said that borders are inviolate, meaning the continental shelf and the air space, that would be a clear position supporting Greece's right and not a favor to it. This is what we expected. Perhaps we should not have expected so many things right now. However, it is clear that Moscow's relations with Ankara are very close.

"As everybody has stressed, Turkey's borders with the Soviet Union are very long. There is also the matter of passage through the Dardanelles and the fact that because of its proximity to the Soviet Union Turkey can create problems in the soft underbelly in case of a world war.

"Consequently, it is obvious that as far as Greek interests are concerned the Soviet Union will not betray its relations with Turkey in preference to relations with Greece. Essentially, the Soviet Union does not want to become involved in the dispute, but we do not call it a dispute. The Soviet Union wants to maintain friendly relations with both Turkey and Greece and this is understandable.

"One cannot ask something from the Soviet Union which is not in its interests, as the prime minister correctly stated. On the other hand, we must not have delusions as to what Moscow can and cannot offer.

"I mention all these things not in order to downplay--I stress this again--the trip's significance, but to help in the correct assessment of the visit to Moscow."

### **Karamanlis' Multidimensional Policy**

"There is no doubt that Karamanlis has made certain foreign policy moves. These moves constitute something new for Greece. What is this? It is the open policy in the Balkans which G. Papandréou had put in motion many years ago. Indeed, G. Papandréou is considered by the Balkan people as the man who laid the foundations for this relationship with the Balkans.

"In any case, Karamanlis has shown that he desires not only bilateral but multilateral cooperation with the Balkan countries and, furthermore, the prime minister has visited and started a dialog with the Arab countries.

Of course, the visit to Moscow is more significant than the other two I mentioned because with the trip to the Soviet Union Greece seems to be receiving a sort of diploma from its allies that it has grown up a little while previously it was an infant. I am stressing the positive elements of this policy. We have always hailed these because we are not conducting petty politics. When such things happen we are glad and say 'well done.' However, I think that it would be a huge mistake to believe that Karamanlis has essentially changed his foreign policy.

"I do not believe this because it is clear that Greece is seeking by all means to join the EEC, something that constitutes an identification of the Greek economy with the West European economy."

#### AT211936 The Return to NATO

"In addition, Karamanlis wants to return the country to the NATO military wing. It is clear to me that the government is exerting a huge effort to facilitate Greece's return to NATO.

"The fact that so far the Americans and NATO have in fact proposed a return to the NATO military wing with a simultaneous betrayal of Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean--mainly in the air space and waters--should lead Karamanlis to suspend negotiations. An ally should not put forth the issue of your borders. What kind of an alliance is this when the cost for joining is to relinquish part of your soil. What kind of an alliance is this when in fact it played a role in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus? What kind of an alliance is this which cannot protect the borders of one of its members from another ally, as is the case with Turkey? Why do you need specifically this alliance when you state that there is no 'danger from the north'?

"This persistence is now incomprehensible, and it is a persistence.

"The prime minister will not do anything that will damage this identification of Greece with the West. What he attempted by the visit to Moscow is simply a very delayed repetition of tactics the West has followed.

"If Karamanlis truly, as such is the case, seeks accession to the EEC, return to the NATO military wing and retention of the bases in Greece, then I think that this policy cannot be called multidimensional. It is simply a one-dimensional policy with certain embellishments.

"I mention the bases, and I should add that the way things are developing the "Pershing 2" (Editor's note: The new type medium-range missile America wants to install in Europe) probably will come to Greece on the altar of the NATO alliance. The danger of nuclear holocaust in case of war will be real.

"This is not being noted by an 'extremist' voice, my own. The truth is that the country will be destroyed, since it has so many bases and so many weapons in it.

"It is clear that there are nuclear warheads in Greece. We do not know where they are, but we know that they are in Greece. Should 'Pershing 2' missiles also be installed, then we are clearly saying to the Soviet Union that in case of a world war it should exterminate everything in Greece."

#### The Cyprus Dossier

"However, have the bases which in 1974 played a provocative role on Turkey's side helped us?

"Not enough things and not many things have been stated or written about this because the government avoids opening the 'Cyprus dossier.'

"It is doing so principally in order not to offend the Americans and NATO with which it wants to be on good terms despite the fact that it is they who helped foster the de facto partition of Cyprus and despite the fact that they are endangering, greatly endangering, our country's territorial integrity.

"After all these things, how can we call it a multidimensional foreign policy? This cannot be done by any means. It is an embellished one-dimensional policy. It is a policy which copies the actions of the West and nothing more."

#### What Moscow Could Do

"The Soviet Union can be useful. It is a superpower very near to us and as a superpower it is in a position to help or harm. Currently, we have no reasons to believe that the Soviet Union desires to harm Greece's interests. When the national defense minister states that there is no 'danger from the north,' essentially he is stating that the Soviet Union's policy is peace-loving and generally friendly toward Greece. Historically, the Soviet Union has not extended its borders to encompass other countries nor has it attempted to intervene in the internal affairs of any country.

"There is no instance of a Soviet or Russian soldier crossing a border. I am not talking about its own area which included Hungary and Czechoslovakia where a clear intervention took place. This is its own area that had been agreed upon since the end of the world war.

"Consequently, it is true that the Soviet Union desires peace. I state this in full cognizance of its significance.

"The West disputes peace and the United States keeps alive the issue of a clash. I believe the desire of the Soviet Union and of all its leaders is fervent that development on an international scale be peaceful. However, the United States does not see things in this light. All analyses by 'hawks' are clear. Brezezinski, Kissinger and Haig are constantly talking about dangers from the Soviet Union, of threats to Asia, threats to Africa,

and China believes in the possibility of a world war. This is the position of Chinese chairman Hua Guofeng.

"Consequently, that which the Soviet Union offers as a superpower in the area of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean is significant. But based on this would hope that Moscow would take such a position on the Aegean, like in the Cyprus issue, which would lead to the protection of existing borders. I think that would be a decisive step and would solve the Aegean issue for Greece. However, nobody expects the Soviet Union to do so because it does not intend to disturb its relations with Turkey.

"The 12 miles to which I referred previously are something specific on which Moscow could take a position."

AT212025 "In certain areas it has extended its territorial waters to 12 miles. Consequently, I cannot see why it does not accept, not legally--there is no obstacle to this--but substantively, the extension of Greek territorial waters, especially when the Greek government has guaranteed the passage of its ships."

#### Coun'ersupports

"In order to have coun'ersupports, we must give examples of whether we are following a genuinely multidimensional and not one-dimensional policy.

"For instance, why should the nonaligned, who exercise immense influence (despite the problems they are facing) in the United Nations, care when at present we are the stronghold, the nuclear fort of the West and of the United States?

"It is very difficult for Greece to be convincing in its search for coun'ersupports when it has such a position in the cold war NATO camp. For one to find out whether there are any possibilities, one must first prove in practice that one is nonaligned, that one is seeking coun'ersupports, otherwise the coun'ersupports will not come by themselves. Why should they come? Why should most Arab countries be moved by Greece when this country is host to arms and naval and air facilities of a country or countries which may lead to war in the future?

"I believe that in addition to the area of the nonaligned and the Arab countries which will play a most significant part because of their wealth, the Soviet Union would take a different position if Greece were genuinely nonaligned without missiles and nuclear weapons."

#### With France

"I also believe that one can create bilateral relations with countries of the Western bloc. For instance, such a relationship could be the one with France, a relationship which basically allows Greece to develop its own national defense.

### Tito's Proposal for Military Industry

"Yugoslavia has made a proposal for the establishment, through equal participation, of a military industry in Greece.

"Of course, this is a large issue because for one to follow a multi-dimensional policy and an active nonaligned policy, one must guarantee one's arms. This also means spare parts and certain oil products which constitute the key to the defense mechanism. Should, however, all these things be U.S. or NATO, it is very difficult to avoid the attachment one has to the West which will not support you at the critical hour."

### The Atlantic Protection

"I seize the occasion to refer to a misconstrued impression that is widely held about NATO.

"Taking for granted our return, one should not consider certain that Greece's capacity as an ally automatically guarantees its protection from attack by another NATO member.

"It should not be believed that the alliance will act to protect Greece. Nothing of the sort is included in the NATO agreement. Simply, the potential exists and its implementation depends on the decisions to be taken by the governments, parliaments or congresses of the other member countries. This is also valid for a declaration of war against the Soviet Union which has no reason to be negative toward Greek interests.

"However, in case of danger from the east for Europe and from the north for Greece--something which I do not believe Moscow has reason to do--the alliance will come to Greece's help only if it is willing to enter into a nuclear clash with the Soviet Union. If, for any reason, the alliance does not want a nuclear clash to protect borders, then it will not do anything and it may ignore Greece's fate by saying 'we shall not burn our cities, we shall not destroy our civilization.'

"On the other hand, supposing Greece did not belong to any alliance--like Yugoslavia--and supposing Moscow wanted to intervene in Yugoslavia or Greece. The alliance would not be indifferent simply because neither of the two countries were alliance members. If it felt it was not in its interest to allow Russia to intervene in the Balkans, it would not come to our assistance. Consequently, it is entirely fictitious that we are protected because we belong to the alliance.

"We could find countersupports if we withdrew finally and irrevocably from the alliance. It is impossible for one to find countersupports by remaining in the alliance and thus threatening the interests of other countries."

## The Internal Political Situation

At this point, Papandreu ended the exposition of his views of the country's foreign issues and the talk was extended to cover internal political developments with the first question being: "Mr Chairman, because of your meeting last Monday with Karamanlis, an impression has been created that between yourselves you have reached a tacit agreement on future political developments in our country, is this correct?"

The PASOK chairman replied as follows:

"I am particularly glad you have asked me this question because I must stress that I have been annoyed by the 'report' that has systematically been spread and has appeared in the press that there has been some agreement in principle between us. There has not been even 'a tacit agreement.' In what sense should it exist? We did not come to an agreement with Karamanlis that Papandreu should not talk.

"Papandreu can talk if he so wants, but he believes that the things which are discussed during a private meeting and are responsibly said by the prime minister to the leader of the official opposition cannot be made public, otherwise there is no meaning to my visit with the prime minister. After all, Karamanlis could issue a statement, instead of me, as to what transpired during our meeting and what problems the country will face in future.

"I have never made substantive statements after a briefing by the prime minister. There is no sense in doing so. If the prime minister wants, let him do it. There is no sense in me doing it.

"The fact that I talked for 2 hours with Karamanlis was considered somewhat special, but the issues which were discussed regarding our country's foreign policy deserve at least 2 hours. This is not at all strange.

AT212110 "In any case, the information the prime minister gives cannot possibly change the PASOK positions which are lucid and permanent regarding NATO, the EEC and the bases.

"PASOK will not enter into an agreement with the right. I want to make this clear to all the Greek people. PASOK will not enter into an agreement with the right.

"PASOK recognizes the right of the leaders of other parties to be briefed by the prime minister. It does not approve of the fact that only the leader of the official opposition is briefed. He believes that all should be briefed. Of course, the prime minister should come to the chamber to substantively brief it and not merely reiterate positions.

"After many years in Greek political life, I would like friends and non-friends to clearly believe in one thing: Things I say, I believe; and things I believe, I say."

The next question was: "So, Mr Chairman, you preclude the possibility that if the results of the next elections lead to the need for a coalition government you will not cooperate with the right in such a government?"

Papandreu gave the following answer: "Precisely, such a possibility does not exist. It is foreign to the idea of PASOK; entirely foreign to PASOK positions."

The last question: "Since we are talking about elections, Mr Chairman, would you tell me if PASOK wants early elections and if it is ready to participate in early elections?"

Papandreu gave the following answer to this question: "PASOK has a very ambitious program. It is not a formal change in administration. At present it is Karamanlis, tomorrow another person may be dealing with the issues, good or bad, within the current framework. PASOK is change. Because it is formulating a position on the issue of elections, PASOK naturally wants some more time to prepare even better the change it is advocating. This, however, does not mean that we are not ready to wage a battle in the elections. We are quite ready for this. Consequently, we are not at all worried if elections were held even tomorrow. We are in excellent shape to contest them. Actually, we desire it because we believe that there is a difference between the political composition of the people and the chamber.

I think that perhaps the president of the republic will reach the same conclusion. This is the first time I have said it, but it is a conclusion we hope he will reach." (Editor's note: In accordance with the constitution, if he ascertains that there is a difference between popular opinion and the chamber, the president of the republic can dissolve the chamber before the end of its term of office and call new elections.)

"This is so," Papandreu continued, "despite the fact that we now feel and will always feel that there is more work the movement should do in order to formulate its policy and program. We are working feverishly, but everything cannot be done in one day. For instance, the government's 5-year program has not yet been completed. The program PASOK is formulating which demands work, sacrifice, meetings and seminars is not an easy job. We are doing this because we have a great feeling of responsibility toward the Greek people."

#### The Question

"I believe that it will be possible to present all our positions before the elections or almost all our positions because we have made contract with the people. I began implementing this contract in Crete when I told them

that the things we announce will be the things we implement. Cretan people, Greek people, we commit ourselves to doing these things." [Position of above subhead and paragraph as published]

As with the other leaders, the AKROPOLIS questions submitted to Papandreu are the following:

In your opinion does the visit of prime minister Karamanlis to Moscow constitute a new dimension in Greek foreign policy? Do you consider as correct the Greek prime minister's initiatives? If you consider it correct, how do you think it will benefit the country? If you do not consider it correct, how do you think it may harm the country? What other foreign policy moves do you think the government should undertake? Can Karamanlis' multidimensional foreign policy take Greece away from the West? In your opinion, what can Greece expect from a closer friendship with the Soviet Union? As the situation has shaped up, is the creation of countersupports for our national issues indispensable? [Passage omitted describing Papandreu personality and his home where the interview took place].

CSO: 4908

## WEAPONS PLANT PRODUCTION STATUS REPORTED

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 6 Sep 79 p 34

[Text] The results of the Greek Weapons Plant, which was established in the fall of 1977 in Aigion, are described as very satisfactory.

According to the announcements made during the regular annual general stockholders meeting, recently, the company has already produced a considerable quantity of G3A3 automatic rifles for the armed forces. At the same time, the foreign exchange benefit from the listed value in drachmae can be considered significant for our economy. Even further than this, however, it is worthwhile to note that the entire project has additional substantial beneficial results. Basically, this effort absolutely coincides with the existing area classification policy of decentralization and decentralization contributes to moving and transplanting a highly specialized technology, which is a necessary substructure for the industrialization of the country. Besides, the establishment and installation of the Greek Weapons Plant in an area that has not yet been developed will play an active and important role in the area's economic and social progress. All of this makes this project assume special importance and substance, both for the defense of the country as well as for the more general developmental policy.

The developmental programs of the Greek Weapons Plant are in a transition stage, as known, which is the step from study to application.

With these factors in mind, consideration is being given to taking orders for other kinds of weaponry, both for the Greek armed forces and for exporting. The materialization of these plans is a new target of the company. The basic objective is to have the Greek Weapons Plant become a production nucleus of other kinds of weaponry.

At the same time, the second basic objective materializes in stages: to have the Greek Weapons Plant become the coordinating instrument for the production of new products by the Greek industry with the establishment of new enterprises. The value of the products manufactured by Greek industry on contracts from the Greek Weapons Plant has already reached the sum of 65 million drachmae and it is certain that the subcontracting of projects will continue with increased momentum.

"The operational structure of the company," said the president of the DS (Administrative Council), Mr Andreas Droulias, addressing the general meeting, "is the product of extensive research and careful planning. Thus, having the plant's competitive standing become secure as a target, special attention was given to the quality of machinery, the training of personnel, the organization of the entire production process and especially to quality control."

"In its entirety, the machinery can be considered one of the most advanced on an international basis. Besides, the method of weapon production is a technological achievement, both from the point of view of the quality achieved and from a productivity point of view."

"Special attention was given to staffing the company and to training. In addition to advanced training of company officials in West Germany, a coordinated training of all technical workers took place in special sections organized for this purpose. The indisputable quality of the weapon which indicates a quick and correct absorption of the technology is the best proof of the success of the training program."

"The organizational methods that are being used and that are a basic denominator for achieving a high productivity are not static. To the contrary, their improvement is the subject of uninterrupted research. With this background, plans are being made to import computer programs not only for use in the established manner, but with the objective of extending the use to methodical research and the monitoring of the company's productivity. Because of its substructure, the Greek Weapons Plant has tremendous productive potentials and the widest margins for developmental exploits. These future prospects are significant assets that should be realized..."

As known, the Greek Weapons Plant was established by virtue of Law 43/75 providing for the establishment of a modern weapons plant in Greece and by the decision of the ministers of Coordination, National Defense and Finance.

The corporation which was formed for this purpose was selected to be the vehicle for the execution of the project. This corporation is 70 percent government-owned and 30 percent owned by the Greek Industrial Development Bank. Part of the government participation was covered by the program of free German military aid of 1978.

On September 29, 1977, the government signed the contract with the German company Maekler und Soehn which provides for the granting of the exclusive right to produce the G3A3 rifle in Greece. Furthermore, it provided for the necessary technical aid (knowhow), the supply of the necessary machinery, the installation and operation of this machinery, the training of Greek technical personnel and the undertaking of the technical management for 2 years.

The rights and obligations that emanate from this contract were turned over from the Government to the "Greek Weapons Plant Inc.," which is the vehicle for materializing the entire program. The Greek Weapons Plant has absolute power to contract out the manufacture of weapon parts to Greek subcontractors.

The study and execution of building construction and machinery installation have been assigned to Greek companies through legal bidding. During 1978, the project progressed according to schedule and it is expected that it will be completed by August 1980. On January 1979, the production process began just as it had been planned. The second and third phases will be completed at the same time on September 9, 1980 when the unit will reach its full organizational growth.

It is worthwhile to note that while the added value of the product reaches 35 percent in the first phase, it will cover 95 percent in the final phase.

From information contained in the first budget (31 December 1978), which refers to the construction period 3 August 1977 to 31 December 1978, the total assets of the company came to 931,564,014.20 drachmae. The total liabilities of every kind came to 371,216,930.20 and the company's funds to 564,347,084.00. In other words, the rate of outside funds to the company's funds was 1.6 to 1 and is considered to be absolutely satisfactory.

Set forth below are the names of the administrative council of the company:

President: Andreas K. Droulias. Advisors: Iakovos Georganas, Christos Gofas, Nikolaos-Ioannis Dimopoulos, Fotios Zagarelos, Vasileios Zervas, Georgios Kakanas, Anastasios Makris, Konstantinos Tsitos. Legal advisor: Akhilleas Gerokostopoulos.

9346  
CSO: 4908

## CABINET MARKS YEAR IN POWER AS INFLATION SOARS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] The November to November inflation increase during the first year of the government is estimated at 50 percent. If, on the other hand, we consider developments in prices from May to November, the annual increase is 60.3 percent. The annual inflation rate was 39.2 percent over the same period last year.

It must be taken into account that the comparison of these two periods is somewhat misleading, as the government increased subsidies considerably toward the end of last year, but decreased them again at the beginning of this year. It can also be mentioned that the bulletin from the Central Bank on increased interest rates indicates a 52.3 percent inflation rate. During the quarter it had increased 10.5 percent, as it was 41.8 percent in the beginning of June.

Pound for Tourists Up 86.3 Percent

According to the foreign exchange rate of the Central Bank, the U.S. dollar has risen 44.5 percent during the year that the present government has been in office. If we take into account the government's taxation of the tourist exchange, the foreign exchange rate for tourists has increased 59 percent in dollars.

The government devalued the krona on 6 September last year, or about a week after it came to power, as we all remember. That devaluation was about 15 percent and involved an increase of 17.7 percent for the dollar. Since then, there has been a steady drop in the value of the krona, and the increase for the dollar is now 44.5, as mentioned above.

The increase in the pound is considerably more than that of the dollar. This year, the pound has increased 69.4 percent while the tourist exchange rate for pounds is up 86.3 percent. The Danish krona has increased 52.9 percent, and the tourist exchange rate for the Danish krona is up 68.2 percent. The West German mark has increased 59.6 over the same period, and the tourist exchange rate in marks 75.5 percent. The peseta climbed 62.6 percent, and the tourist exchange rate increased 78.9 percent.

## Decline of 10.5 Percent in Index Number During First Year of the Left-Wing Government

The fall in the wage index number during the term of the present government has widened to 10.5 percent on lower wages, or the wages of the majority of people. The wage increase during this period was 37.96 percent, but the increase of the cost of living index during the same period was 52.5 percent. The fall in the index number during the last 6 months, or since the government's economic regulations took effect, is 6.6 percent. The cost of living index has increased 27.62 percent during this period, but the new index number under the government regulations is up about 19.24 percent during the same period.

Since the government took office about a year ago wages have increased under wage improvement regulations in the following manner: On 1 September 1978 0 percent; 1 December 6.12 percent; 1 March 1979 6.90 percent; 1 June 11.40 percent, and now, 1 September, 9.17 percent. Thus the wage increase is 37.96 for this period. The cost of living index during this period, from August 1978 until the same month this year, has risen 41.97 percent, which is not a completely accurate comparison, as the index dropped in February. If one takes this drop into account, we get a proper estimate of the index increase, which is 52.5 percent. The wage falloff is therefore 10.5 percent for this fiscal year. It should be taken into account that this falloff is partly due to farm products and because of a price increase for tobacco and alcohol. In addition to that, there are cutbacks in the government's regulations, a reduction of oil subsidies and a reduction because of worsening terms of trade. This last point has not been fully incorporated into the above mentioned figures, but will take full effect during the period from now until 1 December.

If we take a look just at the period when the government's regulations, passed at the end of the assembly last spring, have been in effect, they converted the cost of living index from 1,292 in February to 100 points. This old index number had reached 1,649 in August, which is an increase of 27.63 percent, but the wage bonus price index increased 19.24 over the same time. Thus, wages have been cut 6.6 percent in two index calculations during the February to August period, of which 1.6 percent is due to farm products; 1.3 percent from a cutback in oil subsidies, and 0.8 percent because of tobacco and alcohol. This makes 3.7 percent in all, and the decline because of the terms of trade is, therefore, 2.9 percent. So far, it has not had an effect on the lower wage brackets, as mentioned above, as the wage bonus price index for low wages was put at 121.62, according to the latest calculations. Therefore, the reduction for low wages is only 4.2 percent and takes full effect as of 1 December. This cut will be spread over a 6-month period and will increase much more at the next calculation of the wage bonus price index, which will take effect on 1 December.

8743  
CSO: 3111

## GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC MEASURES FAIL; SHOULD STEP DOWN

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Sep 79 p 20

[Editorial: On the Government's Anniversary]

[Text] Today, a year has passed since the government came to power. Many people had high hopes about it, as it was formed on the basis of the election rhetoric that the negotiations would take effect, even if Steingrimur Hermannsson acknowledged that it would heighten our economic problems, and, in fact, make them unsolvable. Olafur Johannesson, however, was optimistic when he took his seat as prime minister and said that new brooms sweep best and that he expected the ministers would make up for their lack of experience with new ideas.

After the experience, most people in Iceland agree that the government has shown some new sides, which we were not used to. Thus, the labor pains were hardly over, when disagreement on various matters arose, and ever since then, the normal state of the coalition has been ministers quarreling with each other. In the meantime, they let things slide.

Ludvik Joseppson deserves his nickname as the godfather of the government. He explained the role of the People's Alliance in it by saying that economic problems and the problems of wage earners had been solved. And it is correct, in fact, that they succeeded for a while in making it look as if the government had made progress in fighting inflation and yet maintained purchasing power up, through various arrangements and by fooling with the index number. Thus, the minister of the People's Alliance boasted for a while that inflation had gone down to 22 percent. All of this proved to be mere illusions created by postponing unavoidable price increases for goods and services through deficit operations among firms and public partners as well. This policy failed in the long run, and consequently, prices doubled when the dam finally burst, and now inflation is accelerating as never before.

Many leaders of the wage earners movement and especially of the Icelandic Workers Alliance are mainly responsible for the formation of the government. If we bear this in mind, it is easy to see how passive the workers movement has been by changing their wage demands completely.

and being satisfied ... if negotiations have been violated time and again. Thus, the Worker's Alliance did not do anything even though raising the ceiling meant that the increase in a pilot's wages alone was higher than a worker's entire monthly wages. The Icelandic Federation of Labor did not say a word even though the seamen's strike was brought to a halt with the help of the Federation of Icelandic Employers under temporary rulings. At the end of last month the wages of a minister increased by 115,000 kronur, but a worker's wages increased by 18,000 kronur. Thus, the wage difference has steadily increased after this government came to power, contrary to what it promised at its outset.

One consequence of the government's policy is that jobs are getting harder to maintain. This has already caused purchasing power to drop considerably over the last couple of months, more than it would have, and future prospects are not bright at all. We can thus anticipate unemployment in the wintertime, and nothing indicates that the nation's income will increase. On the contrary, we are headed for a deficit with a further deterioration in living conditions and increasing difficulties in maintaining jobs.

As mentioned above, many people had high hopes for the government at its outset. But they have all faded in 1 year. The government as a whole has been inadequate and slack, and none of the ministers stands out above the others. Nothing remains of the economic measures taken last spring, which were supposed to be long-term, and now the left-wing parties are looking towards economic regulations with awe, as they can see no way out of them. New tax increases have been announced, as well as a further cut in negotiated wages, but no effort is being made to make the operational basis for business normal. Under normal circumstances such a government would use the opportunity and resign. That would be a welcome present to the Icelandic nation on its first anniversary.

6745  
CSO: 3111

## IMPLICATIONS OF BREZHNEV OFFER FOR STRATEGIC SITUATION

LD020755 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 21 Oct 79 p 52 LD

[Article by Antonio Gambino: "Before Answering Brezhnev"]

[Text] The most important aspect of the speech which Leonid Brezhnev delivered in East Berlin Saturday, 6 October, undoubtedly lies in his offer to negotiate a reduction of Soviet medium-range strategic weapons targeted on West Europe (SS-20 missiles and backfire bombers). Indeed, it is on this first point that the major concerns of broad sectors of the Atlantic world have centered recently. First, because according to the calculations of NATO and the various Western strategic institutes, the USSR, by means of a great economic and technological effort, has acquired a considerable superiority in this field, which is excluded from the SALT treaty's limitations.

Still proceeding from the premise that this information is accurate (and Brezhnev's denials will certainly not suffice to prove the contrary; especially if one recalls the doggedness which in October 1962 Valerian Zorin denied to the UN Security Council the presence of Soviet-missiles in Cuba up until a few hours before Khrushchev decided to withdraw them), the question which automatically springs to mind is this: Why is Moscow, whose conventional might is clearly already particularly strong, trying to guarantee itself, under the equal umbrella of intercontinental weapons stabilized by SALT II, a clear lead in the field of European theater strategic forces? And once this superiority has become permanent, is it possible to believe that the Kremlin leaders will not be tempted to take advantage of it sooner or later?

In fact, anyone examining the entire picture more carefully will easily realize that not all the current Atlantic (and especially European) concerns stem from this increase in European strategic weapons. Behind them there lies also a more subtle suspicion. And it is precisely this convergence and intersection of two underlying issues of different types which often helps to make the debate on this point excessively confused.

The first cause of the concussions which have for some time been disturbing the Atlantic world stems precisely from the crisis in the concept of

"extended deterrence," that is, the crisis of confidence in the full validity of the U.S. commitment, in the event of a total Soviet attack (involving both nuclear and conventional weapons), to defend its European and Japanese allies using its own strategic nuclear forces and thus automatically exposing itself to a similar Soviet reprisal.

It must be noted that we are witnessing a phenomenon which dates back a long time, inasmuch as the first doubts concerning the complete credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella began over 20 years ago, when the USSR's construction of the first intercontinental missiles (that is, missiles capable of striking the United States) prompted many people to wonder whether, under these new conditions, the Washington government would really still defend its own allies.

Since then this essentially politico-psychological process (it is no accident that it centers on the absolutely abstract concept of "credibility") has experienced a number of ups and downs: moments of extreme insecurity have alternated with other moments when the clear U.S. global superiority in the strategic field has seemed to provide a sufficient basis for its guarantee. Overall, however, the crisis of confidence has increased (because it stemmed from the discovery of a "vulnerability" which no possible future numerical and qualitative U.S. superiority could in any way eliminate). Eventually it exploded openly when during the past few months the SALT-II agreement established the principle of global strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and Western analyses indicated a Soviet superiority in European strategic forces. Together, these two factors acted as the detonator of a phenomena which had been latent and repressed for some time.

This does not mean that Moscow's attainment of a clear superiority in strategic weapons in the European theater is an insignificant fact. First because of the aforementioned reason: why did the USSR want to guarantee itself this position at the cost of such heavy economic sacrifices? Was it purely for complex historical and psychological reasons (that great country's traditional insecurity and the slowness of its bureaucratic machinery); solely as a result of the growing Chinese threat (the medium-range missiles can equally well be targeted on Bonn, Paris and Rome as on Shanghai and Beijing); or is the underlying plan, if not one of aggression, then at least one of increasing threats and pressure with respect to West Europe?

Keeping these two issues separate, we can now try to reach a conclusion. On the one hand there is the crisis of "extended deterrence," which cannot easily be resolved. Because while it is true that, given the terrifying destructive power of current nuclear warheads, it could be believed that the suspicion of a U.S. response is sufficient to lend credibility to its defense guarantee and thus to discourage any Soviet plan of attack (or vice versa), the fact remains that, since it is obviously possible for the Washington administration to pursue a policy of withdrawal into

"fortress America." Its reactions to the decision whether or not to defend West Europe, thus exposing its own country to catastrophic destructions, cannot be--nor can they ever be--entirely certain. The solution must, therefore, be sought elsewhere, probably in the elimination of "long-distance protection" by creating regional or national deterrents. On the other hand, there is the problem of the USSR's real or alleged superiority in European theater forces. This is a subject which must be examined by everyone without preconceptions (a country which declares itself communist can only be aiming at world revolution, the "cossacks" have always wanted to water their horses at St Peter's...) but also without false hopes (the USSR has never attacked anyone, it is intrinsically a peace-loving country...). If Brezhnev's remarks in East Berlin lay the foundations for discussions of this kind, we can only note this with satisfaction. [sentenced as received]

CSO: 3104

## SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS VISIT PRC

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Oct 79 p 3

[Article by Alain Jacob]

[Text] Two leaders of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], Manuel Azcarate of the Politburo and Angel Mullor, have been in Beijing since 25 October. They will reportedly go to Shanghai and Guangzhou before returning to the capital on 6 November and remain until the tenth.

The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY has indicated that Azcarate and Mullor were invited to China in their capacity as journalists--editors of the two PCE organs NUESTRA BANDERA AND MUNDO OBRERO.

We have learned from a good source, however, that the mission of the two Spanish communist leaders is essentially political and is aimed at normalizing relations between the Chinese Communist Party and certain West European CP's.

The secretary general of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, is the only European communist leader to have gone to China (in 1971) since the cultural revolution, but no relations were established as a result between the two parties.

There is little involvement of the French communists in the rapprochement between the Chinese CP and the Eurocommunists. The message addressed to Beijing by the PCI [Italian Communist Party] on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the PRC was published in the RENMIN RIBAO, but one from the PCF [French Communist Party] only merited a short dispatch in the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY regarding President Hua's trip to France.

CSO: 3100

## ETA REPORTEDLY HAS HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Oct 79 p 4

[Text] Brussels is reportedly the new headquarters for the Basque separatist organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], at least if one believes the Belgian magazine EVENTAIL which published an interview with a former ETA member.

According to the Basque militant, who will remain anonymous, ETA training camps are found in Belgium and also in France, Algeria and Portugal. The organization's arms, according to him, are essentially of Belgian origin and are transported by way of Portugal.

Several ETA leaders have taken refuge in Brussels, says the former ETA member, who states that he maintains connections with the political-military branch of the organization.

Belgian authorities have refused to make any comments regarding the interview.

On the other hand, the seizure of numerous documents in the course of a search in Hendaye yesterday morning at a building occupied by ETA-Military militants has allowed us to learn that that organization is preparing to extract ransom from many French merchants of Bayonne, Biarritz, Saint-Jean-de-Luz and Hendaye.

According to French police, some of these merchants have already been victims of this "revolution tax."

Six suitcases of documents and records belonging to the separatist organization also fell into the hands of the French police during an operation begun Thursday evening in a building at the Hendaye beach--the "Ocean Residence." Four apartments had been rented in that apartment building by the Basque nationalists who did not hesitate to demolish partitions so as to allow for free movement between the four apartments.

CSO: 3100

## BERN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN MARTIGNONI INTERVIEWED

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 5 Sep 79 p 3

[Report on interview with Werner Martignoni by Ulrich Kaegi: "Paw in Velvet Glove"]

Text The canton of Jura is drifting on a collision course with the canton of Bern and the confederation. Spokesman for the Bern government is Werner Martignoni, one of the SVP [Swiss People's Party] candidates under discussion for the Federal Council.

Werner Martignoni:

1927 born in Muri (Bern Canton) the son of a canton official, attended the Literary Gymnasium in Bern, studied economics at Bern University while working his way;

1950 staff member of the NEUE BERNER ZEITUNG and the SVP secretariat in Bern;

1953 dissertation on a partial aspect of the Farming Law;

1958 domestic and economic editor of the NEUE BERNER ZEITUNG;

1961-1964 local councillor in Muri;

1963-1973 establishment and leadership of the Swiss Insurance Information;

1965-1972 part-time president of the local council in Muri;

1973 full-time president of the local council in Muri;

1966-1974 member of the Great Council in Bern;

1974 elected to the Bern government and assumption of the directorate of finances;

1 March 1979 president of the Jura delegation in the Bern government.

"We in Bern were immeasurably disappointed," government council member and Dr of Economics Werner Martignoni (52), president of the Jura delegation in the Bern government and head of canton finances, later admitted.

The immeasurable disappointment concerns the fact that on the day after the three-sided conference chaired by Federal Council member Dr K. Furgler the president of the Jurassic government Francois Lachat backed out of the joint communique which had expressed the "regret" of the conference participants over the events of Tramelan.

Perhaps Tramelan constitutes a turning point in Bern-Jura relations, because, as is scarcely remembered any more outside this area of tension, around 200 Beliers from the canton of Jura had there staged an unauthorized demonstration, which claimed some injuries, among them the local president.

Since Tramelan relations between Bern and Delemont have, alas, not improved. On the contrary: the Jurassic government has even felt itself compelled to stand up for the respect of the democratic freedoms in the Bern Jura, that is to say in the neighboring canton. The strategy of "reunification" with the recalcitrant Bern Jura devised by Roland Beguelin, secretary-general of the Rassemblement Jurassien and temporarily also president of the Jurassic parliament, is in full swing.

Besides his immeasurable disappointment, what does the spokesman of the Bern people, Werner Martignoni, have to counter Beguelin's cleverly calculated strategy of provocation with? To be sure, in his spare time he prefers to read works about history in general and history of war in particular, but: "I am a peace-loving person."

In war literature he is fascinated by "the strategic and tactical deliberations which play a role in political and social life as well." Will the man who is averse to any kind of fanaticism be capable -- "democracy is stronger," he declares -- of making a stand against the fanatic from Jura? It is one thing to rise, well protected in the bosom of the People's Party in Bern, the former agrarian, trade and bourgeois party of Rudolf Minger, Markus Feldmann and Rudolf Gnaegi, from a journalist and party propagandist through the usual levels via local and canton parliaments to the almost dizzying height of the government. But it is another thing to have to make exceptional decisions in an exceptional situation.

Martignoni got a foretaste of this in the spring of 1977. At that time he was president of the canton government in Bern and in a critical phase of the Jura conflict responded to an invitation to the congress of the women's organization of the "Force Democratique" loyal to Bern in the Bern Jura against the most massive pressure from all sides all the way up to the confederation. To be sure, he had a moderating effect there, but he left no doubt as to the determination of the government to represent the cause of the Bern Jura and its population.

His motto is: *Suaviter in Modo, Fortiter in Re*, that is to say: gentle in manner, strong in cause, or in Bern German: a forceful paw in a velvet glove. That agrees quite well with a written evaluation demanded by a former employer. In it there is talk of a "very active, energetic and capable nature" with a "sound self-confidence," whereby "everything is enveloped in a certain smoothness."

What was agreeable to the former employer should also be reasonable for activity in the government even when burdened with unusual responsibility. Martignoni must invest one-third of his working time in the Jura problems.

Furthermore, management of the finance directorate is also not a trifling matter. An extensive revision of the tax laws and fiscal adjustment is under way. And at the end of the recession the finances of the canton that had its three northern districts amputated are in better shape by about 100 million than at the beginning. In any case, in comparison with the confederation the canton is doing much better, "I guess you could say that," Martignoni confirms with visible, although tactfully restrained satisfaction behind his desk, almost free of documents, in the venerable patrician government building on Muenster Square.

Despite this double burden Martignoni, a distant descendant of an Italian immigrant from Milan, who at the end of the 18th Century settled in Rorschach on Lake Constance, is firmly determined not to let himself be consumed by his office. He does not consider meetings, file drudgery and representation duties to be the most important part of the government activity. He wants to remain a human being, be able to spend the remaining free weekends with his family (he is the father of one son and two daughters) and above all leave open some time for reflection.

Occasionally, when he does not use the commuter train, he covers the considerable distance from the office to his spacious house in Muri on foot. For his quite private government goal is the following: To retire at some point just as slim as he came in, and to remain fit intellectually and physically.

The son of a minor canton official, and with three brothers and sisters, Werner Martignoni, today domiciled in Rorschach but in Bern as well, was determined from the beginning to earn his way throughout his schooling. He found his first job as a girl Friday for everything from mail boy to book-keeper in a confectionery wholesale company a few minutes from the university. Diligently commuting between the classroom and the store Martignoni used the summer vacations to climb a few rungs on the military ladder as well -- to first lieutenant in the artillery.

However, as early as the fourth or fifth semester Martignoni drifted from the confectionery into part-time journalism for the now defunct NEUE BERNER ZEITUNG, whose editor-in-chief at that time was Fr Markus Feldmann, later federal councillor. He thus entered politics rather incidentally as a skillful reporter on local, cantonal and federal politics.

A Protestant from childhood despite his origins Werner Martignoni never had to fight any great ideological struggles inside himself. Whether he lacked the leisure or the disposition for it, as a journalist, in private a disciple of Spinoza, he nevertheless very early acquired "the ability to maintain a certain distance to the course of things."

At age 26 when he had saved enough money Martignoni broke out of the world at the foot of the Gurken for 7 months, travelled to Holland, Belgium and England, partly in order to improve his language abilities but mainly in order to experience "a change of scenery" or, speaking with the dialect of the potential candidate for the Federal Council: "I bi umenangschtromeret und ha glaebt" (I have roamed the world and have lived).

The conflict with the fighting canton of Jura promises a completely different life, of course. The president of the Jura delegation to the canton government is glad to acknowledge that the daily cooperation with the small northern neighbor "is moving along." Contact between the offices, the winding up of the 123 provisional agreements which were concluded for 1 year, the take-over by personnel from Bern through the new canton administration: 'All of that took place absolutely loyally -- on both sides. However, as soon as the invalid reunification article 138, which I would like to characterize as an aggressive article, comes into play, all is at an end."

The space to maneuver between the boiling anger of the Bern Jurassians and the continuation of good neighborly relations with the canton of Jura has become desperately narrow for the Bern government, in particular after the incidents of La Neuveville and in La Ferriere wished for by Roland Beguelin as well as after his inflammatory speech at the 32d "Festival of the Jurassic People." Werner Martignon must now accept the challenge.

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## PARTIES OF THE LEFT PROFILED

## Socialist Revolution and Labor Parties

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] In addition to the RPP, four leftist parties are entering the upcoming elections. They are the Turkish Labor Party [TLP], the Turkish Socialist Workers Party [TSWP], the Socialist Revolution Party [SRP] and the illegal Turkish Communist Party [TCP], which is supporting the independent senatorial candidate from Istanbul, Beria Onger, chairwoman of the Progressive Women's Association. These four parties fall into two general categories, pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet. The TLP, TSWP and the TCP-backed Beria Onger are in the pro-Soviet category, while the SRP is anti-Soviet. The SRP espouses national socialism and is neither pro-Moscow, nor pro-Beijing. Each party's desire to be "the vanguard party of the working class" is the source of the power struggle among them. They have little interest in the changes that the elections may bring to the makeup of the senate and the assembly. They plan to use the elections as a propaganda vehicle, as a means to reach the masses. For them, the elections will be a test of strength, the number of votes each will poll will be the evidence of the party's strength. Then, there is the Turkish Unity Party [TUP] which represents the left outside these socialist parties. The TUP has an independent leftist philosophy.

## The Socialist Revolution Party

The SRP, one of the "new" parties in the 14 October [by-] elections, is still referred to, out of habit, as "Aybar's party" by leftist circles. It was founded by Mehmet Ali Aybar and his friends after they left the former TLP. In accordance with the party's bylaws, however, Aybar is no longer the party's chairman. The SRP's bylaws, unlike those of the other parties, bar party administrators from serving two consecutive terms in

the same capacity. They can run again for the same job only after one party-convention term elapses. In the SRP's most recent convention 1 1/2 months ago, the entire administrative cadre was changed. Aybar, the founder and the chairman of the party up to that point, was not eligible to run again. The convention elected Cenan Bicasici in Aybar's place.

The SRP describes itself as "the only party to adopt scientific socialism as its guideline," and says that the "liberation of workers will be accomplished by workers themselves." To carry the latter principle into practice, the SRP has written into its bylaws that at least one-third of the party's administrative officers at all levels shall be "workers." That is the reason why three members in the SRP's five-man county administrative boards, five members in its seven-man provincial administrative boards, and 18 of the 27 members in its General Administrative Board are workers.

In the SRP, members have the right to assemble at their county headquarters every 6 months and make policy proposals to the central body. The party underlines that this organizational pattern is "the veritably socialist organizational model."

If, according to our rough classification, the TLP and the TSMP are categorized as adherents of the Soviet model socialism, the SRP, by the same standard, should be called a pro-European-model socialist party.

The SRP's single-page propaganda literature, which the party distributes, draws a clearer picture of the type of socialism the party advocates. The SRP, addressing to the public, says:

"The Socialist Revolution Party is the only party which jealously guards our national independence against everyone--U.S. imperialism, the Soviet Union and China."

It continues:

"You [the public] expected so much of the RPP and you were disillusioned. There is no sense in keeping those hopes alive, and it will be just as senseless to put one's trust in pro-Moscow parties, as the TLP and the TSMP. They will place you under another yoke, have no doubt about it."

The SRP's leading candidates are Mehmet Ali Aybar, Ugur Cankocak, chairman of the All Metal Workers Union, and Ayse Begensel, a union specialist and a former TLP member (Istanbul); Ziya Nur Erum, an attorney (Erzurum), Huseyin Savas, secretary general of the SRP and an education specialist (Manisa), and Naciye Van, a senior chemical engineer (Kars).

Huseyin Savas, secretary general of the SRP, briefed HURRIYET on his party's stand on the four major issues in the coming elections.

Mr Savas said that Turkey will be able to come out of the economic crisis "by severing its imperialist ties, changing the production relations,

thereby affecting a far-reaching transformation." On the eastern question, he cautioned that "imperialism may stage various schemes." On terrorism, the secretary general put the blame on the Nationalist Action Party [MAP] and fascism and stressed that anyone who boycotts the elections will be, in essence, playing into the hands of fascism.

The SRP official's answers to HURRIYET's questions are as follows:

#### Economic Situation

"The Turkish economy is at the lowest point of a 9-year-old deterioration process. In fact, the roots of the present crisis go further back, to 1947 when the initial steps were taken toward an economic, political, military and cultural integration with international capitalism. In those years, the Turkish economy embarked on a foreign resource-oriented development process which deemphasized domestic resources and the essential needs of the native population. In the course of this developmental process, three cracks appeared in the country's economy--the foreign exchange shortage, unemployment and a rapidly rising cost of living. The burden of these gradually widening cracks was placed directly on the shoulders of the working class. There is no chance of closing these cracks while the current economic structure remains as it is. Devaluation and more external borrowing, which the present government introduced as solutions to our problems, have been tried before more than once. We all know what the results were. We soon will see the economic crisis grow deeper and become more unbearable. Turkey can extricate itself from the crisis only by a far-reaching transformation which will entail severing its imperialist ties and changing the production relations."

#### The Eastern Issue

"Turkey's economic system is a distorted form of capitalism dependent on external sources. Under this economic order, the comprador bourgeoisie--an extension of foreign monopolies--and large landholders exploit and oppress our working people. The bourgeoisie is not ethnically homogeneous. It includes many ethnics, Lazes, Circassians, Kurds, Turks, Armenians, Greeks, others. Their ethnic origins may be different, but within the bourgeois class they are partners.

"They are also partners with American, German and other foreign firms. Our working people are not of a single ethnic origin either. As the bourgeoisie, our working people also have common interests and share a common goal. That is to say, our working people form a whole. The answer to the economic problem is establishment of socialism in Turkey. The goal is a socialist government.

"Our country has been intentionally kept underdeveloped. The eastern section is generally more underdeveloped than the rest of the country. Sovereign classes see the eastern question in the perspective of racist nationalism. There is good possibility that imperialism will put various schemes into practice in that area.

"The SRP will resolve the eastern question and all other problems of discrimination through socialism and on the basis of the principles of the integrality of the Turkish Republic and the fraternal solidarity of the working people."

#### Terrorism and Violence

"There is a fascist movement in Turkey today. Its strings are in the hands of U.S. imperialism, and it is centered in and around the NAP with its trained commandos and its counterguerrilla organization within the state. The source of the terrorism and violence in the country is this fascist movement. It should be noted that in all the countries where fascism has achieved success, a major feature of the climate it has exploited is a vacuum of authority. The crises in the capitalist system affect all aspects of social life and increase social activism. During such periods, the bourgeois democratic state machinery becomes incapable of shaping social life in its own image. Obviously, the fascist movement in Turkey, which gathered strength in such a climate, will do everything in its power to perpetuate the climate instrumental in its development, and that is what is happening in Turkey now. This is the motive behind the NAP's terrorist acts, which sometimes take on the dimensions of a massacre, and the subtle tactics it uses to spread violence. Meanwhile, as long as terrorism reigns in Turkey, the NAP's hopes of coming to power will remain alive and the United States will have no difficulty dictating its wishes to Turkey."

#### Election Boycott

"So far, our working people have gone to the polls in every election. By the same token, the political parties which came to, or fell from, power on the force of the working people's votes were, without an exception, bourgeois parties. Workers did not have an alternative and that is why their problems were never solved. There were times when worker participation in elections dropped, but when a sign of hope appeared, no matter how faint that hope may have been, large masses of workers rushed to the polls again. It is not only the elite's political parties that are participating in the coming elections, the SRP, the working people's party, is running also. The calls for a boycott of elections will not find a positive response in the working class. Our people will go to the polls.

"Meanwhile, we have a couple of words to the leftist groups which are urging a boycott. They should read the history of the leftist struggle, observe the schemes being staged in the country, take note of how the fascists are using the advantages of democracy to attain their goal of setting up a bloodthirsty dictatorship. Then, they may realize that they are buttering the fascists' bread by calling for a boycott."

## The Turkish Labor Party

The TLP, which is entering both the senatorial and assembly elections in all the provinces where the balloting will take place, is situated at the "pro-Soviet" side of the leftist party spectrum. However, Sakiye Beris Ongur, chairwoman of the Progressive Women's Association and an independent senatorial candidate in Istanbul, was turned down by the TLP when Mrs Ongur proposed "cooperation during the campaign until the votes are cast." Meanwhile, the talks between the TLP and the TSWP on a preselection merger produced nothing. In the final stages of the negotiations, the TSWP urged a "merger," the TLP insisted on an "alliance." TLP leaders are more interested in using the election campaign to take their message farther and to larger masses, than the political outcome of the elections. The TLP sees the parliament not as an end, but as a means of bringing about a "socialist revolution." There isn't much of an argument between the TLP and the TSWP on the basics of socialism, but the two parties disagree on tactics and on the practice of socialism in Turkey. Behice Boran is the chairwoman of the TLP. The party's emblem consists of a cogwheel and an ear of grain. It has two press organs, GOREV [Duty] and YURUYUS [Marching].

### Candidates

Following people are among the TLP's candidates:

Bahice Boran (Istanbul); Prof Tayyar Bora, Aegean University, Agricultural Faculty (Istanbul); Mehmet Selik, member of the Political Sciences Faculty teaching staff (Istanbul); Prof Fatma Mina Urgen, Faculty of Literature (Istanbul); Gunay Gonenc, member of the Middle East Technical University teaching staff (Istanbul); Nihat Sargin, TLP secretary general (Kars); Prof Veli Lok, Aegean University, Medical School (Antalya); Necat Yardimci, lieutenant governor of Kırklareli (Istanbul); Vecihi Timuroglu, former principal of the Ankara Ataturk Lycée (Erzincan); Terik Ziya Ekinici, former TLP deputy (Agri); Dr Yavuz Erkocak, Ankara Numune Hospital, chief of the Internal Medicine Department (Van); Turgut Alten, father of Serdar Alten, one of the seven TLP members murdered in the house at Bahcelievler where they were staying as guests (Amasya).

### Current Issues

Gunduz Mutluay, secretary of the TLP Central Bureau of Information, Propaganda and Press, who is also one of the party's election term spokesmen, reviewed for us the TLP's stand on the four leading national issues as the country moves toward byelections.

On the economy, terrorism, the eastern question and the campaign to get the voters boycott the elections, Mutluay said the following:

"Unemployment and inflation, which have had a tremendous impact on the lives of the working and proletarian masses, are offshoots of the current economic crisis and the attempts of the large capital, which collaborates with imperialism, to have the working masses pay the price of the crisis."

"The economic crisis which set in in early 1970's is becoming more serious. Our industry, under the private sector's control, is unable to become self-sustaining; it is, in effect, growing more dependent on external sources.

"The problem is that the burden of inflation and the steadily rising cost of living is born solely by the working and proletarian masses.

"The inflationary policy is in the interest of the big capital. Inflation, hovering around 100 percent, is operating virtually like an indirect tax levied in favor of big capital, while working people and proletarian classes are growing poorer and poorer.

"The big capital, its organizations and political spokesmen tell us that the crisis is Turkey's lot. The crisis is not Turkey's lot, it is an inevitable outcome of Turkish capitalism.

"The TLP's 'Democratization Plan for 1978-82' demonstrated by figures that Turkey can extricate itself from the crisis."

#### Terrorism and Anarchy

"Imperialism and big capital want to abolish democratic rights and liberties in Turkey. To frustrate and eventually to put an end to the struggle of the working and proletarian masses are the motives behind the efforts to escalate terrorism.

"The NAP and its affiliated organizations, all of which are in the service of imperialism and big capital, are immersed in terrorism up to their necks. The NAP's ties to the international intelligence organizations of imperialism, as well as to secret organizations, such as the counterguerrilla, are public knowledge.

"Organized fascist terrorism cannot be stopped by police measures. This fact was brought home one more time recently by the murder, by the fascists, of an official directly responsible for the protection of the public's security of life, the security director of Adana.

"To put an end to fascist terror, the NAP and the affiliated organizations must be closed down, fascist nuclei must be disbanded and their secret ties must be revealed.

"Advocating terrorism in the name of leftism have no place in scientific socialism. There is no relationship between scientific socialist struggle and terrorist acts by individuals. Terrorism by individuals hampers the participation of the masses in the struggle and serves the interests of the capital. The TLP has always been against terrorist acts by individuals."

#### The Eastern Question

"The bourgeoisie's racist, chauvinist nationalist, discriminatory policy has been in effect for many years in the eastern and southeastern regions.

This policy has prepared the ground for provocations which have led the way to undesirable practices, including mass murder.

"The TLP rejects bourgeois nationalism. Sovereign classes, having formed a nationwide alliance, are encouraging new plots and provocations in the eastern and southeastern regions. The TLP is calling the public's attention once again to these schemes. The party is standing firm against all pressure and is doing whatever it can to expose these schemes.

"As we said in the resolution adopted in the party's second grand congress, the TLP believes that unity and integrity cannot be achieved, nor consolidated, by force, it must be chosen by free will and sincere desire, and then, must be built over a foundation of equality, fraternity and freedom. This is the objective of the TLP's struggle."

#### Election Boycott

"Voting in elections is part of our struggle. Advocates of scientific socialism use elections and the parliament as a podium, a forum. Big capital wants the 14 October elections to endorse its policy of making the workers and the proletariat pay the bill for the economic crisis. The working class and the proletariat are now faced with an obligation to register their refusal of this policy and their opposition to the reckless course the country is following by voting in the coming elections. Therefore, every vote cast for the TLP and against the reactionary, fascist parties and the RPP which, in service to imperialism is no less enthusiastic than the rest, is important. Not to vote in the elections and to urge leftists and socialists to boycott the elections will only help the reactionary forces.

"The TLP, as always, sees the elections as a forum where efforts are made to win the struggle of large masses for independence, democracy and socialism."

#### Turkish Socialist Workers Party

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 7 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] The TSWP's version of socialism follows, as does the TLP's, the Soviet line. "Our party considers the struggle between the capitalist and socialist systems the major struggle of our day," says Cagatay Anadol, the TSWP's secretary of education and propaganda. "The socialist system, which consists of the world's socialist countries led by the Soviet Union, is the political power center, as well as the central point of gravity, of the world's socialist and revolutionary forces."

The TSWP, under the banner of "Unite for Socialism," is entering the elections in every province where they will be held. Its slate of candidates include many independent socialists who are not card-carrying TSWP members. As a matter of fact, independents make up one-fourth of the TSWP candidates. In Istanbul, the party is helping the campaign of Bakiye Beris Onger, chairwoman of the Progressive Women's Association, the only candidate supported by the TCP. The TSWP and Mrs Onger have been organizing election rallies

together. Reportedly, the cooperation will last until nightfall on 13 October, after which time the TSWP and Mrs Onger will be on their own. On election day, the TSWP candidates and Onger will be vying for votes separately.

The TSWP tried very hard to have the left enter the elections as a single block. It contacted each party and group on the left to work out an alliance. The TLP and several political groups turned down the proposal. Before the election campaign started, the TLP and the TSWP held talks on the possibility of a cooperation between the two parties, but they ran into an impasse when the TSWP insisted on a "merger," and the TLP held out for an "alliance."

Even though the TSWP, TLP and the TCP are all adherents of the Soviet version of socialism, they are locked in a struggle to become "the vanguard party of the Turkish working class."

As most other socialist parties, the TSWP also is not interested in the changes the elections may make in the arithmetic of the senate and the assembly. To put it in another way, socialist parties are not concerned about how many deputies or senators they can elect, as other parties are. To the TSWP, the significance of these elections is not the new balances it may create in the parliament. It is more interested in the electoral trends that will be reflected in the number of votes that will be cast for each party. The amount of votes these socialist parties will receive will help them assess their strength. They are also using the elections as a means to spread their labor policies further.

The TSWP is organized in 61 provinces and will participate in each of the 29 where elections will be held. The TSWP chairman, Ahmet Kacmaz, is not a candidate. Prominent names among the TSWP candidates include Gultekin Gazioglu, chairman of TOB-DER [Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Association], independent (Istanbul); Hasan Izzettin Dinemo, writer, independent (Konya); Tektes Agaoglu (Kars); Yildiz Gurcan, chairwoman of the Democratic Women's Union (Edirne); Demir Ozlu, short story writer, novelist (Antalya); Mehmet Yildirim, assistant secretary general of the Tek Gee-Is [Gas, Electricity and Water Workers Union] of the DISK [Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation] (Mugla). The TSWP publishes a daily, GERCEK [Reality].

#### Views on National Issues

Cagatay Anadol, the TSWP's secretary of education and propaganda, explained the party's stand on the four major issues--economy, anarchy, the east and the election boycott--as follows:

"Turkey is part of the global capitalist system. International [and] domestic monopolies are in control of its economy. Turkey will not be rid of capitalism's universal and local crises as long as it remains dependent on imperialism and the capitalist system maintains its sovereignty in the country. Therefore, the TSWP sees the ultimate solution in the establishment of a democratic people's regime in the country. The sovereignty of imperialism and monopolistic capital must be abolished and a far-reaching land and agricultural reform must be implemented in rural areas. These goals will be

realized only when all the forces of the people jointly come to power. In the TSWP's view, the Turkish economy will get on the course of real development when social ownership, congenial with the quasi-social production of our age, is established, production and consumption in the country are regulated by centralized planning, collective behavior becomes dominant in all phases of social life and problems are resolved through scientifically devised formulas. Turkey can enter into such an era only through a people's democratic revolution. However, urgent steps should be taken against the current economic crises. In the TSWP's view, these steps are as follows:

"The primary concern should be to free the economy from the relations of dependence which are the source of the current crisis. To do this, the economic ties to imperialists who sell goods to Turkey at exorbitant prices, but purchase nothing manufactured in Turkey, and grab the country's agricultural products at ridiculously low prices must be changed from the roots up. Economic, technologic, scientific and cultural ties based on mutual interest must be developed with socialist states and the Third World countries. Consumption of luxury goods must be stopped, production and consumption must be regulated within the perspective of the entire population's needs and in a manner that will accelerate economic development and industrialization. Investments must be made to develop a low-cost and profitable mass transportation system both in and between urban centers in order to economize on fuel. The energy policy must be submitted to a rational revision. Production and consumption cooperatives must be carefully reviewed, a wide network of democratic cooperatives must be formed, and the existing network must be reformed and democratized.

"If these measures are implemented, the rise in the cost of living can be partly arrested, the rate of inflation can be cut down and other steps can be taken to improve the living and working conditions of workers. However, the TSWP is convinced that, even if these measures were taken, the ultimate solution will still rest in the formation of a democratic people's government."

#### Anarchy and Terrorism

"The source of the widely discussed anarchic and violent incidents is the NAP. This is substantiated by evidence in police and court records. To explain the terrorist incidents as a 'right-left clash' is to oversimplify the fascist threat and conspiracy against democracy. Granted that there are small and ostensibly leftist adventurist groups, but their effectiveness is negligible and it is a mistake to consider these groups true leftists.

"Fascists began to organize 12 years ago by setting up militaristic training camps. They spread throughout the country particularly during the 12 March and Nationalist Front eras and launched their bloody assaults. The way to stop terrorism is to descend on the NAP and the organizations affiliated with it, and to disband every overt and underground fascist nuclei.

The fascist nationalist movement, taking advantage of the third Ecevit government's weaknesses and failures, has grown bolder in its actions. Its objective is to create confusion and to turn the disappointment in social democracy

into a general hopelessness and pessimism. Fascism is aggravating anarchy in order to create a public 'longing for authority.' Then, it plans to capitalize on this climate to offer itself as a candidate for authority, and to come to power through its little schemes. Anyone devoted to democracy is obliged to frustrate fascism's schemes and to defend democracy."

#### The Eastern Question

"Spain has a Catalonian and a Basque population in addition to Spanish people. There are Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. Turks, Croatians and others, as well as Serbs live in Yugoslavia. The Iranian society is comprised of Farsis, Azerbaijanis and Kurds. Close to 100 different ethnic groups and nations are living in the 15 republics of the Soviet Union. In our case, we have not only Turks, but Kurds, and a smaller number of Arabs, Circassians, Greeks and several others. To ignore this reality, to deny the existence of the Kurds, to consider them Turks, that is, to claim that they are descendants of Turks, are tantamount to racism. Cabinet ministers, RPP, NSP [National Salvation Party] and independent deputies, even the RPP secretary general refer to our citizens in the eastern regions as Kurds.

"Proceeding from this reality, the TSWP proposes the implementation of all the provisions of the International Declaration of Human Rights, the Rome Treaty, Articles 7 and 8 of the Helsinki Document, and the Lausanne Treaty, all of which have been signed by the Turkish Republic, and the granting of basic rights and freedoms equally to everyone living within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. The TSWP submitted a memorandum to the 1977 Belgrade Conference, the continuation of the Helsinki Conference, and to the Demirel government of the time on the protection of human rights in Turkey. The TSWP contends that imperialists, particularly after the loss of Iran, have turned their attention to this problem in Turkey and are in the process of staging multifaceted schemes. The Apoists and other equally adventurist groups are used as an excuse to create a tempest in a teacup and to increase the repression in the east."

#### Election Boycott

"Boycotting elections is a childish behavior. Under today's circumstances, a boycott will serve the interests of sovereign forces which, declaring publicly that 'depoliticization is necessary,' are trying to exclude the masses from the political arena. The TSWP says that the public is not paying any attention to the calls for a boycott, and therefore, there is no need to take these calls seriously."

#### Independent Onger and the Turkish Unity Party

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 8 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] Bakiye Beris Onger is the only candidate who has the overt support of the pro-Moscow TCP. She is running as an independent senatorial candidate in Istanbul. She is the chairwoman of the Progressive Women's Association.

She is 58, a lawyer, wife and mother. She is married to the art critic Fahir Onger. The couple have two daughters and one grandchild. She is a supporter of the Soviet version of socialism. In her election manifesto, Mrs Onger calls for the legalization of the TCP. On page 21 of the manifesto, she says, "The ban on the Turkish Communist Party, the political organization of the Turkish working class, must be lifted." Her call for cooperation during the election campaign was accepted by the TSWP, but the TLP did not think that it was appropriate.

She espouses a "revolutionary struggle" within a democratic order open to socialism, and calls for the creation of a "national democratic front" to carry on the struggle because, she says, "No single party or force can single-handedly accomplish the task of bringing to power a revolutionary government."

She adds:

"Therefore, members of the TLP and the TSWP, patriotic members of the RPP, Kurdish democrats and other revolutionary forces must unite for action without further loss of time. A progressive democratic government that national democratic forces can form by uniting as a front can accomplish the essential economic, social and political transformations, save our country from the crisis, put a decisive end to the fascist threat and open the way to socialism."

On national sovereignty and foreign policy, she says:

"All pacts and agreements with the West must be abrogated. Turkey must quit NATO."

"All foreign troops must be withdrawn from Cyprus."

"We must form sincere relations, based on mutual benefit and equality, in economic, cultural and political fields, with all nations, all of our neighbors, socialist countries and especially the Soviet Union."

"Turkey must sever all ties to the Common Market."

#### Economic Views

Mrs Onger's views in the economic field are the following in their general outline:

"The state's external debts arising from the country's dependence on imperialism and NATO should be cancelled."

"The capital of all foreign monopolies and all imperialist establishments must be nationalized and turned over to the democratic state."

"Insurance establishments, large private partnerships, holdings, corporations, enterprises where the state is a partner, foreign trade and mining must be nationalized."

"Unions, workers committees must monitor the operations of enterprises and partnerships."

"Private enterprises should be encouraged and supported in proportion to their contribution to national development."

"Land in the possession of large landholders, the treasury and pious foundations must be nationalized without monetary compensation to former owners, and then, distributed to peasants with small land or no land at all. The land, along with the title thereof, must be given to peasants free of charge."

#### Anarchy and Terrorism

Mrs Onger identifies the source of the anarchy and terrorism in Turkey as "fascists," and says the following, in summary:

"Fascist attacks and violent incidents are continuing. It is obvious by now that the NAP and its auxiliaries are the perpetrators. To prepare the climate for a fascist coup, they escalated violence to the point of mass killings, as we witnessed at Kahramanmaraş. Terrorist gangs, disguised as leftist organizations, are identified as the culprits in order to hide the true identity of the criminals. These terrorist organizations, which hide behind a leftist mask, are under the direct control of the [U.S.] CIA, and the [Turkish?] secret service, and their terrorist acts are blamed on labor organizations, progressive forces, communists and socialists.

"The fascist party is enjoying all the parliamentary privileges while the ban on the TCP continues and the working class and the proletariat are deprived of parliamentary representation."

#### The Eastern Question

Mrs Onger uses the term "Kurdish democrats" in her election manifesto and offers the following solution to the eastern question:

"All minorities, religious and sectarian groups must have equal rights.

"Fully democratic and equal constitutional rights of nations and national minorities must be respected as prescribed under the Helsinki Document which we signed. Nations and national minorities must have the right to determine their own fate. Every nation must be free to read, write, speak and publish or broadcast in its own language and must be provided with opportunities to develop its culture."

#### Election Boycott

Mrs Onger opposes any boycott of the elections. She believes that "the election boycott campaign" of a number of leftist groups is "wrong."

"For socialists and communists, the parliamentary struggle is not the only form of struggle," she says and continues, "Neither is it absolute. Election campaigns and the parliamentary podium are opportunities for revolutionaries to reveal the facts to the masses, to preach the working class's independent policy and to point at the road to a solution. A revolutionary's duty is to safeguard and exercise even the least important democratic right and freedom in a bourgeois society. A vote that is not cast is ultimately a vote for reactionary, fascist forces."

Mrs Onger, who supports the form of socialism practiced in the Soviet Union and is the only candidate endorsed by the TCP's broadcast organ, distributed a four-color handbill in which she described herself as "a worker, a grandmother, a mother, a democrat, a patriot and a socialist," and asked "mothers, sisters, brothers, friends and fellow travelers" to vote for her.

Onger also has the support of the Progressive Youth Association, in addition to the TCP and her own organization, the Progressive Women's Association. She has been endorsed by the leaders of several labor unions under the DISK. The TSWP and Mrs Onger arrange joint rallies and meetings in coffee-houses.

#### Turkish Unity Party

Compared to the rest of the parties in the coming elections, the TUP should be considered ahead in seniority in terms of election experience. It participated in many of the earlier elections. Its chairman Mustafa Timisi has been in that position for many years.

The TUP's socialism parallels neither the Soviet, Chinese, nor the Albanian (Enver Hoxha) line. According to the party leaders, the TUP adheres to "Ataturk's independence principle."

Even though its "socialist" views place it on the left side of the political spectrum, the TUP is known as a quasi-religious party and is usually referred to as the Alawis' [Turkish Shiites] party. It is hard to say with any certainty how much influence it has among the Alawis, however. Meanwhile, the twelve stars encircling the lions, which appear in the party emblem, remain open to various religious interpretations.

These stars on its emblem have inspired the TUP to express its views in "twelve principles," which are revolutionism, socialism, Ataturkism, democracy, populism, statism, republicanism, independence, freedomism, secularism, equality and patriotism.

"A democratic, permanent, uninterrupted process" is the party's definition of its revolutionism. It proposes "to achieve political power by the strength it will receive from the democratic masses and to revamp the economic and social order on a populist and more progressive plans." As it stated in its election manifesto, the TUP does not agree with what it describes as the "adventurist, sectarian leftist mentality, far removed from the people, and

exists irrespective of people." The TUP calls it "wrong" and "essentially rightist," and says, the party is waging a struggle against it.

Huseyin Yildirim, deputy secretary general of the TUP, outlined the party's general tendencies and summarized its views as follows:

"The TUP plans to come to power through democratic ways. Ours is a progressive, patriotic party which believes in a socialist order. All of us, from the chief of the county organization up to the chairman of the party, have been born and raised in villages. We are against all types and forms of dependence and subordination. We want a country where no one will exploit anybody. We are totally against continuing our association with NATO and the Common Market. We are for the nationalization of banks, insurance establishments, underground and aboveground natural resources and energy resources."

The TUP entered the elections only in the provinces of Agri, Bitlis, Hakkari, Mardin, Rize and Van.

Huseyin Yildirim, deputy secretary general of the TUP, reviewed the party's stand on the leading issues of the preselection era.

"The principle of secularism is ignored for the sake of winning votes," he complained and warned, "We are moving toward a civil war."

"We believe in socialism," Mr Yildirim said. "There are ideas in socialism, there is no place in it for terrorism." The party official also observed that the crisis was the outcome of the country's economic policy of dependence on imperialism.

Huseyin Yildirim supplied the following information in his answers to HURRIYET's questions:

"We believe that the country is in a very serious economic crisis. We also believe the crisis is the result of the misguided policies that the political parties which came to power over the years implemented. Turkey's current economic policy is subordinate to imperialism and dependent on external sources. Production is not emphasized, the emphasis is on the assembly industry. The assembly industry advantages capitalist countries. We must develop our underground and aboveground resources ourselves. The credit we obtain through bilateral negotiations is not used for the good of the people. All the credit we receive is passed on to certain self-seeking individuals."

#### The Eastern Question

"We have had governments which remained in power many many years. These governments followed excessively partisan policies. The distribution of economic rights was not equitable. Our citizens living in eastern and southeastern regions were treated like 'step children.' These people, whether they talk in Kurdish, or use the Laz or Circassian language, still are the citizens

of the Turkish Republic, but they did not receive equal treatment. They were not provided with social and cultural services. They were not given schools. No social services were extended to them, and yet they were still drafted into the military and they were taxed. The Turkish state is a secular state of law, but the affairs of the state and religion were not kept separate. The Department of Religious Affairs employs 220,000 people and these people are paid by the state out of its revenue from taxes paid by the citizens. However, the head of the department and some of the religious officials are known to have made comments which have no place in the Koran. These people have said that true believers are the believers in Islam. For a Moslem, to kill people of different beliefs is not a crime, or a sin. They have said that if you kill a Kizilbas [an Alewi-related sect], you earn God's reward. When you kill two of them, you get one foot into heaven. There are, unfortunately, religious officials who preach such things. All the people in our country are brothers and sisters. They must not kill each other. People all over the world, regardless of their religion, language, race, beliefs or sect, are brothers and sisters who ought not kill each other. Through such religious exploitations, uneducated, ignorant people in an economically disadvantaged status are turned against one another. Our people have been conditioned so severely with such nonsense that they cannot keep pace with life in modern times. That is how our technological development was dwarfed and then stopped altogether. We have become servants and slaves to Europeans. We open our hands to them for everything we need. Certain constitutional provisions on the secularity of the state have been completely ignored for the sake of winning votes. Moreover, religion is a community affair. Do priests receive their salary from the state? Their income is from religious donations. In our country, however, religious officials are paid by the state."

#### Terrorism

"Turkey has a distorted capitalist system dependent on imperialism. It all goes down to economy. Certain self-seeking individuals are turned against each other. There are political parties which encourage terrorism. People who support one or the other regime become adversaries. Those who support the capitalist, or the mixed-economy system, urge action against socialists. Armed clashes erupt and are soon turned into blood feuds. We believe in socialism. There are ideas in socialism, there is no place in it for terrorism. I must, however, speak for true revolutionaries. When faced with terrorist acts, they go into action for self-defense. Whether rightist or leftist, those who die in these terrorist clashes are people from the same class."

"There are efforts to spread racism. We are moving toward a civil war. I want to stress these points. Escalation of terrorism and anarchy is not in the interest of our people, it only gives comfort to our enemies."

#### Election Boycott

"We think boycotting the elections is unnatural. A boycott will accomplish nothing. We are 40 million people with no political consciousness. Our

citizens support political parties as if they were football teams. There are forces blocking the formation of a progressive, socialist system. The few people who enjoy the facilities and opportunities supplied by the state are able to persuade and mislead a large majority of the population. There are also several self-styled leftist groups which we do not approve of. From the revolutionary point of view, we find these things objectionable."

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## COLUMNIST NOTES FACTIONALISM WITHIN SECURITY FORCES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Oct 79 p 9

[Text] Husnu the auto repairman's apprentice Ali opened the glove compartment of the car they were working on and almost gasped in surprise. There was a big, shiny pistol inside. With all the curiosity of his 14 years, Ali picked up the pistol; at that moment, he heard his boss's voice explode "What are you doing, boy?"

The car was one of the Squad Authority cars from the Security Directorate's First Division. Husnu, with the experience and composure imparted by his age, immediately summoned his men and showed these witnesses that a gun had emerged from the glove compartment. He himself phoned the Security Directorate and said that "A gun has been found in the glove compartment of an automobile belonging to Security which was left for repair." The pistol was handed over and a deposition given to two police who arrived shortly thereafter.

The pistol was not one of the police general-issue pistols, and its number was not included in the Security Directorate's registry. The matter was turned over to the Ministry of Justice. The State Prosecutor's Office was going to send the pistol for ballistics tests in order to determine whether it had previously been involved in any incidents, when a person in high office telephoned the Prosecutor's Office and requested that they "not stir up this matter." The pistol was returned to the Directorate of Security and the affair was forgotten. That is, it appeared to have been forgotten, for nothing could really be forgotten within the Security Directorate, which is divided into three factions. Immediately, the following rumors spread:

- 1) "The gun had been used in a crime, and the ballistics test had been prevented for that reason."
- 2) "The gun, which had been used in a crime, would be presented as if it had been found in the house of some innocent person, and that innocent person would be handed over to the court as a murderer. This had been done in the past and was still being done."
- 3) "The pistol had belonged to a criminal being brought in the car to the Security Directorate; the police, in order not to hand over the criminal to Security with the weapon in his possession, had hidden his gun in the glove compartment."

This is just one of the incidents illustrating the situation of the security forces on the eve of the elections.

A small POL-DER [Police Association] group, a small POL-BIR [Police Union] group, and the real police, who see the impasse within the security organization and are grieved because of it...

These are the three groups which currently make up the security forces subject to Minister of Internal Affairs Hasan Fehmi Gunes.

#### An Internal Affairs Minister

The Constitution has a requirement: At the beginning of an election period, the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Communications are to be replaced; non-partisan ministers — that is, ministers not affiliated with any party — are to be put in their places.

But since the election to be held on 14 October will cover only 29 of the 67 provinces, Minister of Internal Affairs Hasan Fehmi Gunes has remained in office.

Really, Internal Affairs Minister Hasan Fehmi Gunes is a charming man. Think back to that panel discussion on television. Everyone was impressed with Gunes, everyone said "How impartial, how moderate, how tolerant!"

Hasan Fehmi Gunes's charm really comes from this. To public opinion, he seems sympathetic and impartial, yet he does whatever he likes within the ministry. For example: he can ensure that the division director who held a press conference in Istanbul and criticized his superior, and was thus criticized himself within the security apparatus for "lack of discipline", be sent to Sakarya — that is, the Minister's own election district — as Security Director.

It was well known that incidents of violence would increase during the election period. In fact, in order to realize this truth, there was no need for the long arm of an intelligence organization; it was sufficient merely to glance at a newspaper. The newspapers were pointing out the targets, and in fact were being pointed out as targets themselves.

What was the situation in the capital on Monday? For better or worse, a period of calm was experienced in Ankara. But when the Adana Security Director's body was brought to the capital, Ankara once again became a city of violent incidents.

#### Once There Was a Plan

During the election period, Hasan Fehmi Gunes relies on the gendarmes rather than on the police. This means that he doesn't trust the police. How is he to trust them, when the police are after all divided, due to the various organizations: those who raise their left fists, those who raise their right fists, and those who watch the fist-raisers in perplexion and sadness...

The POL-DEM affiliates and POL-BIR affiliates have set themselves up as mutual enemies. The members of one group set free people arrested by the other. While on duty together, they come close to drawing their weapons on each other (which doesn't happen very much, as members of the opposing groups almost never report for duty with their opponents).

Well, what happened to the plan prepared earlier by the government, when Irfan Ozaydinli was Minister? The one in which changes would be made in the law, and police would not join associations. The one that the opposition said it would support. The one that the Prime Minister presented to both his own group and to public opinion as a major step toward securing public order in Turkey.

The proposal got hung up between the Assembly and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it was never possible for it to be brought up in the Legislative General Assembly. It is well known around the Parliament that certain RPP Parliamentarians called the plan a "fascist plan" and said that "If this comes up, count us out."

#### Thick File

There is said to exist a thick file; in this file, prepared by another security organization, information is allegedly provided concerning the state of the security forces.

Actually, it is just a handful of people who have brought the security forces to such a state, but a handful of people in "key positions" can dominate a situation.

Here are a few of the incidents in the file, pertaining to various areas of Turkey:

"A security chief is attacked by a leftist group during an armed incident. The attackers are captured and given over to the court. Representatives of the leftist group enter into contact with the security chief. In the courtroom, the attackers are released when the security chief says 'These are not the ones who attacked me.' In exchange for this, the security chief is given an automobile by the group."

"A telephone call comes from a Minister for the release of those arrested in a raid on the famous Zafer Passageway in the capital, where seditious literature and Kurdish-language books are sold. The department director on duty resists, saying that 'These individuals are in custody upon the instructions of the Martial Law authority. I cannot release them.' But when an official in high office gives a definite order, the suspects are set free in spite of the director's objections."

"A hue-and-cry arose to the effect that the Internationale was sung at the Middle East Technical University. Reports were submitted to the General Directorate of Security concerning the songs sung at the Police Institute diploma ceremony and at the riot police headquarters on May Day, but no one batted an eye."

"While a security administrator and his assistant are taking a ride in an official car with two female police, the car turns over. Traffic squads arriving at the scene of the accident find the two women inside in their underwear. The report is hushed up and the automobile driver is presented as if he had been in the auto, although this was not the case. (As a reward, this policeman is later sent to a high-school course.) However, the Sixth Department of the Directorate of Security objects to the cost of repairs for the vehicle, which amount to 130,000 lira. A nightclub owner then pays for the repairs."

Meanwhile, a dossier in Gunes's possession contains extensive information on the rumors of bribery which are on everyone's tongue. Again, in the same dossier, information is also included to the effect that money collected from the two separate factions has been used to aid members of groups aligned with them within the prison system.

It is thought that all these affairs have been hidden, but nothing stays secret. It is in such an environment that statements become current to the effect that "An interim government is a bad government."

Our topic tomorrow will be an "interim government"...

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## EVENTS SURROUNDING SECURITY DIRECTOR'S DEATH QUESTIONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Oct 79 pp 1,11

[Column by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] What cases had Adana Security Director Cevat Yurdakul been working on before he was killed?..

According to information we have received, Cevat Yurdakul, in his last days, had been giving special priority to an investigation involving a reserve lieutenant by the name of Osman Discen. Just what was this investigation about?..

This investigation involved the connections within the Adana area of Infantry Second Lieutenant Osman Discen, who got leave from the unit where he was serving in Diyarbakir and, going to Adana, was arrested there with a .45 caliber Colt pistol...

Arrested with the .45 caliber Colt pistol in his possession, Infantry Second Lieutenant Osman Discen claimed that he was keeping the pistol for a captain who was serving in the Armed Forces... It emerged from ballistic studies that the pistol had been fired sometime prior to the lieutenant's arrest with the pistol in his possession...

In just what incident had this pistol been used?..

It is also alleged that Infantry Second Lieutenant Osman Discen had had close ties with Attorney Adem Eroglu, the NAP's Adana Central District Chairman, who was taken into custody following the killing of Cevat Yurdakul...

Arrested with a .45 caliber pistol in his possession, Infantry Second Lieutenant Osman Discen was turned over to the Martial Law Command following questioning at the police station nearest to the place where he had been captured... Again, according to reports we have received, Lieutenant Osman Discen was released by the Martial Law Command...

Now, in public, I ask: Did such a chain of events really take place?.. If it did, in what stage is this investigation?.. Who is this Second Lieutenant Osman Discen?.. Who is he tied in with?.. Who is the owner of the .45 caliber pistol found on him?.. And in just what incident was this pistol used?..

If nothing of the sort took place, and there is nothing to it, then I will be satisfied with an explanation to that effect and beg apology of my readers... If there is something to it, then I will continue to ask these questions... Now, Honorable Chief of the General Staff, Adana Martial Law Commander, and Minister of Internal Affairs, I repeat my question:

Just what is this business?..

In this column of mine, I have stressed one matter to the point of boring my readers: in 1970, Dr. Necdet Guclu was killed by pistol shots fired by Ibrahim Dogan, at that time General Chairman of the Idealist Lodges, and Ali Cungor, who later became General Chairman of the NAP Youth Auxiliaries... Following a trial, it was determined that the weapons used in the crime had been registered to Lieutenants (at that time) Fehmi Altinbilek and Mustafa Ilerisoy. Wearing bloody weapons of murder at their waists, these two Lieutenants rose to the rank of Captain. They are still serving in the Army today...

Until such connections as these are unearthed, there is no possibility of getting at the source of terrorism...

On 25 January 1978, a bomb was thrown among students of the Ankara State School of Architecture and Engineering... An investigation carried out proved that this bomb was an American-made bomb, "rocket-bomb M2 hatbil-1131 2-53" [as published], used in the Armed Forces... Where is the dossier on this case, registered as number 978/3925 in the Attorney General's Office?.. What has happened in this case?..

These are all very problematic clues. To combine these clues with similar bits of evidence from incidents all around the country would uncover very interesting connections...

I am asking who is conducting the investigation and at what stage the investigation is currently in the case of Second Lieutenant Osman Discen, who, sometime before the death of Adana Security Director Cevat Yurdakul, was arrested with a .45 caliber pistol in his possession and then set free by Martial Law Authorities.

Adana's streets are no longer covered with stone, but with blood: blood!.. And in this sea of blood, we are looking for clues...

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## IRANIAN EMISSARY CONTRACTS FOR FOODSTUFFS

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 7 Oct 79 pp 1,4

[Article by Saffet Sakarya]

[Text] Ankara: Iran's Assistant Trade Minister Mohammad Sourি, saying in a special interview with GUNAYDIN that he has come to Turkey upon the orders of Khomeyni, stated that "We are going to cut our relations with the European nations and the nations behind the Iron Curtain. We intend to develop our trade relations with Muslim nations and with Turkey in particular.

"This is a decision of Khomeyni and of the new regime in Iran."

Saying that he has come to Turkey not to sell goods but to buy them, Mohammad Sourи continued as follows:

"Whenever possible, we will obtain all our needs from Muslim countries. Closing our trade doors to the West and to the Iron Curtain nations, we will open them to Eastern nations."

Following his contacts in Ankara, Mohammad Sourи concluded an agreement with various concerns for a total of 7.5 million dollars. In addition, Iran will, on the condition that the agreement be valid over a five-year period, buy 1 million tons of wheat, 400 [as published] tons of rice, 450,000 tons of barley, 50 to 60,000 tons of beans, and over 3 million dollars of other foodstuffs annually from Turkey. Mohammad Sourи added that, in accordance with the agreement arrived at, the Iranians might also buy 30 to 40,000 tons of meat and livestock.

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COUNTRY SECTION

TURKEY

BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS ESTABLISHED WITH LIBYA, KUWAIT

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 11 Oct 79 p 3

Text Ankara: A decision has been made to establish four joint companies in order to strengthen the economic relations among Turkey, Libya, and Kuwait. The decision was made in a meeting of Turkish, Libyan, and Kuwaiti delegations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the meeting of representatives of the three nations, a decision on principle was first made in order that the desire to further develop economic and commercial relations among Turkey, Libya, and Kuwait not remain "in word" only; later, four separate corporations being formed, agreement was reached for all such development to be channelled through these companies.

The corporations to be established will make joint investments in all three countries and will ensure that positive steps are taken by developing trade and economic relations.

According to the decision made, the following corporations will be formed:

- 1) A construction company,
- 2) A corporation oriented toward agriculture,
- 3) A corporation to organize industrial investments, and
- 4) A corporation oriented toward economic and commercial goals.

While these corporations will increase trade and investment among all three nations, they will also supply Libya's and Kuwait's needs for such items as foodstuffs, clothing, and household goods.

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## KOC HOLDING TO FORM OIL EXPLORATION, EXTRACTION FIRM

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 Oct 79 p 3

Text Koc Holding Company has announced that, in order to carry out efforts at petroleum exploration and extraction in our nation, a company of over 500 million lira will be set up, and petrol will be sought in 12 separate areas.

According to a report in BIZDEN HABERLER, the press organ of the Koc group, geological, geophysical, and seismic studies will be initiated soon.

It was stated that the company to be established may form a partnership with other concerns, and that it may make use of the savings of the public as well. Furthermore, it is also anticipated that the company will operate jointly with a foreign firm capable of providing modern petroleum technology.

#### Studies Made

Stating that the prospects for strengthening our nation's economy are in large measure dependent upon finding a solution to the petroleum problem, Koc Holding administrators said that, in order for the petroleum crisis to be resolved, it is necessary that organizations involved in economic activities in our nation seek solutions by evaluating prospective areas of effectiveness both at home and abroad, then assuming the requisite responsibility.

The following points were revealed with regard to the studies made by Koc Holding Company:

- There exist areas of petroleum within Turkey which would be amenable to economic production and in which exploration studies have not yet been carried out.
- The law on petroleum currently in effect allows both domestic and foreign concerns to carry out exploration within our nation.
- Because the OPEC price will be paid at the well-head for the crude oil extracted once petroleum is found, the exploration effort will be quite profitable from the standpoint of capital invested.

-- Our nation's existing infra-structure, road network, and pipeline system will substantially facilitate the exploration efforts and transport of petroleum.

-- If a dependable and enterprising capital group were formed in Turkey, it would be possible to ensure that an American oil company would come to our nation, bringing its capital and technology as well.

-- Small savers, even though it is a risky area for investment, would buy shares in such an enterprise led by a dependable group, and would thus constitute a significant resource.

-- If our government were convinced that the enterprise is a serious undertaking, the support of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the TPAO [Turkish Petroleum Corporation] could be obtained.

#### Petroleum Exploration Corporation

According to the report in the publication BIZDEN HABERLER, Koc Holding Company, aware of the need for foreign technical cooperation in order to search for petroleum, wants the cooperation of an American company whose capability in the petroleum field is known throughout the world.

It was also reported that the "Petroleum Exploration Corporation" would complete the necessary financing in conjunction with another national concern which would accept Koc Holding's proposal of partnership, as well as with the participation of the public.

#### Application for Allotment of Area

Making application to the Petroleum Section of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Koc Holding has completed formalities for the leasing of 12 areas where its petroleum exploration activities will be conducted. As it is thought that the establishment of the new corporation will take considerable time, the Tarko Mining Corporation, one of the Koc group's enterprises, has been given responsibility in the matter of the leasing of the allotments. In the future, Tarko will turn over all its authority and obligations to the new corporation.

It is anticipated that geological, geophysical, and seismic studies, which make up a major part of petroleum exploration activities, will be initiated in the very near future.

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## STATISTICS INDICATE JUMP IN UNEMPLOYMENT

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 9 Oct 79 p 5

Text It has been determined that the number of unemployed has dangerously increased, and that 15 out of every 100 employable persons are now without work. According to calculations made in the light of the available information, the number of unemployed, increasing by another 270,000 people this year, has reached 2.5 million.

Since 1962, the number of unemployed in our country has steadily increased. In 1962, of 13,133,000 employable people in the country, 1.4 million were unemployed. By 1978, the number of people able to work had increased to 16,411,000, while the number of unemployed was 2,224,000. It is calculated that, in 1979, the number of employables reached 16,700,000, while 15 percent of these, or 2,500,000 people, were out of work.

## Given Up Hope of Finding Work

In our nation, where the unemployment rate has reached a level as high as 15 percent, a level high enough to present a ready danger of social unrest, it is calculated that 1,240,000 of the unemployed have finally given up hope of finding jobs. According to information included in a report entitled "The Turkish Economy 1979", published by TUSIAD Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, the number of unemployed who had given up all hope of finding work in 1978 was 1,216,000.

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November 16, 1979

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